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The
Breakdown?:
Communication
Future of Global Connectivity After
the Privatization of INTELSAT
Kenneth Katkin*
ABSTRACT

In 1971, eighty-five nations (including the United States)
formed the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT), a public intergovernmental treaty
organization. INTELSAT was charged with operating the
world's first global telecommunications satellite system, to
guarantee the interconnectednessof the world's communications
of
international
the
availability
and
systems
earth.
By the late
on
nation
to
every
telecommunications service
1980s, however, INTELSAT's operations began to experience
substantial competition from the private sector. In 2000, the
proliferation of privately-owned telecommunications satellites
and transoceanic fiber-optic cables led the U.S. Congress to
mandate the privatization of INTELSAT. That privatization
process began in 2001, and was substantially completed on
April 8, 2005, when the Federal Communications Commission
approved the $5 billion sale of INTELSAT's former satellite
system to private investors.
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The privatizationof INTELSAT has been said to threaten
universal global connectivity, the continuation of international
telecommunications service to developing countries, or both. Are
the legal safeguards instituted during the privatization(which
include the maintenance of a residual treaty organization)
sufficient to dispel such economic and political threats?
Economically, the privatized satellite system is now legally
obligated to serve developing countries at rates no higher than
those charged prior to privatization. It likely will remain
capable of honoring this legal commitment. Even if its business
operations fail, however, this commitment would survive
bankruptcy. Politically, the privatized satellite system has been
rendered subject to U.S. law, including U.S. internationaltrade
policies. Current U.S. law, however, strongly protects the
satellite system's ability to serve every country on earth.
Congress, of course, retains power to amend U.S. law. But
certainpolitical safeguards, including U.S. participationin the
World Trade Organization, would interpose significant
obstacles to any Congressional attempt to implement
telecommunications sanctions as a means of advancing U.S.
foreign policy. Accordingly, the privatization of INTELSAT is
unlikely to undermine the universal global connectivity of the
world's communications systems.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On January 28, 2005, a consortium of private investors paid $5
billion to purchase a global fleet of thirty commercial communications
satellites used to transmit a variety of types of mass communicationtelevision, radio, internet, and domestic and international telephone
calls-to virtually every country or territory on earth. Despite its large
price tag, the sale of these satellites passed largely unnoticed by the
U.S. media. The transaction, however, marked the final major step in a
remarkable
four-year
process
in
which
the
International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), a multilateral
intergovernmental treaty organization, was privatized.
The INTELSAT treaty organization was formed in several stages
in the 1960s. Before anyone knew whether the task was possible,
INTELSAT was charged with creating and operating a global fleet of
international communications satellites that would guarantee the
universal connectivity of the world's telecommunications networks. In
this effort, INTELSAT succeeded. By the mid-1990s, the INTELSAT
treaty organization consisted of 148 member nations and operated a
global fleet of twenty-five geostationary satellites that served virtually
every populated location on earth.
INTELSAT's success, however, also planted the seeds of the
organization's eventual demise. In the 1980s, separate international
satellite systems inspired by INTELSAT's success began competing
against INTELSAT. By 2000, more than 200 operational
geostationary commercial communications satellites orbited the
earth, of which only nineteen belonged to INTELSAT. As competition
intensified,
some commentators
questioned
why a public
intergovernmental treaty organization was still needed to provide
telecommunications services that by then were substantially provided
by the private sector. Acting on such concerns, Congress enacted the
ORBIT Act of 2000, which mandated the privatization of INTELSAT.
The privatization process began in July 2001, and essentially ended
with the sale of INTELSAT's satellites on January 28, 2005.
Although widely welcomed in the United States, the
privatization of INTELSAT caused alarm in many developing
nations. Particularly in "lifeline nations" not served by any other
international telecommunications carrier, some voiced fears that the
privatization of INTELSAT could threaten the interconnectedness of
the world's communications systems by rendering the future of global
connectivity subject to both market forces and U.S. international trade
policies.
To address such concerns, in executing its privatization,
INTELSAT left in place a
small residual International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (ITSO). ITSO's primary
charge is to ensure that the new owners of INTELSAT's former
satellite system preserve global connectivity and continue to serve
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those poor or underserved countries that remain highly dependent on
INTELSAT for international telecommunications service. ITSO,
however, has no role in operating the privatized satellite system, nor
any satellites of its own. Thus, for the first time since 1971, the sole
public international organization charged with ensuring that every
country on earth receives international telecommunications service
lacks the technological facilities to provide the service itself. Instead,
ITSO must rely entirely on political and legal tools to accomplish its
mandate.
To date, INTELSAT's private successor has continued to serve
every country and territory on earth. Indeed, under the supervision of
ITSO, the private successor has executed lifeline connectivity
obligation (LCO) contracts that guarantee the maintenance or
expansion of existing service to lifeline nations. At present, no
country is threatened with removal from the global network of
communications systems.
Concerns have been raised, however, that the global connectivity
world's communications systems has been rendered less secure
the
of
by the privatization of INTELSAT. Some of these concerns are
economic in nature: Will the private successor honor its commitments
to serve lifeline countries at reduced rates? Will honoring such
commitments threaten the successor's financial viability? What will
happen if the successor goes bankrupt? Other concerns are political in
nature, and principally revolve around fears that the U.S.
government might use its legal authority over the private successor to
force the removal of certain "rogue states" from the world's
communications grid.
In Part II, this Article briefly reviews the formation of the
INTELSAT treaty organization in the 1960s, and explains its structure
and the nature of its operations from the 1970s through the 1990s. Part
III surveys the pressures leading to privatization that arose both from
outside and within INTELSAT in the 1990s. Part TV provides a detailed
narrative documentary history of the privatization of INTELSAT, from
the enactment of the ORBIT Act in 2000 through the sale of
INTELSAT's satellites in January 2005. Part IV also documents the
formation of the residual treaty organization ITSO in 2001 and the
activities ITSO has engaged in since its formation. In Part V, this
Article catalogues and evaluates certain specific claims that have been
raised concerning the threat to global connectivity posed by
INTELSAT's privatization. In particular, Part V.A evaluates whether
the financial and economic framework left in place following the
privatization of INTELSAT provides a sufficient and viable means of
providing international communications service to underserved and
developing nations. Part V.B then evaluates whether the legal and
political framework under which INTELSAT's former satellites are now
governed unduly empowers the U.S. government to interfere with global
connectivity, creating an intolerable risk that the U.S. government will
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do so to advance a political agenda. The Article concludes that while
privatization does pose certain theoretical risks to global connectivity,
the risks are sufficiently remote and improbable that, in practice, global
connectivity remains highly secure.

II. INTELSAT'S FORMATION AND STRUCTURE

On May 14, 1959, a radio signal transmitted from Jodrell Bank,
England, was bounced off the moon and received at the U.S. Air Force
Cambridge Research Center in Bedford, Massachusetts.1 This
transmission proved that radio signals could be bounced off passive
objects in space (either natural or artificial) and relayed to distant
points on the earth. 2 Recognizing the practical implications of this
demonstration, the U.N. General Assembly resolved in 1961 that
''communication by means of satellites should be available to the
nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and nondiscriminatory basis. '3 In 1962, AT&T's experimental TELSTAR
satellite performed the world's first intercontinental broadcast
transmission of a television signal.4 Very shortly thereafter, the U.S.
Congress enacted the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 (Satellite
Act). 5

1.
Stephen E. Doyle, Communications Satellites: International Organization
for Development and Control, 55 CAL. L. REV. 431, 432 n.3 (1967) (citing EUGENE
M. EMME, AERONAUTICS AND ASTRONAUTICS 1915-1960, at 55 (1961)).
2.
Id. The concept of an artificial geostationary communications satellite had
first been proposed in 1945 by engineer-turned-science-fiction-writer Arthur C. Clarke.
See Arthur C. Clarke, Letter to the Editor, Peacetime Uses for V2. V2 for Ionosphere
Research?, WIRELESS WORLD, Feb. 1945, at 58.
An 'artificial satellite' at the correct distance from the earth would . . . remain
stationary above the same spot and would be within optical range of nearly half
the earth's surface. Three repeater stations, 120 degrees apart in the correct
orbit, could give television and microwave coverage to the entire planet."
See also Arthur C. Clarke, Extra-TerrestrialRelays: Can Rocket Stations Give WorldWide Radio Coverage?, WIRELESS WORLD, Oct. 1945, at 305-08 (expanding upon the
proposal discussed above).
3.
G.A. Res. 1721(XVI), U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., 1085th plen. Mtg., Supp. No.
17, pt. D, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (Dec. 20, 1961). Several months before the United Nations
adopted this resolution, President John F. Kennedy had called for the United States to
spearhead an international effort to develop a global satellite communications system
that would serve all the nations of the world on a nondiscriminatory basis. See
Statement of the President on Communications Policy (July 24, 1961), appended to S.
REP. NO. 87-1584, at 25 (1962), reprintedin 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269, 2287.
4.
See Lucent Technologies Bell Labs Innovations, 40 Years of Telstar,
http://www.lucent.com/minds/telstar/fit.html.
5.
Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419
(1962) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-69 (2005)) [hereinafter Satellite Act].
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The Satellite Act declared it
the policy of the United States to establish, in conjunction and in
cooperation with other countries, as expeditiously as practicable a
commercial communications satellite system, as part of an improved
global communications network, which will be responsive to public
needs and national objectives, which will serve the communication
needs of the United States and other countries, and which will
6
contribute to world peace and understanding.

In effectuating this program, the Satellite Act directed that "care and
attention... be directed toward providing [satellite communications]
services to economically less developed countries and areas as well as
those more highly developed .... -7 It also directed "that all
authorized users have nondiscriminatory access to the system."8
To achieve these ends, the Satellite Act created a new,
stockholder-owned District of Columbia corporation, COMSAT, and
directed the corporation to raise private financing and to seek foreign
partners with whom to establish the proposed satellite system.9 In
1965, an ad hoc partnership involving forty-four nations, led by
COMSAT, successfully launched into geostationary orbit the world's
first commercial communications satellite, "Early Bird."10 In 1971,
after several more satellites had been launched by ad hoc
international partnerships led by COMSAT, 11 eighty-five nations
entered into an international agreement that established the
Organization. 12
Satellite
Telecommunications
International

For a legislative history of the Satellite Act, see generally Note, The Communications
Satellite Act of 1962, 76 HARv. L. REV. 388 (1962).
6.
Satellite Act § 102(a), 47 U.S.C. § 701(a).
7.
Satellite Act § 102(b), 47 U.S.C. § 701(b).
8.
Satellite Act § 102(c), 47 U.S.C. § 701(c).
See id. ("United States participation in the global system shall be in the
9.
form of a private corporation."); see also 47 U.S.C. §§ 731-35 (setting forth structure
and mission of the new private corporation). The new corporation that was formed
pursuant to the Satellite Act was named "Communications Satellite Corporation," or
"COMSAT." See Articles of Incorporation of Communications Satellite Corporation,
2 I.L.M. 395 (1963) (setting forth COMSAT's articles of incorporation).
10.
See Communications Satellite Corporation,5 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 369, 371
(1965).
63-65 (1980) (describing interim
11.
See COMSAT Study, 77 F.C.C.2d 564,
arrangements); Stephen E. Doyle, Communications Satellites: International
Organization for Development and Control, 55 CAL. L. REV. 431, 434-42 (1967)
(describing interim arrangements).
12.
See Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization [INTELSAT], Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, 1220 U.N.T.S. 22
[hereinafter INTELSAT Agreement] (establishing a permanent intergovernmental
treaty organization); see also 23 U.S.T. 4066-83 (listing the 85 nations that founded
INTELSAT). By 2000, just before INTELSAT was privatized, the number of member
nations that had become Signatories to the INTELSAT Agreement had risen to 144.
See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES

1330

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.1323

INTELSAT was established as a permanent intergovernmental treaty
organization in order "to continue and carry forward on a definitive
basis the design, development, construction, establishment,
operation, and maintenance of the space segment of the global
commercial telecommunications satellite system .... ,,13 As its "prime
objective" INTELSAT was charged with providing, on a commercial
basis, the satellite transmission capacity (also called "space segment")
"required for international public telecommunications services of high
quality and reliability to be available on a non-discriminatory basis to
all areas of the world." 14 In addition, to the extent it could do so
without impairing its prime objective, INTELSAT was authorized to
provide
satellite transmission capacity for domestic public
telecommunications services and for specialized international or
domestic telecommunications services, other than for military
15
purposes.
INTELSAT was governed via a complex, four-level structure that
reflected the organization's dual nature as both a public international
treaty organization and a commercial provider of telecommunications
services. 16 At the top of this structure was the Assembly of Parties,
"the principal organ of INTELSAT. ''17 Populated by diplomats
representing each INTELSAT member state, the Assembly of Parties
met biennially to establish general policy and long-term objectives of
INTELSAT, to consider "those aspects of INTELSAT which are
primarily of interest to the Parties as sovereign States," to monitor
INTELSAT's compliance with other multilateral conventions adhered
to by at least two-thirds of the Parties, and to confirm the nomination
of the Director General who exercised executive responsibility over
18
day-to-day operations.
The governing level below the Assembly of Parties was the
Meeting of Signatories. Within INTELSAT, each member state was
required to designate a single telecommunications entity known as a
"Signatory" to make the capital contributions necessary to finance
that state's share of the global satellite system; Signatories were also

AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE AS OF

JANUARY 1, 2000, at 457-58 (2000) (listing INTELSAT member nations).
13.
INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. II(a), 23 U.S.T. at 3816, 1220
U.N.T.S. at 24.
14.
Id. art. III(a).
15.
Id. art. III(b)-(d). All such services, like INTELSAT's "prime" international
public telecommunications services, were to be provided commercially on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id.
16.
See id. art. VI(a).
17.
See id. art. VII(a); see also id. art. I(f) (providing that a "Party" to
INTELSAT means "a State for which the Agreement has entered into force or been
provisionally applied").
18.
See id. arts. I(f), VII.
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intended to perform the commercial and technical operations
necessary to furnish the transmission capacity and communications
services of the satellite system to carriers and users located in their
home state. 19 Most INTELSAT member states designated their
telephone, and telegraph offices (PTTs) to
government-owned post,
20
serve as Signatories.
INTELSAT's third level of governance, the Board of Governors,
was assigned principal responsibility "for the design, development,
construction, establishment, operation and maintenance of the
INTELSAT space segment and ...for carrying out any other
'' 21
Unlike the
activities which are undertaken by INTELSAT.
Assembly of Parties and the Meeting of Signatories, which each
adhered to a one-vote-per-state rule, representation on the
INTELSAT Board of Governors was apportioned based on Signatory
ownership share, which, in turn, was apportioned based each
Signatory's share of utilization of INTELSAT satellite transmission
22
capacity.

See id. art. 1(g) (defining "Signatory"; these telecommunications were called
19.
"Signatories" because they "signed" a separate "INTELSAT Operating Agreement" on
behalf of their member states); see also Operating Agreement Relating to the
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization [INTELSAT] art. II, Aug. 20,
1971, 23 U.S.T. 4091 [hereinafter INTELSAT Operating Agreement] (comprising a
commercial agreement that set forth the commercial rights and obligations of
Signatories within the INTELSAT cooperative).
INTELSAT Operating Agreement, supra note 19, art. II. The United
20.
States, in contrast, designated COMSAT (the new private corporation that had been
created under the 1962 Satellite Act) to serve as "the U.S. Signatory to the Operating
Agreement of INTELSAT." SENATE REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME SATELLITE

TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT, S. REP. No. 95-1036, at 4 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5272, 5275.
INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. X(a). These "other activities"
21.
included virtually all of INTELSAT's business operations, including procurement,
budgeting, allocation of satellite transmission capacity, rate setting, and securing
patent rights. Id. The Board of Governors also was responsible for nominating
individual candidates to serve as "Director General," subject to confirmation by the
Assembly of Parties. Id. art. XI(b)(iii).
See id. art. IX(f) ("[Elach Governor shall have a voting participation equal
22.
to that part of the investment share of the Signatory, or group of Signatories, he
represents, which is derived from the utilization of the INTELSAT space segment").
For example, in 1999, 22 percent of INTELSAT traffic worldwide was carried to or from
the United States. Because the United States' "INTELSAT utilization share" was 22
percent, the investment share of the United States Signatory, COMSAT, was
correspondingly set at approximately 22 percent, meaning that COMSAT was
responsible for making 22 percent of the capital contributions needed to operate the
entire system. In exchange for these capital contributions, COMSAT obtained
ownership of a 22 percent share in the global system, and was entitled to vote this
entire share in the Board of Governors. See INTELSAT Operating Agreement, supra
note 19, art. VI. In the Assembly of Parties and the Meeting of Signatories, in contrast,
the United States and its Signatory each were entitled to cast just one vote. INTELSAT
Agreement, supra note 12, arts. VII(f), VIII(e).
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Finally, a unitary executive Director General served as "the chief
executive and the legal representative of INTELSAT and [was]
directly responsible to the Board of Governors for the performance of
'23
all management functions.
During the thirty years that it existed, from 1971 to 2001, the
INTELSAT treaty organization used its global fleet of international
communications satellites to guarantee the universal global
connectivity of the world's telecommunications networks. By the late
1990s, INTELSAT's satellites served not only the organization's nearly
148 member nations, but, indeed, virtually every populated land mass
24
on earth.

III.

CALLS FOR

INTELSAT's

DISSOLUTION

From its inception, the INTELSAT satellite system was highly
successful. Over time, however, the continuing need for INTELSAT to
maintain its complex structure of governance and its quasigovernmental status was periodically questioned. By the 1990s, calls
for the privatization of INTELSAT were regularly heard. This Part
reviews the causes of INTELSAT's privatization. Subpart III.A
discusses some concerns raised by INTELSAT's competitors and
potential competitors. Subpart III.B then sets forth some reasons why
INTELSAT eventually came to favor its own privatization.
A. Calls From Without
When the Satellite Act was enacted in 1962, many members of
Congress and administration officials envisioned the proposed
international satellite system as a "natural monopoly. '25 Nonetheless,
rather than ruling out future competition, the Satellite Act expressly

23.
INTELSAT Agreement. supra note 12, art. XI(b)(i).
24.
See INTELSAT ANNUAL REPORT at i, 2-3 (2000). From its inception until its
privatization in 2001, INTELSAT provided telephone, broadcast, internet, and
specialized communications services to 214 countries and territories. See id.
25.
See, e.g., S. REP. No. 87-1584, at 28 (1962), as reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2269, 2289 (statement of President Kennedy) (characterizing COMSAT
as "by nature a Government-created monopoly ....
"); id. at 51, reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2309 (minority views) (opposing proposal to "create a private
corporation that would own and operate the U.S. portion of a worldwide satellite
communications system" on ground that "[tihis corporation would be a Governmentcreated monopoly."); see also 108 CONG. REC. H7505 (daily ed. May 2, 1962) (statement
of Rep. Cellar noting that in the Satellite Act, "we are creating here a private
monopoly."); id. at H7515 (statement of Rep. Kowalski: "Let us make no mistake about
the bill before us-it proposes to place in private hands a Government-created
monopoly ... ").
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provided for the 26eventual "creation of additional communications
satellite systems."
The 1971 accession of the United States to the INTELSAT
Agreement, however, may have effectively delayed the deployment of
separate international communications satellite facilities capable of
serving the United States. Article XIV(d) of the Agreement
upon
Parties,
of
Assembly
INTELSAT
the
authorized
recommendation of the Board of Governors, to veto the development
within any member state of any separate international satellite systems
projected to cause "significant economic harm" to the INTELSAT
system. 27 In practice, INTELSAT probably lacked any means to
enforce such a veto against an intransigent member state. 28 Perhaps
for this reason, as international telecommunications traffic expanded
rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, INTELSAT did consent to the
development of several competing "separate systems" that provided
competitive regional international service in different parts of the
world.29

Satellite Act § 102(d), 47 U.S.C. § 701(d).
26.
See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. XIV(d), 23 U.S.T. at 3854
27.
(No INTELSAT member state may "establish, acquire or utilize space segment
facilities separate from the INTELSAT space segment facilities to meet its
international public telecommunications services requirements" unless INTELSAT
first determines that such proposed facilities would be technically compatible with
INTELSAT and would not cause "significant economic harm to the global system of
INTELSAT.") (emphasis added). The "economic harm" provision was justified as a
means of protecting INTELSAT against "cream-skimming" in order to safeguard
INTELSAT's ability to serve every country on earth, regardless of cost, on nondiscriminatory terms and conditions. See CHARLES H. KENNEDY & M. VERONICA PASTOR,
AN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 79-80 (1996). For a
discussion of the substantive criteria formerly used by INTELSAT to determine
whether a proposed separate satellite system would cause "significant economic harm,"
see Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, 101
139-43, 159-69 (1985) [hereinafter Separate Systems Order],
F.C.C.2d 1046,
modified on recon., 61 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 649 (1986), further recon. denied, 1 F.C.C.R.
439 (1986).
See Albert N. Delzeit & Robert F. Beal, The Vulnerability of the Pacific Rim
28.
Orbital Spectrum Under International Space Law, 9 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 69, 80-81
(Winter 1996) (lamenting INTELSAT's inability to enforce its determinations of
"economic harm," and concluding that, "[i]n light of the lack of INTELSAT's power over
its own member states . . . INTELSAT is a 'paper tiger'...." (citing Francis Lyall, The
International Telecommunications Union and Development, 22 J. SPACE L. 23, 106-09
(1994))).
See KENNEDY & PASTOR, supra note 27, at 80 ('The first separate system to
29.
receive approval was [Western Europe's] EUTELSAT in 1979, which was soon followed
by [Southeast Asia's] PALAPA and [the Middle East's] ARABSAT."); see also Richard
R. Colino, A Chronicle of Policy and Procedure: The Formulation of the Reagan
Administration Policy on InternationalSatellite Telecommunications, 13 J. SPACE L.
103, 105-06 n.10 (1985) (listing all separate satellite systems approved by INTELSAT
under the article XIV(d) coordination process from 1973 to 1983).
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On November 28, 1984, President Reagan "determine[d] that
separate international communications satellite systems [were]
required in the national interest. '30 Accordingly, he jointly directed
both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce "to inform
the Federal Communications Commission of criteria necessary to
ensure the United States meets its international obligations [under
the INTELSAT Agreement] and to further its telecommunications
and foreign policy interests" by establishing separate satellite
systems to compete against the INTELSAT system. 31 On January 31,
1985, INTELSAT responded to President Reagan's determination by
adopting a resolution urging its members not to participate in
establishing any separate international satellite systems linking the
United States and Europe.3 2 Nonetheless, shortly thereafter, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) authorized the
development of the first separate international satellite system to
serve U.S.-international routes.3 3 ' In 1988, the Connecticut-based
Pan American Satellite Corporation (PanAmSat) launched the PAS-1
Atlantic Ocean Region satellite, the first U.S. private-sector satellite
to provide international satellite services.3 4 By 1999, more than 200
commercial geosynchronous satellites were in orbit above the earth,

30.
Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,987 (Nov. 28, 1984). For
discussions of the deliberations that led to this Presidential determination, see Colino,
supra note 29; Richard R. Colino, The Possible Introduction of Separate Satellite
Systems: International Satellite Communications at the Crossroad, 24 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 13 (1985); Bert W. Rein & Carl R. Frank, The Legal Commitment of the
United States to the INTELSAT System, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 219, 225-27
(1989).
31.
Presidential Determination No. 85-2, 49 Fed. Reg. 46,987. The following year,
Congress endorsed and codified President Reagan's "separate systems" policy. See Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-93, § 146, 99
Stat. 425 (1985) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 701 note (2000)) (declaring U.S. policy to utilize
both INTELSAT system and also any separate international satellite telecommunications
systems satisfying conditions established pursuant to Presidential Determination No. 852).
32.
See Michael R. Gardner, December 19, 1984: A Big Day in
Telecommunications, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 625, 633 n.23 (1985). The resolution, which
was supported by every one of INTELSAT's 109 member nations except for the United
States, asserted that the prosperity and political harmony of the INTELSAT satellite
system would be jeopardized if separate systems were licensed by the FCC. Id. Despite
this unequivocal assertion, however, INTELSAT did not invoke the procedures set
forth in Article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement to veto the development of
separate international satellite systems linking the United States and Europe. Id.
33.
Separate Systems Order, supra note 27, 101 F.C.C.2d 1046,
139-43,
159-69.
34.
See PanAmSat Company Timeline, http://www.panamsat.com/company/
timeline.asp.
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of which approximately seventy-three served the United States. 3 5 Of
these, only seventeen satellites belonged to INTELSAT, only thirteen
36
of which served the United States.
At the same time, INTELSAT also began to face substantial
for international
market
in
the
competition
intermodal
communications transmission capacity. In 1988, AT&T Corporation
completed the world's first transoceanic fiber-optic cable.37 The first
trans-Pacific fiber-optic cable entered service in 1991.38 During the
1990s, the entire world witnessed a proliferation of high-capacity
transoceanic submarine fiber optic cables that are capable of
delivering many of the same services that satellites can deliver, often
at lower cost. 39 In fact, since the early 1990s, fiber-optic cable systems
have carried more traffic for U.S.-international switched voice and
40
private line than satellite systems have.
During the 1990s, the international telecommunications market
began to experience vigorous competition for the first time.
Unsurprisingly, the special legal status of INTELSAT and its
41
Signatories irritated many of INTELSAT's new private competitors.

35.
See PHILLIPS SATELLITE INDUSTRY DIRECTORY 17-234, 279-413 (21st ed.
1999) (setting forth complete information about each of these satellites and their
operators).
36.
See In re Availability of INTELSAT Space Segment Capacity To Users and
2, 5
Service Providers Seeking To Access INTELSAT Directly, 15 F.C.C.R. 19,160,
(2000).
Neil King Jr., Deep Secrets: As Technology Evolves, Spy Agency Struggles
37.
To Preserve Its Hearing,WALL ST. J., May 23, 2001, at Al.
Id.
38.
39.
In 1997, for example, the 17,000-mile-long "Flag Telecom" cable connected
Europe with North Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Japan. See In re
COMSAT Corp. Reclassification as a Non-Dominant Carrier, 13 F.C.C.R. 14083, T 11,
19, 32-39 (1998) [hereinafter COMSAT Non-Dominant Order], modified on recon., 14
F.C.C.R. 3065 (1999) (characterizing satellites and submarine cables as fungible
commodities serving the markets for switched voice, private line, and video services,
and noting that cables compete effectively against INTELSAT satellites on every major
international telecommunications route to or from the United States). By the end of the
1990s, transoceanic submarine fiber-optic cables had proliferated so greatly that the
TAT-9, TAT-10, TAT-11, and PTAT cables, which were laid in the early 1990s,
collectively represented only 0.01% of trans-Atlantic capacity. Michelle Donegan,
CarriersRetire Cables, COMM. WK.INT'L, Oct. 7, 2002, at 4, available at 2002 WLNR
10584785.
56 ("Excluding
40.
See COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 14083,
traffic carried to Mexico and Canada over terrestrial networks, markets COMSAT does
not serve, fiber-optic cable systems carried three times as much switched voice traffic
and six times as much private line traffic than satellite networks in 1996."); see also id.
76 ("Intermodal competition leads us to believe that fiber-optic cables represent a
substitute for satellites in the transmission of switched voice service.").
41.
See Francis Lyall, On the Privatisationof INTELSAT, 28 J. SPACE L. 101,
106 (2000) (noting that during the privatization debate, "as a matter of the dogma of
competition, it [was often] alleged that INTELSAT [did] not compete on that mythical
'level playing field."').
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As an intergovernmental treaty organization, for example,
INTELSAT was immune from paying taxes to any national
government.4 2 INTELSAT (and its Signatories) also enjoyed three
categories of legal immunities not enjoyed by private satellite
operators: "immunity from jurisdiction, which prevents courts from
considering lawsuits of any type against INTELSAT; archival and
testimonial immunity, which protects INTELSAT from being
compelled to provide documents or testimony of its employees; and
immunity of assets, which prevents courts from enforcing monetary
judgments against INTELSAT. '' 43 Some critics alleged that but for
these immunities, INTELSAT's relationship with its Signatories
would violate U.S. antitrust laws. 44 Others alleged that INTELSAT's
unique "treaty status help[ed] ensure its access to the national
markets of member countries" 45-a valuable asset that INTELSAT's
46
private competitors sometimes experienced difficulty in obtaining.

42.

See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. XV(b):

Within the scope of activities authorized by this Agreement, INTELSAT and its
property shall be exempt in all States Party to this Agreement from all national
income and direct national property taxation and from customs duties on
communications satellites and components and parts for such satellites to be
launched for use in the global system.
See also Lyall, supra note 41, at 106 (noting the claim of proponents of INTELSAT
privatization "that INTELSAT's position as an inter-governmental organisation, with
all the privileges of an international organisation, which includes tax exemptions, is an
unfair distortion of competition.").
In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 15 F.C.C.R. 15,460, 7, n.13 (2000), recon. denied,
43.
15 F.C.C.R. 25,234 (2000) (citing COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 F.C.C.R. at
14161-63, and Amendment of the Commission's Regulatory Policies to Allow Non-U.S.
Licensed Space Stations to Provide Domestic and International Satellite Service in the
United States, 12 F.C.C.R. 24,094, 24,149 (1997) [hereinafter DISCO II Order], recon.
denied, 15 F.C.C.R. 7207 (1999), corrected by, 15 F.C.C.R. 5042 (2000)); see also
International Telecommunications Satellite Organization Headquarters Agreement,
Nov. 22, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 2248, T.I.A.S. 8542 [hereinafter INTELSAT Headquarters
Agreement] (providing that INTELSAT and the representatives of the parties and of
the Signatories shall be immune from suit and legal process relating to acts performed
by them in their official capacity and falling within their functions, except as such
immunity is waived by INTELSAT).
44.
In Alpha Lyracom Space Communications,Inc. v. Communications Satellite
Corp., a putative competitor alleged that COMSAT and INTELSAT had violated
antitrust law by allegedly boycotting competing satellite systems, delaying mandatory
Article XIV(d) consultations, pricing satellite telecommunications services without
regard to cost (for example, on a nondiscriminatory basis), and purchasing excess
satellite capacity. 946 F.2d 168, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1096
(1992). Dismissing the case on the ground that INTELSAT and COMSAT were
immune, the court opined, "[hiaving created COMSAT to wield monopoly power, along
with the other participants in a global satellite system, Congress did not expect that
corporation to face antitrust liability in deciding, as a member of INTELSAT, whether
and to what extent to permit competition." Id. at 174.
In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 15 F.C.C.R. 15460, 1 7 (2000); see also Lyall, supra
45.
note 41, at 106-07 (noting competitor's allegations "that INTELSAT's very existence,
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In 1997, Representative Thomas Bliley gave effect to such
criticism by introducing a bill "to amend the Communications
Satellite Act of 1962 to promote competition and privatization in
satellite communications" in the 105th Congress. 47 The bill, which
was opposed by INTELSAT but supported by many of its competitors,
forthrightly sought "to eliminate the provision of commercial satellite
communications by intergovernmental organizations . . . [and] to
ensure that the privatized [successor] entities be independent of
[INTELSAT's] 'signatories."' 48 Rep. Bliley claimed that the
elimination of INTELSAT would introduce "a level playing field for
all competitors" in the satellite telecommunications marketplace,
which "in turn would bring consumers lower prices, higher service
quality, improved efficiency, innovative new products, and more
choice." 49 For this reason, the Bliley bill would have privatized
INTELSAT by requiring it to divest all of its foreign government
ownership and to sell its satellites and other assets to private
stockholder-owned corporations."0
B. Calls From Within
While Rep. Bliley and others alleged that INTELSAT's
unfair
competitive
provided
attributes
intergovernmental
advantages, "INTELSAT management and many Signatories
[asserted] that these very same intergovernmental attributes [were
actually] a handicap (particularly in getting Signatories to make the
necessary capital investment commitments) in a dynamic and

and the fact that its constitution calls for each member state to designate a signatory to
the Operating Agreement through which access to the INTELSAT system is given,
affords it and its signatories a privileged position within a very competitive industry.").
52 ("[I1n
46.
See, e.g., COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 14083,
some cases, INTELSAT Signatories are the spectrum licensing authorities and
monopoly providers of satellite services in their home markets, so they have an
incentive to minimize the spectrum licenses that they issue to independent satellite
systems seeking to compete in their markets."); 145 CONG. REC. H11933 (daily ed. Nov.
10, 1999) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) ('Today, the owners of [INTELSAT] are often the
same folks that control licensing decisions and foreign market access. Thus, they have
the ability and the incentive to make it hard for U.S. satellite companies to enter and
to compete in their national telecom markets.").
47.
H.R. 1872, 105th Cong (1998), introduced in 143 CONG. REC. H3796 (daily
ed. June 12, 1997).
48.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPORT ON THE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
COMPETITION AND PRIVATIZATION ACT OF 1998, H.R. REP. NO. 105-494, at 12 (1998).

49.
Id.
See H.R. 1872 § 102 (introducing proposed new Satellite Acts §§ 601-02,
50.
621-22, which set forth these requirements).
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increasingly competitive global market. ''51 Testifying before Congress
in 1998, INTELSAT's Director General argued that:
INTELSAT faces intense competition, but is constrained in how it may
react to that competition. For example, unlike its competitors,
INTELSAT must provide connectivity to every point on the globe-even
remote areas not served by others. In addition, our charter mandates
non-discriminatory access and pricing. INTELSAT's charter also
mandates a decision-making process characterized by consensus. This
is a deliberative process that, depending on the issue, involves
multilateral negotiations among our 143 Parties and Signatories.
Obviously, such a process takes time. In addition, INTELSAT is limited
to providing space segment only; we cannot provide vertically
52
integrated solutions that deliver services directly to end users.

In 1998, Rep. Bliley's bill passed the House of Representatives by
a large majority.53 The bill was not taken up by the Senate during the

51.
Changes in InternationalSatellite Policy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 105th
Cong. (1.999), available'at 1999 WL 194674 (F.D.C.H.) (statement of John Sponyoe,
C.E.O., Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications). See also id.:
Whatever perceived advantages INTELSAT may or may not have in its current
incarnation, these advantages are certainly not reflected in its steadily
decreasing market share ....Indeed, INTELSAT's current position in the USinternational market vis-A-vis other satellite and terrestrial competitors is so
far from anything that could be accurately termed 'dominant' that I have to
wonder whether its current structure might not pose a greater threat to itself
than to its competitors.
Six months before the CEO of Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications
[hereinafter LGMT] delivered this testimony, LMGT had entered into an agreement to
purchase 100 percent of the outstanding stock ownership of COMSAT (INTELSAT's
U.S. Signatory), pending receipt of regulatory approval. See In re Lockheed Martin
Corp., Regulus, LLC, & COMSAT Corp., 14 F.C.C.R. 15,816,
1-3 (1999) (describing
proposed transaction), vacated in part in other respects, PanAmSat Corp. v. FCC, Nos.
99-1384, 99-1385, 2000 WL 621421 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 2000) (unpublished per curiam
slip op.). After receiving the necessary approvals, LMGT's acquisition of COMSAT was
consummated on Aug. 3, 2000. In re Lockheed Martin Corp., Comsat Government
Systems, LLC, and Comsat Corp., Applications for Transfer of Control of Comsat Corp.,
order on recon., 17 F.C.C.R. 13,160, 4 n.5 (2002) (citing Letter to the FCC from
Raymond G. Bender, Jr., Counsel for Comsat Corp., dated Aug. 21, 2000). In 2002,
LMGT sold the bulk of the facilities and authorizations it had acquired from COMSAT
in 2000 to the privatized Intelsat Ltd. See Lockheed MartinCOMSAT and Intelsat
Seek FCC Consent to Assign Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations, Public Notice,
17 F.C.C.R. 7358 (2002).
52.
International Satellite Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (1998), available at
1998 WL 778936 (F.D.C.H.) (statement of Conny Kullman, Director General and CEODesignate of INTELSAT); see also id. (characterizing INTELSAT "not as a privileged
player in the global telecommunications market but as a somewhat handicapped
player").
53.
H.R. 1872, 105th Cong., H.R. Roll No. 129 (1998), available at
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1998/rol129.xml (the recorded vote was 403-16, with 2
absences).
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54
105th Congress, however, and thus failed to become law.
Nonetheless, under pressure both from within and from without, the
Twenty-Fourth INTELSAT Assembly of Parties in 1999 resolved to
transform INTELSAT from a public intergovernmental treaty
organization into an ordinary private corporation providing
international telecommunications services. 55 Within INTELSAT, the
56
United States played a leading role in championing this resolution.
Shortly thereafter, the INTELSAT Board of Governors identified
seven reasons why retention of INTELSAT's existing structure as an
Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) was not viable in the medium
term: (1) INTELSAT's prices for services were not flexible and
responsive to the market because of the cumbersome nature of
INTELSAT's organizational structure; (2) the existing unlimited
liability of INTELSAT's owners to the IGO rendered commercial
decisions conservative and unresponsive; (3) INTELSAT's governance
procedure was slow and open to scrutiny by competitors; (4) access to
public equity markets for capital was restricted; (5) investment in
INTELSAT was linked to usage; (6) it was difficult for INTELSAT to
leverage its intellectual property assets; and (7) distribution channels
57
for INTELSAT were determined by governments.

Rep. Bliley reintroduced substantially the same bill in the 106th Congress.
54.
See H.R. 3261, 106th Cong. (1999), reprinted in 145 CONG. REC. H11929-33 (daily ed.
Nov. 10, 1999). The Senate's version of this bill (S. 376, 106th Cong. (1999)), which
differed in some respects from Rep. Bliley's House version, was ultimately enacted as
the ORBIT Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-180, 114 Stat. 48 (2000) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 761-69 (2000)) [hereinafter ORBIT Act]; see infra Part IV.A, (discussing ORBIT).
55.
See In re INTELSAT LLC, 15 F.C.C.R. 15460, 8 n.14 (2000) ("In response
to competition, and the desire of governments to promote a more level playing field,
INTELSAT and investing Signatories decided to restructure as a private commercial
entity.") (citing 1999 INTELSAT Assembly of Parties Decision, AP 24-24-3E Final).
Under its 1999 resolution, the Assembly of Parties proposed to take final decisions on
all significant aspects of the privatization by November 2000, after which the Board of
Governors would implement the privatization. Id.
See Changes in InternationalSatellite Policy: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
56.
on Communications of the Sen. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (1999), available at
1999 WL 166941 (F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter Changes in Int'l Satellite Pol'y] (statement of
Ambassador Vonya B. McCann, U.S. Coordinator for International Communications
and Information Policy).
The Administration, in partnership with the Congress, has worked tirelessly
for more than five years to bring about the restructuring and privatization
of... INTELSAT . .. . These efforts have borne fruit ....

[D]iscussions within

the INTELSAT Board of Governors on privatization are progressing favorably.
The United States will continue to play a leadership role within the
international community, to get a pro-competitive transition plan and an
aggressive timetable for full privatization of INTELSAT.
See NEW ZEALAND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON FOREIGN
57.
AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TREATY EXAMINATION OF
TO THE INTERNATIONAL
RELATING
THE AMENDMENTS TO THE AGREEMENT
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At the same time, and also with the support of the United
States, 58 the Twenty-Fourth Assembly of Parties resolved that any
such restructuring must preserve INTELSAT's core principles, which
included "maintaining global connectivity and coverage of the
INTELSAT system, protecting lifeline users and connectivity, and
'59
ensuring continual non-discriminatory access to the global system.
It further determined "that lifeline users and connectivity must be
protected through the creation of a residual intergovernmental
organization (IGO) that would ensure such connectivity to countries
satisfying certain criteria. '60 As envisioned by the Twenty-Fourth
Assembly of Parties in 1999, the residual IGO
would neither function as a commercial provider of space segment
capacity nor a Signatory, as this role would cease to exist. Rather, it
would supervise the commitment of Intelsat LLC to provide satellite
capacity to lifeline users for a predetermined number of years with
price protection during the life of the commitment. This commitment
would be contained in an intergovernmental agreement creating the
IGO and implemented through a "public services" agreement between
61
the company and the residual IGO.

The proposal to divide INTELSAT into two components-a
private corporation and a residual IGO-reflected
the underlying agreement among INTELSAT Parties... [that]
INTELSAT's satellites and other assets and personnel necessary to
operate the satellites will be transferred to a private company that no

TELECOMMUNICATIONS
SATELLITE ORGANISATION,
2-3
(2001), available at
http://www.clerk.parliament.govt.nz/content/578/fdintelsat.pdf (listing the reasons why
retention of INTELSAT's existing structure as an IGO was not viable in the medium
term); cf. Lyall, supra note 41, at 107 (criticizing claims that INTELSAT was
inefficient, or not as efficient as it could or should be, and unable to meet the
challenge of competitors who have been newly released from their cages. On
this view INTELSAT procedures and the procedural requirements of its
constituent documents mean that the organisation is hobbled, cribbed, cabined
and confined in its response to the changes of the marketplace, and the swift
development of emergent telecommunications technologies. A 'better
INTELSAT' should be created on the commercial models of private
corporations, which would therefore be leaner, fitter, more responsive to
market requirements. Such would be able to meet competition both from other
satellite systems, as well as from the optical fibre networks, which were
undreamed of until relatively recently.
58.
In re INTELSAT LLC, 15 F.C.C.R. 15460, 25 n.96 (2000) ("The United
States supported the 1999 Assembly decision that INTELSAT must continue to
maintain global coverage and connectivities and ensure non-discriminatory access to
the system.") (citing INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the
Twenty-Fourth Meeting, AP 24-3E Final Aug. 10, 1999, at 8), recon. denied, 15
F.C.C.R. 25234 (2000).
59.
Id. 3 n.3; accord id.
25-27.
60.
Id. 26 n.99.
61.
Id. 26 (footnotes omitted).
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longer has privileges and immunities and is subject to a national
licensing authority, as long as that company assures continued services
62
to lifeline users under the "core principles."

In conformity with this understanding, the United States supported
the retention, post-privatization, of a residual IGO charged with
63
ensuring continued service to "lifeline users.1

IV. INTELSAT

PRIVATIZATION

As calls for the privatization of INTELSAT intensified both
inside and outside the organization, it perhaps became inevitable that
privatization would occur. This Part sets forth a narrative
documentary history of the privatization of INTELSAT. Subpart IV.A
discusses the mandates imposed by Congress in the ORBIT Act of
2000, which codified comprehensive sets of benchmarks, yardsticks,
carrots, and sticks, many of which substantially dictated the shape of
IV.B
describes
the
INTELSAT's
privatization.
Subpart
implementation of the privatization plan, a four-year process that
culminated in January 2005 with the sale of INTELSAT's satellite
fleet for $5 billion to a consortium of private investors. Subpart IV.C
then surveys the creation and ongoing work of the residual IGO that
was left in place when INTELSAT was privatized.
A. The ORBIT ACT of 2000
In light of the progress towards privatization already underway
within the INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, the U.S. Department of
State and some legislators warned that unilateral U.S. legislation
purporting to mandate INTELSAT privatization would now be
unnecessary and potentially counterproductive.64 Nonetheless, in

62.
Id.
63.
Id. 26 n.102.
64.
See Changes in Int'l Satellite Poly, supra note 56 (statement of Ambassador
Vonya B. McCann, U.S. Coordinator for International Communications and
Information Policy).
[Tihe Administration does not believe any legislation to ensure the
privatization of INTELSAT . . . does not harm competition in the U.S.
market ....
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have ample authority to protect
U.S. interests, and the Administration has been aggressive in ensuring that
plans to restructure and privatize [INTELSAT] are pro-competitive.
See also 145 CONG. REC. H11936 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1999) (statement of Rep. Dingell):
Intelsat should be privatized as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, the
U.S. cannot, by legislative fiat, simply impose its will on 143 foreign
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March 2000, a skeptical Congress enacted the Open-Market
Reorganization
for
the
Betterment
of
International
Telecommunications Act (ORBIT) 65 to mandate "fully privatizing the
intergovernmental
satellite
organizations,
INTELSAT
and
Inmarsat. ''66 The Senate report that accompanied ORBIT explained
the perceived need for the legislation:
Extraordinary technological and market changes have reshaped the
global satellite communications marketplace in the thirty-seven years
since enactment of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 and the
creation of COMSAT and INTELSAT. Where once only a treaty-based
intergovernmental satellite system would be willing to undertake the
enormous financial risks associated with developing, launching, and
maintaining a global satellite system, there are now multiple
commercial satellite systems providing an array of international
telecommunications
services
in this increasingly
competitive
marketplace. However, in this mature, competitive satellite services
environment, it is no longer appropriate for any single competitor to be
advantaged by an intergovernmental structure accompanied by certain
privileges and immunities; rather it must be transformed into a
commercial structure comparable to that of any of the existing
67
commercial satellite entities.

To ensure that INTELSAT's restructuring was not merely
cosmetic, ORBIT required INTELSAT to satisfy certain specific "procompetitive privatization" criteria. 68 First, ORBIT specified that any
privatized successor of INTELSAT must be organized as an ordinary
shareholder-owned
corporation or other
similarly accepted
commercial organization under the laws of a single nation. 69 In
response to the Assembly of Parties' decision to retain a residual IGO
after privatization, ORBIT barred the residual IGO from owning even

countries who are signatories to the Intelsat treaty. I believe the Bliley
bill, as currently constructed, would actually undermine American
diplomatic efforts currently underway to secure an Intelsat
privatization.
65.
ORBIT Act, Pub. L. No. 106-180, 114 Stat. 48 (2000) (codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 761-69 (2000)).
66.
Id. § 2.
67.
S.REP. No. 106-100, at 1 (1999); see also 145 CONG. REC. H11934 (daily ed.
Nov. 10, 1999) (statement of Rep. Markey):
Back in 1962 . . . it took national efforts to build, to launch and to maintain
satellites in orbit. But much has changed in the last thirty-five years, since
President Kennedy signed the original COMSAT bill into law, since
INTELSAT... [was] made a part of the international telecommunications
infrastructure. Today, we have private individuals with their own money
willing to build and to launch satellites into space .... [T]hat 1962 model ... is

counterproductive to American interests today. It is time to update the
[Satellite Act].
68.
69.

ORBIT Act § 621, 47 U.S.C. § 763.
ORBIT Act § 621(5), 47 U.S.C. § 763(5).
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70
In
a scintilla of equity in the commercial successor corporation.
addition, although the successor corporation would necessarily be
owned by INTELSAT's Signatories at the moment of privatization,
ORBIT mandated the substantial dilution of Signatory ownership
71
through an initial public offering to take place soon thereafter.
ORBIT also prohibited any privatized successor of INTELSAT
from retaining any of the legal privileges or immunities from liability
or regulation that INTELSAT, as an IGO, had enjoyed. 72 Relatedly,
ORBIT proclaimed that any privatized successor of INTELSAT would
need to procure future orbital slot registrations and international
frequency assignments from the national licensing administration of
a government subscribing to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Basic Telecommunications Services Agreement, rather than through
international legal channels. 73 Moreover, a privatized INTELSAT
successor was not to receive preferential treatment in the assignment
74
of orbital locations from any national licensing administration.
Finally, ORBIT required INTELSAT to put an end to the
"consultation" process, under which applicants from INTELSAT
member nations had not been permitted to launch new separate
international satellite systems without first obtaining INTELSAT's

ORBIT Act § 621(2), 47 U.S.C. § 763(2). ORBIT further required any future
70.
transactions or other relationships between a residual INTELSAT IGO and a private
successor entity to "be conducted on an arm's length basis." ORBIT Act § 621(2), 47
U.S.C. § 763(5)(E).
ORBIT Act § 621(2), 47 U.S.C. § 763(2). In 2000, 80 INTELSAT Signatories
71.
were agencies of foreign governments. In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 15 F.C.C.R. 15460, 7
(2000). These 80 foreign government-owned Signatories collectively owned
approximately 30 percent of INTELSAT's total equity. Id. The remaining 70 percent of
INTELSAT's equity was owned by 63 private Signatories, including COMSAT. Id.
Although ORBIT Act § 621(2) applied to all INTELSAT Signatories, its primary
purpose was to dilute foreign government ownership of the private successor
corporation. Id.
ORBIT Act § 621(3), 47 U.S.C. § 763(3).
72.
ORBIT Act § 621(6)-(7) , 47 U.S.C. § 763(6)-(7). The FCC, for example, is
73.
such a national licensing administration. These provisions were significant because
orbital slot registrations must be obtained from the International Telecommunications
Union (ITU), a specialized agency of the United Nations that deals only with national
governments. Historically, as a ministerial matter, INTELSAT's ITU applications for
orbital slots were filed by the United States on behalf of INTELSAT. See In re
INTELSAT L.L.C., 15 F.C.C.R. 15460, (2000). The ITU, however, always distinguished
INTELSAT applications from other United States applications. Id. Orbital slots
earmarked for INTELSAT were shown in the ITU listing of network filings as "USAIr"' registrations, and non-INTELSAT U.S.-licensed satellites were precluded from
using those orbital slots. Id. Orbital slots allocated to U.S.-licensed satellites, in
contrast, were recorded as "USA" registrations, and could be used by any U.S. licensee
designated by the FCC. Id.; see also COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 F.C.C.R.
14083, 92 (1998) (describing details of FCC's role in registering INTELSAT's orbital
locations with the ITU).
ORBIT Act § 621(3)(C), 47 U.S.C. § 763(3)(C).
74.
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certification that the new facilities would be technically compatible
75
with INTELSAT.
While ORBIT did not directly abrogate the 1971 INTELSAT
Agreement, its enactment exerted substantial pressure on
INTELSAT to privatize in conformity with ORBIT's "pro-competitive"
criteria. As ORBIT's Senate sponsor declared, the Act "provide[d] new
incentives for INTELSAT's privatization, while at the same time,
carr[ying] tough consequences if INTELSAT fail[ed] to achieve this
important objective. '76 Perhaps the most attractive incentive set forth
in ORBIT was the automatic repeal, upon privatization, of a host of
unique regulatory burdens to which INTELSAT and its U.S.
77
Signatory, COMSAT, had long been subject under the Satellite Act.
In particular, ORBIT promised to lift a longstanding prohibition that
had prevented INTELSAT from providing domestic communications
services (including direct broadcast satellite (DBS) television service
78
and retail internet access) within the United States.
On balance, however, ORBIT relied more heavily on sticks than
on carrots to achieve its ends. Effective on its date of enactment,
ORBIT prohibited any further expansion of INTELSAT's U.S.international service offerings or facilities until all of the Act's "procompetitive privatization" criteria had been satisfied. 79 In addition,
ORBIT established dates by which INTELSAT was directed to satisfy
each of its privatization criteria.8 0 If INTELSAT failed to meet these

75.
ORBIT Act § 622, 47 U.S.C. § 763a ("Technical coordination shall not be
used to impair competition or competitors, and shall be conducted under International
Telecommunication Union procedures and not under Article XIV(d) of the INTELSAT
Agreement."); accord ORBIT Act § 644(a), 47 U.S.C. § 765(c)(a) (' The Commission and
United States satellite companies shall utilize the International Telecommunication
Union procedures for technical coordination with INTELSAT and its successor entities
and separated entities, rather than INTELSAT procedures."); cf. supra notes 27-28
(discussing the INTELSAT Agreement art. XIV(d) consultation process).
76.
145 CONG. REC. S8052 (daily ed. July 1, 1999) (statement of Sen. Burns).
77.
ORBIT Act § 645(2), (4); 47 U.S.C. § 765d(2), (4); cf. 146 CONG. REC. H905
(daily ed. Mar. 9, 2000) (statement of Rep. Tauzin) ('"This compromise legislation
unshackles COMSAT from the antiquated regulatory burdens that have to date
hampered its success.").
78.
See DISCO II Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 24094,
125-27 (1997) (reiterating that
INTELSAT satellites may not be used to serve the U.S. domestic service market unless
and until such market entry can be shown to promote competition and otherwise serve
the public interest), recon. denied, 15 F.C.C.R. 7207 (1999), corrected by, 15 F.C.C.R.
5042 (2000).
79.
ORBIT Act §§ 602, 621(4), 47 U.S.C. §§ 761a, 763(4).
80.
See ORBIT Act § 621(1), 47 U.S.C. § 763(1) (setting forth deadlines for
satisfying initial privatization criteria); see also ORBIT Act § 621(5)(A), 47 U.S.C.
§ 763(5)(A) (setting forth later deadline for dilution of Signatory ownership).
Subsequent to ORBIT's enactment in 2000, Congress amended the statute several
times to extend the IPO deadline set forth in § 621(5)(A). See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 108-228,
118 Stat. 644 (2004) (extending IPO deadline from 2004 to 2005); Pub. L. No. 107-233,
116 Stat. 1480 (2002) (extending the IPO deadline from 2002 to 2004). In October 2004,
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deadlines, ORBIT threatened to cut off the U.S. market for all of
INTELSAT's existing services except for certain "core" international
public-switched telephone network (PSTN), voice telephony, and
occasional-use television services. 8 ' By enacting these provisions,
Congress undoubtedly hoped that the INTELSAT Assembly of Parties
in mind as it determined
would keep ORBIT's "tough consequences"
82
the shape of INTELSAT privatization.
B. Transfer of INTELSAT's Assets to a Private U.S.-Licensed
Successor Entity
On January 18, 2000, two months before ORBIT was enacted, a
newly-formed Delaware corporation wholly owned by INTELSAT's
Signatories applied to the FCC for U.S. licenses to operate the
seventeen existing and ten planned satellites then owned and
operated by INTELSAT.83 In its application, the new corporation,
to
"Intelsat LLC," informed the FCC that INTELSAT hoped presently
84
It
transfer its satellites and associated assets to Intelsat LLC.
become effective
therefore requested that its new FCC licenses
85
immediately upon consummation of the transfer.
On August 8, 2000, after ORBIT had been enacted, the FCC
conditionally granted the applications Intelsat LLC had filed on

Congress again amended ORBIT to permit Intelsat Ltd. to dilute its percentage of
former Signatory ownership through a private stock transfer, rather than through a
public IPO. See Pub. L. No. 108-37, § 1(2), 118 Stat. 1752 (2004) (codified in pertinent
part at 47 U.S.C. § 763(5)(F) (Supp. 2005)).
ORBIT Act §§ 601(b), 621(1), 681(a)(11), 47 U.S.C. §§ 761(b), 763(1),
81.
769(a)(11). ORBIT contained an exception that would have allowed INTELSAT to
continue existing service to U.S. government agencies who utilized INTELSAT service
to protect the health and safety of the public. ORBIT Act § 601(b)(1)(C), 47 U.S.C.
§ 761(b)(1)(C). Another exception would have enabled the FCC, under certain
circumstances, to allow INTELSAT to continue existing service to U.S. customers who
depended on the service and could not obtain comparable service elsewhere. ORBIT Act
§ 601(b)(3), 47 U.S.C. § 761(b)(3).
See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. H906 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2000) (statement of Rep.
82.
Pallone).
[If INTELSAT thumbs its nose at the standards set forth in this bill for a procompetitive privatization, its ability to offer services in the United States could
be hindered dramatically. However, this leverage is necessary to ensure that
INTELSAT truly privatizes, and to ensure that we finally have a level playing
field in the satellite services market.
1, 8 n.15 (2000).
See In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 15 F.C.C.R. 15460,
83.
Because INTELSAT was an IGO, its global satellite system had never before been
licensed by any national licensing authority. Id. 2.
Id. In connection with the transfer of assets, the application stated that
84.
INTELSAT also planned to transfer its ITU network filings (i.e., orbital slot
registrations) to the U.S. registry. See id. 38.
See id. 1, 8 n.15.
85.

1346

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.'1323

January 18, 2000.86 Under this conditional grant, Intelsat LLC's new
FCC licenses were to take effect "upon INTELSAT's transfer of the
satellites and assets necessary to operate the satellites on the
effective date of privatization. ''8 7 In its Order, the FCC directed

Intelsat LLC "to supplement its application following the November
2000 Assembly of Parties decision to provide the details of
' 88
INTELSAT's privatization as reflected in the Assembly decision.
The following month, the INTELSAT Board of Governors formally
recommended that the Assembly of Parties accept the FCC licenses
and select the United States to receive and license INTELSAT's
8
orbital registrations upon privatization.

9

On November 13-17, 2000, the Twenty-Fifth INTELSAT
Assembly of Parties unanimously "confirmed the decision of a 1999
Assembly of Parties that INTELSAT should restructure, decided on
the terms and conditions that would apply to the restructuring, and
approved amendments to the INTELSAT Agreement necessary to
effect the privatization." 90 The Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties set a

86.
87.

See id.
See id.

1, 8 n.15.
2; see also id.

38:

The licenses we grant today will become effective only upon privatization when
the applicant is no longer owned and controlled by an intergovernmental
organization. Operating authority would be conferred upon Intelsat LLC only
upon the date on which INTELSAT transfers its satellite and associated assets
to Intelsat LLC and its ITU network filings to the U.S. registry.
88.
Id. 38.
89.
In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 16 F.C.C.R. 12280,
8 (2001) (Second Mem. Op.
Order & Auth.). The Board selected the United Kingdom as a backup jurisdiction for
licensing INTELSAT's existing and planned satellites operating in the C-band and Kuband "should the terms of the U.S. license approval be adversely affected prior to
privatization." Id.' The Board also selected the United Kingdom as the licensing
jurisdiction for future satellites.that may be constructed for operating in the Ka-band,
V-band, and BSS band. Id. 8 n.22.
90.
FCC Report to Congress as Required by the Orbit Act, 16 F.C.C.R. 12810,
at 9 (2001) [hereinafter FCC Report to Congress 2001]. On June 1, 2001, the United
States acceded to the amendments to the INTELSAT Agreement approved at the
Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties, and thereby became a Party to the residual IGO,
discussed infra, immediately upon privatization of INTELSAT. See United States
Department of State,
Office
of Treaty Affairs:
2001 Treaty Actions,
http://www.state.gov/s/l1/5234.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter 2001 Treaty
Actions] (reporting acceptance by the United States on June 1, 2001, of the
Amendments to the Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization "INTELSAT' done at Washington, D.C. on Nov. 13-17, 2000).
Formally, the amendments to the INTELSAT Agreement approved in November 2000
by the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties could not "enter into force" until they were
ratified by the governments of two-thirds of the INTELSAT's member countries-or
ninety-six countries-that held at least two-thirds of INTELSAT's total investment
shares as of November 2000. Press Release, International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization Press Release No. 2004-110, Treaty Amendments Enter Into
Force Related to Restructuring of the International Telecommunications Satellite
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target date of July 18, 2001 for the transfer of INTELSAT's satellite
assets to its private commercial successor entity.9 1 It also decided
that the commercial successor entity would be structured as a group
of affiliated national subsidiary corporations all owned by "Intelsat
Ltd.," a holding company to be organized under the laws of
Bermuda. 92 Finally, it decided that the FCC licenses authorizing the
operation of INTELSAT's existing and planned satellites in the Cband and Ku-band would be held by an Intelsat Ltd. subsidiary called
"Intelsat LLC," a Delaware corporation whose operations would be
based in INTELSAT's former headquarters building in Washington,
93
DC.
On July 18, 2001, at 7:59:59 p.m. (EDT), INTELSAT transferred
all of its satellite assets, and virtually all of its other financial assets
and liabilities, into the corporate holding company structure approved
in November 2000 by the Twenty-Fifth INTELSAT Assembly of
Parties. 94 At that moment, the intergovernmental International
Telecommunications
Satellite Organization
was transformed
immediately upon transfer from "a treaty-based Organization
[INTELSAT] that at one time enjoyed a monopoly position in
providing international satellite services, to a treaty-based
Organization [ITSO] that ensures international satellite public
services [without itself providing any such services]. ... ,,95 At the
same time, pursuant to the FCC's Intelsat L.L.C. Licensing Order
issued on May 29, 2001,96 Intelsat Ltd.-the private entity that

Organization (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://tinyurl.com/arhhc. It was not until
September 1, 2004, however, that the requisite 96th INTELSAT member country
ratified the amendments, and thereby triggered the revised ITSO Agreement to enter
into force on November 30, 2004. Id. As a practical matter, however, the restructuring
of INTELSAT approved in November 2000 by the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties
began long before the treaty revisions were formally entered into force. See id.
("Although the restructuringof the Organization took place in July 2001, today's entry
into force of the amendments to the Agreement fulfills the final treaty obligations for
the restructuring process.") (emphasis added).
91.
In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 16 F.C.C.R. 12280,
8 nn.23-24 (2001) (citing
INTELSAT ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES: RECORD OF DECISIONS OF THE TwENTY-FIFrH

(EXTRAORDINARY) MEETING, AP-25-3E FINAL, W/ii/00 34 (Nov. 27, 2000)).
92.
Id. 9; see also id. attachment A (a graphic displaying the holding company
structure of Intelsat Ltd. and its affiliated national corporations).
93.
Id.
9. In contrast, the United Kingdom authorizations for ITU
registrations for planned future satellites in the Ka-, BSS-, and V-bands were to be
held directly by Intelsat Ltd., the Bermuda holding company. Id.
94.
FCC Report to Congress as Required by the ORBIT Act, 18 F.C.C.R. 12525,
at 3, 12 (2003); see also id. at 12-13 (describing this corporate holding structure in
detail). At the time of transfer, the assets transferred to the new Bermuda holding
company, Intelsat Ltd., were valued at $3.0 billion. William Glanz, Intelsat Goes
Private:Satellite Firm Must Adjust to Competition, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), July 19, 2001,
at B12, 2001 WLNR 393973.
95.
ITSO, About Us, http://tinyurl.com/au4fg.
96.
In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 16 F.CC.R. 12280, 72 (2001).
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received INTELSAT's assets-was immediately transformed from an
functioning
U.S.-licensed
shell
into
a
empty
corporate
telecommunications carrier, subject to the pressures of the market
and the burdens of national government regulation.
Since it began operating on July 18, 2001, INTELSAT's private
successor entity "has competed in the marketplace as a U.S.-licensed
space station operator on the same footing as its competitors-i.e.,
free from any privileges and immunities derived from its former
status as an [IGO].''97 For several years, technical constraints
hindered the privatized company from capitalizing on its new legal
right to offer domestic communications services in the United
States.9 8 In March 2004, however, Intelsat Ltd. purchased four
operational satellites then in orbit above North America, plus the
right to launch a new satellite into one additional North American
orbital location later that year.9 9 Upon consummation of the
transaction, Intelsat Ltd. began using these four satellites to provide

FCC Report to Congress as Required by Orbit Act, 17 F.C.C.R. 11458,
97.
11468 (2002) [hereinafter FCC Report to Congress 20021.
As discussed at footnote 77 and accompanying text, ORBIT Act § 645
98.
repealed upon privatization a rule that had prohibited INTELSAT satellites from being
used to provide domestic communications services. See 47 U.S.C. § 765d. Upon
privatization, however, INTELSAT was not well-positioned to enter the domestic
communications market. In part, this was because INTELSAT's satellites were located
primarily over the oceans, rather than over the North American continental land-mass,
and were thus not well-positioned to provide purely domestic service within the United
States. In addition, INTELSAT's ability to enter the domestic communications services
market upon privatization was hindered by its lack of excess transponder capacity on
its existing satellites.
See Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat Completes Acquisition of Loral's North
99.
American Satellite Assets; FSS Leader Begins Executing Customer Transition and
Satellite Integration Plan (Mar. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Intelsat Acquistion Press
Release], available at http://tinyurl.com/93wv8. In this $961.1 million dollar
transaction, Intelsat Ltd. acquired, from the insolvent French-American satellite
operator Loral Space & Communications Corporation, the U.S.-licensed "Telstar 5, 6,
and 7," satellites, which were then located in geostationary orbit above the North
American continent at 970 W.L., 930 W.L., and 1290 W.L., respectively, and also an

interest in the Papua New Guinea-licensed "Telstar 13" satellite, co-owned with
EchoStar Communications Corporation, which had recently been launched into
geostationary orbit above the North American continent at the 1210W.L. Id. In
addition, Intelsat Ltd. acquired Loral's rights to launch the planned "Telstar 8"
satellite into orbit at $90 W.L. See In re Loral SpaceCom Inc. (Debtor-in-Possession) &
4 n.l (2004), corrected by, 19
Intelsat North America L.L.C., 19 F.C.C.R. 2404,
F.C.C.R. 4029 (2004). On June 23, 2005, Intelsat Ltd. exercised these rights when it
successfully launched the rechristened, Loral-manufactured "IA-8" satellite into the 89'
W.L. orbital location. See Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat Americas-8 (IA-8) Launch
Successful (June 23, 2005), available at http://tinyurl.com/cwlzx. Although the FCC
also approved the transfer of Loral's 'Telstar 4" satellite to Intelsat Ltd., id., that
satellite was never transferred because it failed in orbit before the transfer could be
consummated. See Intelsat Acquistion Press Release, supra. For background on the
Loral/Intelsat Ltd. transaction, see Andy Pasztor, Intelsat Trumps Echostar in Bid For
Loral Assets, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2003, at A2.
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domestic video services throughout North America.10 0 Both before
and after being transferred to Intelsat Ltd., the satellites carried
traffic for U.S. broadcasters, cable and private data network
operators such as CBS and Fox Broadcasting,'land provided directto-home (DTH) and DBS video services to end users in the United
States.102
While beginning to function as an ordinary satellite carrier,
Intelsat Ltd. also began working to comply with ORBIT's mandate
that Intelsat Ltd. dilute the share of its ownership held by
INTELSAT's former Signatories. 103 After several false starts, 10 4 on

See Intelsat Acquisition Press Release, supra note 99; see also Press
100.
Release, Intelsat, Intelsat Launches Fiber-Based, Digital Video Delivery Network,
2004),
available at
at NAB 2004 (Apr. 19,
Enabled by Level 3,
http://tinyurl.com/d9mhm (announcing commercial launch of Intelsat's North American
video fiber network, designed to support digital video transmissions for broadcast news
and sports distribution, including distribution of NBA basketball broadcast
programming for viewing within North America). The "IA-8" satellite, launched into
the 890 W.L. orbital location on June 23, 2005, now also provides services similar to
those provided via the four operational satellites that Intelsat Ltd. acquired from Loral
in 2004. See Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat Americas-8 (IA-8) Launch Successful,
supra note 99.
101.
Intelsat Signs Agreement to Purchase Loral's North American Satellite
Services Assets, CAMBRIDGE TELECOM REPORT, July 21, 2003; see also Andy Pasztor et
al., Satellite Ills Ground Industry Leaders: Loral Files for Chapter 11, Sets Asset Sale to
Intelsat, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2003, at A3:
After years of unsuccessful efforts to get into the U.S. market, Washingtonbased Intelsat is poised to enter the still-lucrative segment for video services in
North America. Buying Loral's U.S. orbital slots, still subject to regulatory
approval and potential bids from others, amounts to a "once in a lifetime
opportunity," according to Intelsat's Chief Executive Conny Kullman.
102.
In the same Order in which it otherwise approved the transaction, the FCC
initially ordered Intelsat Ltd. to terminate provision of DTH and DBS video services
within 180 days after acquiring the Loral satellites. In re Loral Satellite, Inc., 19
65 (Int'l Bur. 2004), modified, 19 F.C.C.R. 4029 (Int'l Bur. 2004),
F.C.C.R 2404,
reconsideration denied, 19 F.C.C.R. 7014 (Int'l Bur. 2004). The FCC's order was
predicated on a provision of ORBIT that prohibits Intelsat Ltd. from providing any
"additional services" before diluting the ownership of INTELSAT's former signatories.
See ORBIT Act §§ 602(a), 621(4), 47 U.S.C. §§ 761a(a), 763(4); see also ORBIT Act
§ 681(a)(12)(B), 47 U.S.C. § 769(a)(12)(B) (defining "additional services" for INTELSAT
to mean "[DTH] or [DBS] video services, or services in the Ka or V bands").
Subsequently, the FCC extended this deadline an additional 180 days, until March 14,
2005. See In re Intelsat North America, L.L.C., 19 F.C.C.R. 14807, 6 (2004). Finally,
after Intelsat Ltd. complied with ORBIT's final ownership dilution benchmark on
January 28, 2005, the FCC authorized Intelsat Ltd. to continue providing "additional
services" indefinitely. See FCC Report To Congress As Required by the ORBIT Act, 36
CoMM. REG. (P&F) 120, available at 2005 WL 1412923, at *8 (F.C.C. June 15, 2005)
("Intelsat is no longer subject to the provisions of Section 602 that.prohibited Intelsat
from providing 'additional services' in the United States.").
See ORBIT Act §621(5)(A)(i), 47 U.S.C. § 763(5)(A)(i) (as amended in 2004)
103.
(mandating substantial dilution of former signatories' ownership interest in Intelsat
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August 16, 2004, Intelsat Ltd. announced that it had entered into an
agreement to sell all of its assets to an international consortium of
private investors. 10 5 This announcement appeared to be at odds with
ORBIT's mandate directing Intelsat Ltd. to dilute its ownership

through an initial public offering (IPO). l0 6 On October 25, 2004,
however, Congress amended ORBIT to permit Intelsat Ltd. to "forgo
an initial public offering and public securities listing" if the company
was able to "achieve[ ] substantial dilution of the aggregate amount of
signatory or former signatory financial interest" through other
means, such as a private equity transfer. 0 7 Accordingly, on December
22, 2004, the FCC tentatively approved the private international
investment consortium's proposed acquisition of Intelsat Ltd. 0 8 On
January 28, 2005, Intelsat Ltd. announced that it had sold all its
assets to the private investment consortium for $5 billion.' 0 9 On April

Ltd. by end of 2005); see also supra note 80 (discussing past extensions of ownership
dilution deadline).

104.

See, e.g., Yuki Noguchi, Intelsat Plans to Hold Long-Delayed Stock Sale

before July, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2004, at E5 (discussing past plans for Intelsat Ltd.
IPO that had been abandoned, and reporting Intelsat Ltd.'s announcement of plans for
a new IPO, which never subsequently occurred).
105.
Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat to be Acquired by Consortium of Private
Investors (Aug. 16, 2004), available at http://tinyurl.com/dvzmv; see also Ellen Sheng,
Intelsat Strikes Deal to Be Bought By 4 PrivateFunds For $3 Billion, WALL ST. J., Aug.
17, 2004, at A12. On October 10, 2004, the proposed transaction was approved by a
ninety-nine percent majority of Intelsat's shareholders, most of whom at that time
remained former INTELSAT Signatories. Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat
Shareholders Approve Proposed Acquisition by Zeus Holdings (Oct. 10, 2004), available
at http://tinyurl.com/e27yr.
106.
As enacted in 2000, ORBIT provided that an initial public offering (IPO) of
stock was the sole permissible means by which Intelsat Ltd. could achieve its required
dilution of signatory ownership. See ORBIT Act § 621(5)(A)(i), 47 U.S.C. § 763(5)(A)(i)
(2000) (amended 2004).
107.
Pub. L. No. 108-371 § 1(2), 118 Stat. 1752 (2004), codified at 47
U.S.C. § 763(5)(F)(i)(1) (Supp. 2005).
108.
In re Intelsat, Ltd., Transferor, & Zeus Holdings Ltd., Transferee, 19
F.C.C.R. 24820, 47 (2004) (stating that FCC approval of transaction is
conditioned on a future Commission finding that Intelsat has fully complied
with the privatization requirements under Section 621 of the ORBIT Act, as
amended, by either conducting an initial public offering in accordance with
Sections 621(2) and 621(5)(A)(i) of the ORBIT Act, as amended, or making a
certification to the Commission pursuant to Section 621(5)(F) of the ORBIT Act,
as amended, and that the Commission has determined, after notice and
comment, that Intelsat is in compliance with the certification requirements of
Section 621(5)(F) of the ORBIT Act, as amended.
109.
See Intelsat Sale Completed, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2005, at E2; Press
Release, Intelsat, Intelsat Announces Completion of Acquisition by Zeus Holdings Ltd.
(Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://tinyurl.com/afmbp (noting that to acquire Intelsat
Ltd., the buyers paid $3 billion in cash and assumed $2 billion in debt). Much of the
debt assumed by Intelsat Ltd.'s buyers appears to have been incurred just a few days
before the acquisition. See COMM. DAILY, Jan. 26, 2005, 2005 WL 62275807.
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8, 2005, the FCC determined that this sale satisfied ORBIT's final
ownership dilution benchmark.' 1 0 Even subsequent to this
acquisition, however, ORBIT continues to regulate Intelsat Ltd.'s
ownership structure by prohibiting INTELSAT's former Signatories,
individually or collectively, from reacquiring a controlling interest in
Intelsat Ltd.'
C. Establishment of Residual Treaty OrganizationITSO
For different reasons, both INTELSAT and the operators nof2
separate satellite systems championed INTELSAT privatization.
To the extent that INTELSAT privatization was expected to foster
competition, it was also expected to yield benefits to the international
telecommunications carriers that had been INTELSAT's principal
customers, and, ultimately, to U.S. consumers who used international

Intelsat sold $2.55 billion of notes in 3 parts late Mon. [Jan. 24,
2005] .... [T]he company sold $1 billion of 7-year floating-rate notes to yield
487.5 basis points over the 6-month London interbank offered rate, $875
million of 8-year notes yielding 8.25% and $675 million of 10-year notes
yielding 8.625%.
110.
See Declaratory Ruling that Intelsat, Ltd. Complies With Section 621(5)(F)
of the ORBIT Act, 20 F.C.C.R. 8604 (2005) (concluding that the sale of Intelsat Ltd.s'
assets satisfied 47 U.S.C. §§ 763(5)(A)(i), 763(5)(F) (Supp. 2005) (as amended in 2004));
accord FCC Report To Congress As Required By the ORBIT Act, supra note 102, at 4
n.29:
On April 8, 2005, the Commission determined that Intelsat's certification was
in compliance with Sections 621(5)(F) and 621(5)(G) of the ORBIT Act, that
Intelsat can forgo the requirement for an IPO and the public listing of
securities, and that Intelsat was no longer subject to the provisions of Section
602 that prohibited Intelsat from providing 'additional services.'
(citing 20 F.C.C.R. 8604 (2005)).
ORBIT Act §§ 621(5)(C), 621(5)(F)(i)(II), 47 U.S.C. §§ 763(5)(C),
111.
763(5)(F)(i)(II) (Supp. 2005); see also Declaratory Ruling that Intelsat, Ltd. Complies
14 (2005) (confirming
With Section 621(5)(F) of the ORBIT Act, 20 F.C.C.R. 8604,
Intelsat Ltd.'s compliance with this ORBIT Act requirement). In addition to promoting
competition in the U.S. market for satellite communications services, ORBIT's
prohibition against Signatory reacquisition of ownership in Intelsat Ltd. also appears
to advance U.S. geopolitical objectives. Cf. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MILITARY
SPACE OPERATIONS: COMMON PROBLEMS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON SATELLITE AND
RELATED ACQUISITIONS, GAO Rep. No. GAO-03-825R, at 22 (June 2, 2003) (noting that
in 2002 and 2003, U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) officials raised "pointed
objections ... to the DOD's use of commercial satellite systems such as INTELSAT and
INMARSAT because they were 'part owned' by countries such as Iraq and Iran"),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03825r.pdf.
See supra Part III.A (discussing considerations of INTELSAT's
112.
competitors); Part III.B (discussing considerations of INTELSAT itself).
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telecommunications services.1 13 Once INTELSAT privatization came
business, and U.S.
to be seen as beneficial to INTELSAT, U.S.
114

consumers, its implementation was assured.
It was less clear, however, whether INTELSAT privatization
would benefit users in developing nations that relied heavily on
INTELSAT to stay connected to the world. By and large, proponents
and representatives of lifeline countries were wary of relying on free
international
countries'
those
satisfy
to
alone
markets
telecommunications needs. 115 Many doubted "that the private
operator model [could] generate the same positive network

externalities and global connectivity as are achieved through the
'116

cooperative [IGO] model.
In November 2000, in consideration of such concerns, the
Twenty-Fifth INTELSAT Assembly of Parties reaffirmed the TwentyFourth Assembly's decision to leave in place, upon privatization, a
small residual IGO to monitor performance of the new private

113.
See H.R. Rep. No. 105-494, at 12 (1998) (asserting that INTELSAT
privatization "would bring consumers lower prices, higher service quality, improved
efficiency, innovative new products, and more choice").
Rob Frieden, Privatization of Satellite Cooperatives: Smothering A Golden
114.
Goose?, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 1001, 1015 (1996) ("[Tjhe cachet of privatization, combined
with support for privatization from most constituencies, including the U.S.
government... make some sort of INTELSAT privatization inevitable."); see also id. at
1003.
[A]nalysis by the U.S. government of satellite carrier privatization appears to
have proceeded according to a simple political calculus. Because both
[INTELSAT and its competitors] desire a change in the status quo, U.S.
officials have considered it reasonable to make some kind of change ostensibly
promoting competition and private enterprise.
115.
Changes in InternationalSatellitePolicy: Hearingon InternationalSatellite
Reform Before S. Subcomm. on Communications, S. Commerce Comm., 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV) ("INTELSAT has a history of serving
all parts of the world at reasonable prices. We have an interest in making sure that
developing nations are part of the global information infrastructure."); see also, id.
(statement of John Sponye, CEO, Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications):
[D]eveloping countries.., do not view their small telecom service requirements
nor those of their consumers as being of any great commercial interest to
INTELSAT's commercial competitors. INTELSAT's treaty commitment to
serving all countries, rich and poor alike, providing universal access under a
regime of non-discriminatory pricing-for both lucrative and uneconomical
routes-has led many of INTELSAT's less developed member countries to rely
on INTELSAT as not only a carrier of last resort but as their only link to the
world.
116.
Frieden, supra note 114, at 1002; see also id. at 1002-03 ('The fact that
both [IGO] cooperatives and their commercial competitors agree, for different reasons,
that the cooperatives should be privatized suggests that more is at stake than simply
fostering 'a level competitive playing field."').
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company's public service obligations. 11 7 The Assembly decided that
the residual IGO would retain INTELSAT's full name "International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization," but now be known by a
new acronym, "ITSO."118 This residual IGO was envisioned as "the
continuation of [the INTELSAT] intergovernmental organization
and... the guarantor of 'permanent connectivity' of the world
through satellite technology."' 19 Through the residual IGO, lifeline
countries would retain legal and political-rather than merely
economic-means of protecting their access to the satellite system
formerly operated by INTELSAT. Post-privatization, the residual
IGO's actions would "continue to be framed by Resolution 1721 of the
General Assembly of the United Nations as well as the principles
embodied in the Treaty on Principles Governing120the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.'
To these ends, the Twenty-Fifth INTELSAT Assembly of Parties
amended the INTELSAT Agreement (now the "ITSO Agreement") to
establish the structure and responsibilities that would define the
residual IGO, ITSO. Post-privatization, ITSO would retain an
Assembly of Parties and an executive organ, headed by the Director
General, responsible to the Assembly of Parties. 12 1 Because ITSO was
to have no operational or commercial role in the privatized
commercial entity Intelsat Ltd, 122 however, the Twenty-Fifth
Assembly of Parties amended the INTELSAT Agreement to eliminate
that had
both the Meeting of Signatories and the Board of Governors
123
previously overseen INTELSAT's commercial operations.

In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 16 F.C.C.R. 12280, 1 10 (2001); see also Agreement
117.
Related to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Nov. 17,
2000) [hereinafter ITSO Agreement], available at http://216.119.123.56/dyn4000/dyn/
docsITSO/tpll-itso.cfm?Location=&ID=5&Link src=HPL&largrenglish.
FCC Report to Congress as Required by the Orbit Act, 16 F.C.C.R. 12810,
118.
12819 (2001); accordIn re INTELSAT L.L.C., 16 F.C.C.R. 12280, 10 (2001).
Ahmed Toumi, Director General, ITSO, Presentation Before the European
119.
Institute Roundtable on Telecommunications, E-Commerce & Audiovisual Policies
(Feb. 25, 2004), availableat http://tinyurl.com/aovc6.
Id.; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text (setting forth text of U.N.
120.
General Assembly Res. 1721).
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, art. VIII. In addition, the Twenty121.
Fifth Assembly created a new, quasi-judicial branch of the residual IGO, which is an
eleven-member "Panel of Legal Experts," elected by the ITSO Assembly of Parties, to
resolve disputes in connection with the treaty agreement between two or more current
or former parties, or between ITSO and one or more current or former parties. See id.
arts. IX(d)(xiv), XVI, annex A art.3.
FCC Report to Congress as Required by the Orbit Act, 17 F.C.C.R. 11458,
122.
11466 (2002).
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, art. VIII. Upon privatization,
123.
INTELSAT's Signatories were divested of their special legal status and transformed
into ordinary shareholders in the new private corporation. For this reason, in addition
to deleting all reference to "Signatories" or "Governors" from the amended INTELSAT
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As its primary responsibility, ITSO was charged with
safeguarding three "core principles" concerning the ongoing operation
of the privatized satellite system. 12 4 First, ITSO must protect the
"4global connectivity and global coverage" of the system. 125 This duty
requires ITSO to ensure that, post-privatization, the satellite system
always maintains the technical capability to carry communications to
126
and from virtually every populated land mass on earth.
Second, ITSO must safeguard "non-discriminatory access to the
[privatized] Company's system.' 27 This duty requires ITSO to ensure
that all users and prospective users enjoy "fair and equal opportunity
to access the [privatized] Company's system,"' 28 both for existing
services and for "future public telecommunications services offered by
the Company when space segment capacity is available on a

Agreement (i.e., the ITSO Agreement), the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties also
approved the decision of the Thirty-First Meeting of Signatories (Nov. 9-10, 2000) to
terminate the INTELSAT Operating Agreement, supra note 19, which had governed
commercial relations between the Signatories. See AMENDMENT TO THE OPERATING
AGREEMENT, INTELSAT ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES: RECORD OF DECISIONS OF THE TWENTYFIFTH (EXTRAORDINARY) MEETING, AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00, Attachment 2 (Nov. 27,
2000) [hereinafter Amendment to the Operating Agreement] (amending Art. 23(c) of
the INTELSAT Operating Agreement to provide for automatic termination of entire
INTELSAT Operating Agreement "when amendments to the [INTELSAT] Agreement
deleting references to the Operating Agreement enter into force . . . ."i.e., upon
privatization of INTELSAT's satellite system). On June 1, 2001, the United States
approved the termination of the INTELSAT Operating Agreement. See 2001 Treaty
Actions, supranote 90.
124,
FCC Report to Congress 2001, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12819, n.42 (citing
INTELSAT Assembly of Parties, Record of Decisions of the Twenty-Fifth
(Extraordinary) Meeting, AP-25-3E FINAL W/ll/00
34, at 6-8 (Nov. 27, 2000); see
also ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, arts. III(b), IX(c) (setting forth the "core
principles").
125.
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, arts. III(b)(i), IX(c)(i).
126.
See id. art. I(n) ('Global connectivity' means the interconnection
capabilities available to the Company's customers through the global coverage the
Company provides in order to make communication possible within and between the
five International Telecommunication Union regions defined by the plenipotentiary
conference of the ITU, held in Montreux in 1965."); id. art. I(m) ("'Global coverage'
means the maximum geographic coverage of the earth towards the northernmost and
southernmost parallels visible from satellites deployed in geostationary orbital
locations."); see also ITSO PUBLIC SERVICES AGREEMENT, INTELSAT ASSEMBLY OF
PARTIES: RECORD OF DECISIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH (EXTRAORDINARY) MEETING, AP-

25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment No. 3, art. 2, § 2.01(i) (Nov. 27, 2000) (obligating
Intelsat L.L.C. to "provid[e] the capability for any country or territory to connect with
any other country or territory through the provision of capacity from at least one
satellite in each of the three ocean regions: the Atlantic Ocean region (304.5 to 359
deg. E), the Indian Ocean region (60 to 66 deg. E), and the Pacific Ocean region (174 to
180 deg. E) such that these satellites together provide global coverage to all ITU
regions").
127.
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, arts. III(b)(iii), IX(c)(iii).
128.
See id. art. I(o).
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commercial basis."1 29 With respect to this duty, ITSO's Public Service
Agreement with Intelsat LLC emphasizes that
the provision of international public telecommunications services on a
commercial basis, in a manner consistent with the Public Service
Obligations, is not met if any country or territory which seeks or
permits the services provided by the Intelsat system is denied full and
complete access to all services provided by the Intelsat system on any
130
ground other than a commercial basis.

Finally, ITSO has a duty to ensure that the privatized Intelsat
LLC "serve[s] its lifeline connectivity customers." 131 Although the
revised ITSO Agreement does not define the term "lifeline
connectivity customers," the Twenty-Fifth INTELSAT Assembly of
Parties resolved that LCO protection must be extended to any
country that satisfies at least one of five alternative eligibility
criteria.

132

First, under the "Income/Teledensity Eligibility" criterion, a
country that is a Party to ITSO qualifies for LCO protection if it
1 33
or (2)
either (1) is "low income" as defined by the World Bank,
134
In
possesses a teledensity of less than three as defined by the ITU.

129.
130.
131.

See id. art. V.
ITSO Public Services Agreement, supra note 126, art. 2, § 2.01.
See ITSO Agreement, supranote 117, arts. III(b)(ii), IX(c)(ii).

132.
MODEL LCO CONTRACT (TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE LIFELINE
CONNECTIVITY OBLIGATION), INTELSAT ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES: RECORD OF DECISIONS OF
THE TWENTY-FIFTH (EXTRAORDINARY) MEETING, AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00 Attachment

No. 4, at 2-3 (Nov. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Model LCO Contract]. Although there are five
distinct bases, discussed infra, by which a country may qualify for LCO protection,
Intelsat L.L.C.'s "lifeline connectivity customers" have often been collectively described
as "those customers in poor or underserved countries that have a high degree of
dependence on INTELSAT." FCC Report to Congress as Required by Orbit Act 2002,
supra note 97, 17 F.C.C.R. at 11466 & n.40 (citing INTELSAT ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES,
RECORD OF DECISIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH (EXTRAORDINARY) MEETING, AP-25-3E

FINAL W/I1/00 34 (Nov. 27, 2000)).
3(a). In 2000, the World Bank
133.
Model LCO Contract, supra note 132,
defined a country as "low income" if its Gross National Income Per Capita was less
than $755. See LCO ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES, INTELSAT ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES: RECORD OF
DECISIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH (EXTRAORDINARY) MEETING, AP-25-3E FINAL

W/11/00 Attachment No. 5 (Nov. 27, 2000). Gross National Income Per Capita is
defined as "gross national income (formerly called gross national product or GNP)
divided by midyear population." Id. at 237 GNI per capita is measured in current US
dollars. Id In 2000, nearly 2.5 billion of the world's 6.1 billion people lived in countries
characterized by the World Bank as 'low income." Id. at 8, 16
3(a). "Teledensity" measures the
134.
Model LCO Contract, supra note 132,
number of telephone access lines per one hundred inhabitants. In re Int'l Settlement
Rates, 12 F.C.C.R. 19806, 164 (1997), aff'd, Cable & Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC, 166 F.3d
1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The ITU has noted that "a level of teledensity less than one is
generally a strong indication that a country's telecommunications infrastructure is
164 & n.295 (citing ITU, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
severely underdeveloped." Id.
INDICATORS FOR THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 4 (1st ed. 1995)). In

2002, ITU

figures showed that "83 countries have a teledensity of less than 10% [and] 29

1356

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38:1323

November 2000, the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties identified
sixty-nine member nations that qualified for LCO protection based on
35
"[i] neome/teledensity [e]ligibility."'
Second, until August 1, 2000, INTELSAT member countries that
did not qualify for income/teledensity eligibility were permitted to
petition the Assembly of Parties for LCO protection "on the basis that
there [was] no cost effective alternative provider of a service
136
equivalent to the service" then being provided by INTELSAT.
Those countries whose petitions were granted became eligible for
LCO protection under the "petition eligibility" criterion.13 7 In
November 2000, the Twenty-Fifth Assembly of Parties identified
twenty-seven countries or locations that qualified as "[p]etition
[e]ligible" for LCO protection for all of their international traffic, plus
fourteen additional countries or locations that qualified as petition
1 38
eligible for LCO protection for certain international links.
Third, a country not otherwise eligible for LCO protection can
qualify for limited "Correspondent Eligibility" to obtain LCO service
for communications to or from a country that is a lifeline customer.139
Fourth, a country that has temporarily lost connectivity through
every international channel except for the Intelsat system due to an
emergency (e.g., earthquake, war, etc.) may obtain temporary LCO
protection under the "Emergency Eligibility" criterion. 140 Fifth, a new
country created after July 18, 2001 is eligible to join ITSO and obtain
LCO protection under the "New Country Eligibility" criterion if the

countries have a teledensity of less than 1%." Ahmed Toumi, Director General, ITSO,
Addressing the 27th ITSO Assembly of Parties (June 26, 2002) [hereinafter Toumi
Address], available at http://tinyurl.com/99uhz.
135.
See LCO Eligible Countries, supra note 133 (setting forth complete list).
136.
Model LCO Contract, supra note 132, at 2 3(b).
137.
Id.
138.
See COUNTRIES AND LOCATIONS IN WHICH SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ARE
RECOMMENDED FOR LCO PROTECTION, INTELSAT ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES: RECORD OF
DECISIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH (EXTRAORDINARY) MEETING, AP-25-3E FINAL

W/11/00 Attachment No. 6, at 1-2 (Nov. 27, 2000) [hereinafter LCO Protection] (setting
forth complete lists); see also Model LCO Contract, supra note 132, at 2 3(b).
139.
Model LCO Contract, supranote 132, at 3 3(c).
Contract is eligible for LCO Protection if ... [t]he Contract(s) are not eligible
under (a) or (b), above, but, pursuant to an approved service order or lease
service transmission plan for the Contract(s), as of the Closing Date, Customer
is a correspondent to one or more other customer(s) that are eligible under (a)
or (b) for LCO Protection which other customer(s) has signed an LCO Contract,
with respect to that service.
140.
Id. The term of LCO protection under the "Emergency Eligibility" criterion
is not normally permitted to exceed six months. Id.
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new country also satisfies the income/teledensity eligibility
141
criterion.
ITSO's primary means of ensuring that the satellite system
continues to abide by these "core principles" is through enforcement
of a contractual Public Services Agreement that ITSO has executed
with Intelsat Ltd. 142 Under this agreement, Intelsat Ltd. is
contractually bound to adhere to ITSO's "core principles," and,
specifically, to enter into individual LCO commitments with every
lifeline country or territory that qualifies for LCO protection under
any of the five eligibility criteria. Although individual terms can vary,
generally these LCO commitments obligate Intelsat Ltd. to continue
to serve lifeline users at fixed pre-privatization costs, at least until
2013.143 The lifeline users, in turn, need only commit to purchase
capacity on a year-to-year basis. 144 After twelve years, ITSO's
financing will expire, and the Parties will need to decide whether or
5
to retire or to retain it.14
In addition to monitoring Intelsat Ltd.'s performance of its public
service obligations, ITSO may also pursue its public service mission
by "promoting the development of telecommunications services and
competition as an important means of securing international public
146
In
telecommunications services to all countries in the long term."
the
in
encouraging
role
"an
important
to
play
this regard, ITSO hopes
creation of a favorable environment for commercial satellite
communications, . . . both the individual State level, [and] at the
multilateral level at the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU), the [WTO], and other multilateral fora."'1 4 7 Within these
multilateral organizations, ITSO "will promote equitable access to
satellite systems
orbital / spectrum resources, notably for commercial
''
148
service.
public
international
to
committing

Id. In addition, the "New Country Eligibility" criterion for LCO protection
141.
also applies to a new country located in the geographic territory of a former country
that had previously qualified for "Petition Eligibility." Id.
FCC Report to Congress 2001, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12819, n.42 (citing
142.
INTELSAT ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES, RECORD OF DECISIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH

34 (Nov. 27, 2000); see also
(EXTRAORDINARY) MEETING, AP-25-3E FINAL W/11/00
ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, art. III(b) (setting forth the "core principles").
143.
FCC Report to Congress as Required by Orbit Act 2002, supra note 97, 17
F.C.C.R. at 11466.
144.

Id.

See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, arts. VII, XXI; see also infra Part
145.
V.A.4 (discussing procedures for renewing or retiring ITSO after 12 years).
146.
ITSO Mission & Role, http://tinyurl.com/dfanm.
Id.
147.
Id. For examples of ITSO's promotional activity, see, e.g., INTELSAT
148.
ASSEMBLY OF PARTIES, RECORD OF DECISIONS OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH (EXTRAORDINARY)

13(b) (May 1, 2001) (establishing a Frequency
MEETING, AP-26-3E FINAL W/4/01,
Working Party (FWP) to develop ITSO positions on "equitable procedures for the
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As it begins to define its mission, ITSO necessarily must "define
the scope and the attributes of public service" that it will devote its
efforts to safeguarding. 149 Addressing the Twenty-Seventh Assembly
of Parties in 2002, ITSO's new Director General sought to establish a
broad definition, stating:
The concept of public service adopted in this process differs from that of
Universal Service commonly defined in national regulations. And this
distinction is sizeable. . .. [Wihere [universal service] fills a social
function (minimum telephony service, sometimes limited to receive only
or emergency calls), public service has an economic purpose .... [T]he
public service definition in the ITSO treaty ... encompasses delivery of
voice, data, image and multimedia services to all countries of the world,
under conditions assuring universality, equality, quality and reliability,
150
continuity and, lastly, adaptability.

In support of this mission, ITSO's Twenty-Seventh Assembly of
Parties in June 2002 set four overriding goals and objectives for the
organization to pursue from 2002 to 2007: (1) maintaining the
continuity
of
the
provision
of
"international
public
telecommunications services"; (2) contributing to the promotion of a
global "information and communications infrastructure";
(3)
improving affordability of satellite services "through the promotion of
open standards"; and (4) serving as an information resource for
gathering "and disseminating data about national market and policy
environments."1

51

management of the radio frequency spectrum and orbital locations" to recommend to
the ITU); Press Release, ITSO, No. 2005-2, Satellite Industry Takes another Step to
Shape Future of Satellite Broadband (Jan. 18, 2005) (describing ITSO's Global
Broadband Satellite Infrastructure Initiative, designed to provide affordable highspeed Internet access to users in remote and underserved areas by creating a
harmonized technical and regulatory environment that promotes the emergence of a
mass market for satellite broadband services).
149.
Toumi Address, supra note 134.
150.
Id.; accord ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, art. I(f) (defining the "public
telecommunications services" safeguarded by ITSO to include
fixed or mobile telecommunications services which can be provided by satellite
and which are available for use by the public, such as telephony, telegraphy,
telex, facsimile, data transmission, transmission of radio and television
programs between approved earth stations having access to the Company's
space segment for further transmission to the public, and leased circuits for
any of these purposes; but excluding [most] mobile services ....
See also ITSO Global Broadband Satellite Infrastructure Initiative (GBSI Initiative)
(Dec. 17, 2002), http://tinyurl.com/cwc4n ("It is now universally accepted that
[information and communication technology] services are the engines for economic and
social development.").
151.
ITSO, CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF COMMITMENT TO INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES: 1964-2004,
at 6-7 (2004), available at
http://www.itso.int/brochureDocs/english-web-ok.pdf.
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Facilitating deployment of the magnitude of telecommunications
infrastructure that can lead underdeveloped nations to integrate
economically with the wider world is a lofty and worthwhile goal for
ITSO to pursue. Moreover, ITSO is well-situated to catalyze such
deployment. Still unclear, however, is whether ITSO will be fully
effective in fulfilling its primary mission to safeguard the universal
global connectivity of the world's telecommunications systems against
political and economic threats that could possibly arise.

V. DOES INTELSAT'S PRIVATIZATION THREATEN GLOBAL UNIVERSAL
SERVICE?

During the debate over INTELSAT privatization, some
commentators questioned whether ITSO, a residual "treaty-based
15 2
Organization that ensures international satellite public services"'
without itself providing any such services, could be as effective at
promoting and protecting its evolving "public service" mission as was
its predecessor INTELSAT, "a treaty-based Organization that at one
time enjoyed a monopoly position in providing international satellite
services. ' 153 To answer this question, both the economic and political
consequences of INTELSAT privatization must be assessed. Subpart
V.A addresses whether an economically viable framework in which
satellite communications connectivity will continue to be provided to
every populated location on earth at reasonable and affordable rates
remains in place after the privatization of INTELSAT. Subpart V.B
then addresses whether the privatization of INTELSAT has left in
place a legal framework in which global connectivity is now
dangerously subject to disruption by the unilateral action of the U.S.
government.

ITSO, About Us, supra note 95.
152.
Id. For articles questioning whether ITSO can be as effective as INTELSAT
153.
at protecting the interests of underserved nations, see Rob Frieden, Balancing Equity
and Efficiency Issues in the Management of Shared Global Radiocommunication
Resources, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 289 (2003) [hereinafter Frieden, Balancing
Equity]; Frieden, Privatizationof Satellite Cooperatives, supra note 114; Rob Frieden,
Should Intelsat and Inmarsat Privatize?, 18 TELECOMM. POL'Y 679 (1994); Ram S.
Jakhu, Safeguarding the Concept of Public Service and the Global Public Interest in
Telecommunications, 5 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 71 (2001); Francis Lyall, Expanding
Global Communications Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORKSHOP ON SPACE LAW IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: UNISPACE III TECHNICAL FORUM 63 (2000) [hereinafter
Lyall, Expanding Global Communications Services]; Lyall, On the Privatization of
INTELSAT, supra note 41; Patricia M. Sterns, Safeguarding the Concept of Public
Service in View of Increasing Commercialisationand Privatisationof Space Activities
with ParticularAttention to the Global Public Interest and the Needs of Developing
Countries, 5 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 133 (2001).
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A. Economic Threats to ITSO's "PublicService" Mission
One widespread concern about INTELSAT privatization is that,
notwithstanding ITSO's best efforts to enforce its public service
agreement with the privatized Intelsat Ltd., 154 some lifeline countries
will nonetheless be unable to afford to purchase needed
communications services from Intelsat Ltd. or from other market
participants. As one leading commentator has stated:
The original conception when space services were contemplated by the
United Nations was of telecommunications as a public service. This is
not the same as a service to the public. While it is equitable that
payment is made for use of both a public service, and a service to the
public, a public service should be provided and maintained even if it is
not itself profitmaking. A "service to the public" will usually be
provided only if there is a reasonable prospect of profit. Profits will
155
normally be maximized.

While such concerns are not without force, it must be
remembered that even prior to privatization, the INTELSAT treaty
organization did not-and could not-provide service to users who did
not pay for the service. 156 Moreover, although profitmaking was never
the primary goal of the INTELSAT treaty organization, 157 the
organization was always required to collect utilization charges that
were at least sufficient to cover its costs. 15 8 Thus, although

154.
See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (describing contents of
Public Service Agreement).
155.
Lyall, Expanding Global Communications Services, supra note 153, at 65.
156.
See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. III(a) ("INTELSAT shall
have as its prime objective the provision, on a commercial basis, of the space segment
required for international public telecommunications services of high quality and
reliability to be available on a non-discriminatory basis to all areas of the world.")
(emphasis added); id. Art. V(d) ("All users of the INTELSAT space segment shall pay
utilization charges determined in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and
the Operating Agreement.") (emphasis added); cf. Lyall, supra note 41, at 112
(acknowledging that the INTELSAT treaty organization did take sanctions against
users for non-payment of bills, but characterizing such sanctions as a "hiccup" in
INTELSAT's public service obligation that was "unwillingly applied by the
Organisation").
157.
See Frieden, Balancing Equity, supra note 153, at 299 (INTELSAT's
charter "emphasized the promotion of world peace and understanding through
widespread access and use of satellites. [INTELSAT and other intergovernmental
satellite] cooperatives operated as businesses, but had missions that emphasized access
and service instead of profit maximization.").
158.
See INTELSAT Operating Agreement, supra note 19, art. 8(a).
INTELSAT space segment utilization charges .. .shall have the objective of
covering the operating, maintenance and administrative costs of INTELSAT,
the provision of such operating funds as the Board of Governors may determine
to be necessary, the amortization of investment made by Signatories in
INTELSAT and compensation for use of the capital of Signatories.
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INTELSAT from its outset perhaps failed to fully implement the
United Nations' original conception of space telecommunications
services as a "public service," rather than a "service to the public," its
recent privatization is not the original source of this failure.
Nonetheless, privatization has changed the economics of the
satellite system's operation in certain significant respects. While the
INTELSAT treaty formerly required uniform rates to be offered to all
countries for all services, 159 the privatized Intelsat Ltd. now generally
is permitted to set rates that reflect market conditions and market
competition. Moreover, as a profit-driven commercial entity, the
privatized Intelsat Ltd. now has incentive to charge rates that will
maximize its profits. On monopoly routes, of course, maximizing
profits would entail charging monopoly rents. For this reason,
virtually all participants in the privatization process acknowledged
the need to explicitly guarantee that those nations not served by any
satellite systems other than INTELSAT would not face increases in
160
their cost of obtaining service.
Accordingly, as discussed above, qualified lifeline countries were
granted rights to enter into LCO commitments with ITSO and
Intelsat Ltd. 161 These LCO commitments guarantee that Intelsat Ltd.
may not raise the rates it charges to lifeline users above preprivatization levels until 2013.162 In theory, this disposition renders
INTELSAT's privatization Pareto optimal by yielding the benefits of
market competition to consumers and investors located in developed
nations, while making users in underserved countries no worse off.
The question remains, however, whether the LCO commitments, in
practice, have left underserved countries in a worse position than if
163
INTELSAT had never privatized.

159.
See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. V(d) ('The rates of space
segment utilization charge for each type of utilization shall be the same for all
applicants for space segment capacity for that type of utilization.").
160.

See, e.g., NEW ZEALAND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 57,

11.

The restructuring is unlikely to disadvantage New Zealand but raises issues for
lifeline users (such as several Pacific Island states with no other international
telecommunications circuit available other than INTELSAT) who rely on
INTELSAT for all their international telecommunications needs. To overcome
this possible threat, the interests of lifeline users are to be guaranteed by the
implementation of the "Lifeline Connectivity Obligation" by the new company,
with oversight from the new intergovernmental organisation, the ITSO.
See supra notes 131-41 and accompanying text (discussing LCO eligibility
161.
criteria and terms of LCO commitments).
162.
See id. In other words, lifeline users would continue to pay the same unitprice for transmission capacity, in nominal dollars, every year from 2001 to 2013. See
id.
See Frieden, Balancing Equity, supra note 153, at 301 ("[T]oo little time has
163.
passed to confirm that spun-off and commercialized former [satellite] cooperatives will
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To answer this question, this Subpart catalogues several ways in
which INTELSAT privatization arguably may have jeopardized or
impaired the ability of underserved countries to obtain international
satellite communications services, and evaluates the merits of each
identified potential threat. Thus, Subpart V.A.1 analyzes whether
lifeline users will enjoy a fair share of any future cost decreases likely
to be realized by the privatized Intelsat Ltd., as they would have if
privatization had not taken place. Subpart V.A.2 addresses whether
"lower-middle-income" nations not poor enough to qualify for lifeline
protection remain secure in their ability to obtain international
communications service. Subpart V.A.3 discusses whether the system
of financing Intelsat's provision of service to lifeline users is secure,
given that privatization has arguably eliminated certain implicit
subsidies to such users while failing to replace them with explicit
subsidies. Subpart V.A.4. discusses how lifeline users will enforce
their LCO contracts after 2013, when the endowment that finances
the residual IGO, ITSO, is scheduled to run out of funds. Finally,
Subpart V.A.5 considers whether, and how, global connectivity would
survive the insolvency or bankruptcy of Intelsat Ltd.
1. Can Lifeline Countries be Charged Rates Higher than the Average
Rates Paid by High-Volume Users?
Although the LCO commitment now protects lifeline countries
against rate increases for satellite communications services before
2013, one consequence of INTELSAT's privatization is that the rates
paid by such countries are no longer tied to the rate paid by highincome countries for similar services. 164 Historically, however, global
rates for international telecommunications services have decreased
over time, as technological advancement has steadily reduced the
costs of providing such service and has enabled growth in
transmission capacity to outstrip growth in demand. 16 5 If the historic

not further handicap developing nations and worsen the gap between nations in terms
of access to telecommunications and information-processing services.").
164.
Compare FCC Report to Congress 2002, 17 F.C.C.R. at 11467 (describing
Intelsat Ltd.'s obligation to supply transmission capacity to lifeline users at fixed preprivatization costs for 12 years), with INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. V(d)
(mandating, prior to privatization, that "[t]he rates of space segment utilization charge
for each type of utilization shall be the same for all applicants").
See Frieden, Balancing Equity, supra note 153, at 299-300:
165.
As satellite technology evolved and as the marketplace for satellite services
developed, the cost of constructing, launching, and operating a satellite
network dropped substantially. Demand for satellite services, particularly
delivery of video content to broadcast and cable television networks, stimulated
private entrepreneurs to think they could enter the market and thrive.
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trend towards ever-decreasing average global prices continues into
the future, then lifeline countries could have expected further rate
decreases from 2001 through 2013, had INTELSAT's utilization
charges remained uniform and cost-based. In contrast, while LCO
commitments protect lifeline countries against any rate increases
until 2013, such commitments do not guarantee that future cost
savings will be passed through in the form of rate decreases.
Accordingly, while privatization combined with the LCO commitment
essentially has preserved the pre-privatization status quo ante for
lifeline countries, in comparative terms it may have curtailed those
countries' opportunities to share in potential cost savings derived
from continued technological advancement.
While the LCO commitment itself does not require future
decreases in cost to be shared with lifeline users, however, as a U.S.licensed carrier, Intelsat Ltd.'s rates remain subject to FCC
regulation. Upon privatization, the FCC classified Intelsat Ltd. as a
"dominant international carrier" on those U.S. -international "thin
routes" that are not served by any other carrier. 166 Under this
classification, Intelsat Ltd. must
provide at least a four percent annual [retail price] reduction ...in its
provision of capacity for switched voice services on thin routes,
comparable to rates charged on thick routes, and [must] cap rates for
private line service to thin routes at the rates offered on thick routes,
167
with no future rate increases.

The requirement of an annual four percent reduction in price was
originally imposed precisely to reduce the rates charged for
INTELSAT transmission capacity "in 'non-competitive' markets to
rates below those presently charged .. .in 'competitive' markets. '168

Prior to privatization, INTELSAT's U.S. signatory, COMSAT, had already
166.
been classified and regulated as a "dominant international carrier" on the same U.S.international "thin routes." See COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 14083
(reaffirming 1985 Order classifying COMSAT as a dominant carrier on monopoly "thin
routes," but reclassifying COMSAT as a nondominant carrier on competitive "thick
routes") modified, Policies and Rules for Alternative Incentive Based Regulation of
Comsat Corp., 14 F.C.C.R. 3065 (1999). Subsequently, when COMSAT was merged into
Intelsat Ltd. during INTELSAT's privatization process, the FCC transferred
COMSAT's regulatory status to Intelsat Ltd. See Lockheed Martin Corp., 17 F.C.C.R.
22 (Int'l Bureau & Wireless Telecomm. Bureau 2002) (classifying
27732, 27746
Intelsat Ltd., upon merger with COMSAT, "as dominant in its provision of space
segment capacity for switched voice and private line service on thin routes").
167.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 17 F.C.C.R. at 27747 23. The FCC had originally
adopted this regulation several years before INTELSAT was privatized. See Policies
and Rules for Alternative Incentive Based Regulation of Comsat Corp., 14 F.C.C.R.
3065, 3072-75
19-22, 25 (1999) [hereinafter Comsat Thin Route Order] (adopting
regulation requiring four percent annual reduction in rates charged by the U.S.
Signatory, COMSAT, for INTELSAT transmission capacity used to serve "thin routes").
Comsat Thin Route Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3072 19 (emphasis added).
168.
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Moreover, this mandatory annual price reduction will continue until
"market conditions ha[ve]
changed enough to warrant a
modification. ' 169 Thus, although Intelsat Ltd.'s LCO contracts do not
require future cost savings to be passed through to lifeline users,
longstanding FCC regulations that remain in effect do appear to
ensure that lifeline users will never be charged rates that
substantially exceed the average rates charged by Intelsat Ltd.
2. Are the LCO Eligibility Criteria So Stringent that They Fail to
Protect Underserved "Lower-Middle-Income" Nations?
In 2000, sixty-nine nations were determined to qualify for LCO
protection under the "low income" or "low teledensity" LCO eligibility
criteria established by INTELSAT's Twenty-Fifth Assembly of
Parties. 1 70 Other underserved nations with very limited resources,
however, were not sufficiently destitute to satisfy those criteria.
Specifically, a country whose gross national income per capita in 2000
was more than $755 would not qualify for LCO protection under the
"low income" criterion. 171 In comparison, however, the world's mean
gross national income per capita in 2000 was $5,170.172 Thus,
countries whose 2000 gross national incomes were as low as $756 per
person-less than 15% of the world average-were not granted LCO
protection under the "low income" criteria. 173 Instead, despite their
relative need, such countries now generally must pay market prices
174
to obtain international satellite communications services.

169.
Lockheed Martin Corp., 17 F.C.C.R. at 27747 23.
170.
See supra note 133-35 and accompanying text (discussing these criteria);
see also LCO Eligible Countries, supra note 133 (setting forth complete list of 69
eligible countries).
171.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text (explaining eligibility criteria).
172.
WORLD BANK, THE LITTLE GREEN
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2002, at 8 (Apr. 2002).

DATA

BOOK

FROM

THE

WORLD

173.
Examples of poor countries that did not qualify for LCO protection under
the "low income" criteria are Bolivia, whose gross national income per capita in 2001
was $950, and Kiribati, whose gross national income per capita in 2001 was $830. See
WORLD BANK, THE LITTLE GREEN DATA BOOK FROM THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT

INDICATORS 2003, at 47, 122 (April 2003). The World Bank refers to such countries as
"lower middle income" countries. See id. at 15 (defining "lower-middle-income
economies" as "those with a GNI per capita of more than $745 but less
than... $2,975").
174.
A country that did not qualify for LCO protection under the "low income"
criteria might still qualify for such protection under the separate 'low teledensity"
criteria if it had fewer than three telephone access lines per one hundred inhabitants.
See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing "low teledensity" eligibility
criteria).
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Presumably, of course, the market-based prices paid by such
countries are kept in check by competitive forces. 175 But competition
can do no more than force Intelsat Ltd. to match the terms and
conditions of service offered by its competitors. Under conditions of
oligopoly, low-volume, lower-middle-income countries may not enjoy
sufficient bargaining power to obtain favorable terms from any of the
handful of international telecommunications providers willing to
serve them. INTELSAT privatization, however, provides a benefit to
lower-middle-income countries only if the rates now available to such
countries are set in a market that is truly competitive. If, in contrast,
those rates simply reflect price leadership in an uncompetitive
oligopoly market, then even the advent of formal competition is not
guaranteed to yield rates more favorable to lower-middle-income
countries than those countries would have paid if INTELSAT's
176
former uniform pricing policy had remained in effect.
3. Have Implicit Subsidies to Underserved Nations Been Eliminated,
Without Being Replaced by Explicit Subsidies?
Before privatization, INTELSAT's rates for transmission
capacity were uniform throughout the world. 177 Arguably,
INTELSAT's uniform pricing policy caused the system's low-cost and
high-volume users to implicitly subsidize its high-cost users.' 7 8 In

A country that could not qualify for "Income/Teledensity Eligibility"
175.
nonetheless remained eligible for LCO protection if, at the time of INTELSAT
privatization in 2000, that country could not obtain equivalent service from any costeffective alternative provider. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text
(discussing "petition eligibility" criteria); see also Countries and Locations in Which
Specific Commitments are Recommended for LCO Protection, supra note 138 (setting
forth a list of 27 countries or locations that are "petition-eligible" for LCO protection for
all international traffic, plus 14 additional countries or locations "petition-eligible" for
LCO protection for certain international links). Thus, any "lower-middle-income"
countries ineligible for LCO protection should presumably be able to obtain equivalent
service, cost-effectively, from providers other than Intelsat Ltd.
176.
Cf. Robin Cooper Feldman, Consumption Taxes and the Theory of General
and Individual Taxation, 21 VA. TAX REV. 293, 351-52 n.139 (2002) (discussing
economic literature suggesting that prices frequently can be maintained at levels far in
excess of marginal cost in markets characterized by oligopoly and price-leadership).
177.
INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. V(d). In practice, the uniform
pricing policy ensured that INTELSAT's rates did not vary to reflect any differences in
the organization's cost of providing service to different countries, nor to reflect
competitive pressures on pricing brought to bear in particular national markets.
See Lyall, Expanding Global Communications Services, supra note 153, at
178.
69 (Prior to privatization,
[iln terms of Article V(d) of the INTELSAT Agreement, the charging rate for
each type of utilisation of the INTELSAT space segment [was] the same for all
users of that service. What this means is that routes and connections which
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that respect, INTELSAT's historic pricing policy mirrored the system
of implicit subsidies that was used in the United States throughout
the twentieth century to finance the deployment of wireline telephone
service to high-cost, low-volume rural locations. 179 In both situations,
users in low-cost, high-volume locations historically had little choice
but to pay the implicit subsidies at issue; served by monopoly
providers, these low-cost users had no ability to take their business
elsewhere.
In the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (1996 Act), Congress
sought to bring the benefits of competition to U.S. telephone
consumers by bringing an end to the "regulated monopoly"
environment under which wireline local telephone service had long
been provided.18 0 At the same time, Congress recognized that the
advent of competition would threaten the ability of incumbent local
exchange carriers to continue to "overcharge" low-cost urban users as
a means of implicitly cross-subsidizing service to high-cost rural
users.18 1 For this reason, the 1996 Act established a new,

competitively neutral system of explicit subsidies designed to finance
the continued provision of affordable telephone service to high-cost
users.18 2 Under the 1996 Act, every telecommunications carrier that
provides interstate telecommunications service is required to

[did] not themselves generate sufficient income to pay for their provision [were]
charged at less than cost.
179.
See generally FCC Report to Congress in re Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11504
7 (1998) [hereinafter FCC Report on
Universal Service]:
[Historically,] universal service was promoted through a patchwork quilt of
implicit and explicit subsidies .... Charges to long distance carriers and rates
for certain intrastate services . . . were priced above cost, which enabled local
telephone companies to . . . [subsidize the cost of providing phone service to]
residents in rural and high cost areas ....
180.
See H. R. Rep. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (stating Congress's
intent "to provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework
designed
to
accelerate
rapidly
private
sector
deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans by
opening all telecommunications markets to competition...").
181.
See S. Rep. No. 104-23, at 4-5 (1995) (stating Congress's twin goals of
"protect[ing] and advanc[ing] universal service" while also "allow[ing] competition for
local telephone service").
182.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (2000) (mandating
that subsidies to support universal service "should be explicit"); see also H. R. Rep. No.
104-458, at 131 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (stating Congress's intention that universal service
support mechanisms "continued or created under [the 1996 Act] should be explicit,
rather than implicit as many support mechanisms are today"); FCC Report on
Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R., at 11510
18 (stating that "establishing an orderly
transition from federal implicit subsidies to federal explicit subsidies" was the
"intended goal" of the 1996 Act).
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contribute regularly into a universal service fund. 183 The revenues
paid into this fund are then used to underwrite "the provision,
maintenance, and upgrading of facilities and services for which the
support is intended." 184 This system of explicit payments and explicit
subsidies ensures that the burden of providing service to high-cost
rural and low-volume users is apportioned across all industry
participants in a competitively neutral manner.
The revised ITSO Agreement, in contrast, requires Intelsat Ltd.
alone to support ITSO's public service mission to bring international
communications service to underserved global regions. 185 None of
Intelsat Ltd.'s competitors must meet any similar public service
obligation. Nor are those competitors required to contribute any funds
to help underwrite Intelsat Ltd.'s provision of service to high-cost,
low-volume lifeline users. In essence, Intelsat Ltd.'s postprivatization commercial operations, while subject to substantial
competition on all high-volume international routes, now must
underwrite the company's costs of serving low-volume routes.
Arguably, under conditions of competition, Intelsat Ltd. cannot
continue to command rates from its high-volume route customers that
are sufficiently high to cross-subsidize service to lifeline users.
Rather, if the analogy to wireline telephony is apt, then Intelsat
Ltd.'s competitors now have incentive to "cream-skim" Intelsat Ltd.'s
customers by charging slightly lower rates than Intelsat Ltd. on
profitable high-volume routes, while leaving Intelsat Ltd. alone with
the burden of serving low-volume lifeline users at price-capped
rates.1 86 Such a paradigm would not be economically sustainable.
On the other hand, the marginal cost of providing satellite
transmission capacity to low-volume users located in remote locations

47 U.S.C. § 254(d) ("Every telecommunications carrier that provides
183.
interstate telecommunications service shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis, to the specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms established
by the Commission to preserve and advance universal service.").
Id. § 254(e); see also id. § 214(e) (setting forth eligibility criteria for
184.
telecommunications carriers who seek to provide services financed by universal service
fund).
185.
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, arts. III, V (obligating Intelsat Ltd.,
post-privatization, to maintain global connectivity and global coverage, serve its lifeline
connectivity customers, and provide non-discriminatory access to its satellite system to
such customers).
186.
See Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization,
116 HARv. L. REV. 1285, 1324 (2003) (defining "cream skimming" as "offering service
only to the most profitable customers," and noting that competitive "cream skimming"
poses a threat to universal service when telecommunications systems that formerly
relied on implicit subsidies are privatized); cf. FCC Report on Universal Service, supra
note 179, at 11505 (stating that Congress in 1996 created the Universal Service Fund
to collect and administer explicit subsidies precisely because Congress "[r]ecogniz[ed]
the vulnerability of ... implicit subsidies to competition").
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may not be as burdensome as the marginal cost of providing wireline
telephone service to such users. While a domestic local exchange
carrier may need to string and maintain miles of costly copper wire to
a
single
remote
residential
customer,1 8 7
satellite
reach
telecommunications do not require any additional physical facilities
or resources to reach highly remote locations.' 8 8 Moreover,
technological innovation has tended to increase the transmission
capacity of satellites, and thereby to continually reduce satellite
operators' unit cost of providing service.'

8 9

Indeed, for these reasons,

Intelsat Ltd.'s competitors have often purported to covet Intelsat

Ltd.'s monopoly "thin routes," which they often have characterized as
a potential source of monopoly profits for Intelsat Ltd., rather than a

costly burden. 190

187.
See FCC Report on Universal Service, supra note 179, 13 F.C.C.R. at 11504
6-7 (stating that, without subsidies, consumers located in "remote and sparsely
populated areas" would be "forced to pay prohibitively high rates for their phone
service," and that the high cost of serving "residents in rural and high cost areas"
would have prevented such residents, if unsubsidized, "from receiving phone service
because of prohibitively high telephone rates").
188.
See Frieden, Privatization of Satellite Cooperatives, supra note 114, at
1004:
The unconcentrated signal from a geostationary orbiting satellite can
illuminate as much as one-third of the earth's surface. Once a carrier incurs the
substantial sunk cost to make this footprint available, the incremental cost for
it to serve an additional point of communication and additional users via
another earth station approaches zero. (footnote omitted).
See Comsat Thin Route Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3071-73
15-21(assuming
189.
that the unit cost of providing satellite communications services declines by at least
four percent per annum); see also Ahmed Toumi, Director General, ITSO Welcoming
Address at the Opening Session of the 28th Assembly of Parties (June 29, 2004),
http://tinyurl.com/ahyg7 (noting that the price of supplying satellite transmission
capacity dropped precipitously in the early twenty-first century due to "[t]he drop in
demand for satellite capacity by major telecommunications carriers that are
consolidating and reducing costs, the competition from transoceanic fiber optics cables,
and the drop in demand for bandwidth as a consequence of digital compression").
See Lockheed Martin Corp., 17 F.C.C.R. 27732, 27744
19 (Int'l Bur. &
190.
Wireless Tel. Bur. 2002) (reasoning that Intelsat Ltd.'s rates are regulated "as
dominant on thin routes because [Intelsat Ltd.] possesses market power in this
geographic market"), aff'd on recon., 18 F.C.C.R. 16605 (Int'l Bur. & Wireless Tel. Bur.
9 (1998)
2003); COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 14083, 14090-91
(explaining that, as a dominant carrier on its "thin routes," Intelsat Ltd. "require[s]
detailed regulatory scrutiny" because its "market power" creates "incentive to charge
rates or engage in practices that contravene the requirements of the Communications
Act"). But see U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELSAT PRIVATIZATION AND THE
(2004),
04-891, at 15-16
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORBIT ACT, GAO
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04891.pdf:
While Intelsat is the sole provider of satellite service into certain
countries,... traffic into some countries is "thin"--that is, there is not much
traffic, and therefore there is little revenue potential. In such cases, global
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Only time will tell whether Intelsat Ltd.'s exclusive capabilityand corresponding obligation-to serve lifeline countries at everdecreasing regulated rates will prove, in fact, to be a burden or a
benefit to the company financially. If it is a burden, however, then the
burden is relatively light. 191 Specifically, shortly before privatization,
the FCC determined that only thirteen percent of INTELSAT's U.S.international circuits were deployed for service to the sixty-three
"thin routes" that no other carrier then served. 192 Moreover, only
eight percent of U.S. revenue derived from INTELSAT services was
then attributable to thin routes. 19 3 To date, these ratios appear to
remain relatively unchanged. 194 In the future, as commercial
communications satellites continue to proliferate and the number of
thin routes decreases, Intelsat Ltd.'s obligation to serve lifeline
customers can only grow less burdensome. 195 Thus, even if Intelsat
Ltd.'s obligation to serve lifeline users at price-capped rates does
impose a cost burden on Intelsat Ltd., this cost burden appears small
in comparison with the company's overall operating revenues, and
can only diminish over time. Accordingly, the lack of any explicit
subsidy mechanism through which other carriers and users
contribute payments toward the cost of serving lifeline users does not
appear seriously to jeopardize Intelsat Ltd.'s financial viability or its
196
ability to fulfill its public service obligation.

satellite companies other than Intelsat may not be interested in providing
service to these countries.
191.
See Comsat Thin Route Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3073 21 (noting "the small
size of the [thin-route] markets .
.
192.
Id. at 3068 T 9.
193.
Id. at 3068
8. In 1997-98, of $263 million derived from the provision of
INTELSAT service on all U.S.-international routes, only $19 million was attributable
to service provided on U.S.-international "thin routes." Id.
194.
Since privatization, the FCC has not performed any new study of the
revenues or circuit resources attributable to the Intelsat Ltd.'s "thin routes." During
the privatization process, however, the FCC ruled that upon privatization, Intelsat Ltd.
would be regulated as a "dominant carrier" on its "thin routes." In the regulatory
proceedings that led to this decision, the FCC considered revising some of the specific
regulations that had previously applied to the U.S. signatory, COMSAT, prior to
privatization. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp., 17 F.C.C.R. at 27744-47 IT 19-23, afFd
on recon., 18 F.C.C.R. 16605, 16607 T 3 & nn.9-10 (2003) (ultimately declining to
modify thin-route rules after concluding that underlying market conditions had not
changed in any significant respect).
195.
See Comsat Thin Route Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3079-80 (assuming that
current "thin routes" will gradually become competitive, and establishing a procedure
for reclassifying them as "thick routes" when competition arises); cf. FCC Report on
Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11503-04 (1998) ("[Iln general, continued growth
in the information services industry will buttress, not hinder, universal service.").
196.
Notably, Intelsat Ltd.'s obligation to serve to its lifeline users at pricecapped rates did not deter a group of sophisticated private investors from paying $5
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4. Will Global Connectivity Survive the Possible Retirement in 2013
of the Residual Treaty Organization ITSO?
On July 18, 2001, the international treaty organization
INTELSAT formally transferred its satellites to the new private
company Intelsat Ltd. and simultaneously transformed itself into the
residual treaty organization ITSO. 197 When it transferred the
satellites, however, the treaty organization retained "certain financial
assets" to be used to fund ITSO's operating costs until 2013.198 In
2013 or thereafter, when these funds run out, ITSO's member
governments must decide whether to continue the residual treaty
organization ITSO or to retire it.199 Should ITSO be retired, then
lifeline users will no longer be able to enlist the treaty organization's
aid in enforcing Intelsat Ltd.'s public service obligations. 200 Arguably,
such a development could leave such users vulnerable to detrimental
20 1
price increases or service reductions.
For several reasons, however, such an outcome is unlikely. First,
a decision to terminate the ITSO treaty organization would require
the approval of two-thirds of ITSO's member governments. 20 2 Thus, if
just fifty-one of ITSO's 150 member countries vote to continue the
treaty organization beyond 2013, then the treaty organization will

billion dollars to purchase Intelsat Ltd. on January 28, 2005. See supra note 109
(discussing the transaction).
197.
See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
198.
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, art. VII(a) ("ITSO will be financed
for.., twelve year[s] . . . by the retention of certain financial assets at the time of
transfer of ITSO's space system to the Company.").
199.
See id. art. XXI ("This Agreement shall be in effect for at least twelve years
from the date of transfer of ITSO's space system to the Company. The Assembly of
Parties may terminate this Agreement effective upon the twelfth anniversary of the
date of transfer of ITSO's space system to the Company ....
").
200.
The ITSO was originally created because some lifeline users and
commentators were "reluctant to see INTELSAT's public service obligation secured
through the vagaries of U.S. law as it now exists" and, therefore, preferred "to entrust
the supervision of such matters to an international body." Lyall, Expanding Global
Communications Services, supra note 153, at 69. Notably, however, Intelsat Ltd.'s
contractual obligations to lifeline users, including particularly the LCOs set forth in its
LCO contracts, do not necessarily expire in 2013, even if the ITSO treaty organization
should be retired. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
201.
See Lyall, supra note 41, at 118 (expressing "fear that, even with
the ...temporary securing of lifeline services for remote and under-developed areas
[through the LCO Commitment], in fifteen years such services provided by the new
INTELSAT structures on a subsidised basis will have disappeared on commercial
grounds.").
202.
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, art. XXI ("The Assembly of Parties
may terminate this Agreement . . . by a vote pursuant to Article IX(l) of the Parties.
Such decision shall be deemed to be a matter of substance."); see also id. art. IX(f)
("Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken by an affirmative vote cast by at
least two-thirds of the Parties whose representatives are present and voting.").
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continue. 20 3 At present, however, at least 110 countries qualify for
LCO protection under ITSO's various criteria for at least some
services or some routes. 20 4 If, in 2013, even half of these lifeline
countries believe that ITSO's continuation would serve their national
interests, such countries would control a sufficient number of votes to
ensure that ITSO will continue.
Of course, any individual ITSO member country that favors
to
retirement of the treaty organization in 2013 would be free 205
withdraw at that time, even if the organization continues to exist.
But individual ITSO member countries already have the right to
withdraw today. 20 6 For non-lifeline ITSO member countries, the costs
and benefits of maintaining membership in an ongoing ITSO would
not change significantly in 2013. Indeed, should ITSO remain in
existence after its initial twelve-year endowment is exhausted, the
organization's modest operating costs would then be paid by Intelsat
Ltd., not by ITSO's member governments. 20 7 Thus, it is very likely
that ITSO will remain in existence beyond 2013 if the lifeline
countries consider its continuation to be beneficial.
Moreover, even if ITSO is retired in 2013, lifeline countries
would not be left wholly unprotected. While it exists, ITSO provides
assistance to lifeline users by monitoring Intelsat Ltd.'s performance
in honoring its commitments to such users, and by assisting 20in8
resolving any disputes between Intelsat Ltd. and its lifeline users.

See ITSO Member Countries, http://tinyurl.com/9bong (listing 148 member
203.
countries).
See supra notes 131-41 (discussing criteria for lifeline connectivity
204.
protection and counting numbers of countries that qualify); see also LCO Eligible
Countries, supra note 133 (listing sixty-nine countries eligible for lifeline connectivity
protection under low income or low teledensity criteria); LCO Protection, supra note
138 (listing forty-one additional countries or locations that do not meet low income low
teledensity criteria but nonetheless are eligible for lifeline connectivity protection on
ground that no other carrier provides service).
205.
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, Art. XIV(a)(i) ("Any Party may
withdraw voluntarily from ITSO.").
See id.
206.
See id. Art. VII(b) ("In the event ITSO continues beyond twelve years, ITSO
207.
shall obtain funding through the Public Services Agreement."); id. art. 1(j) ('Public
Services Agreement' means the legally binding instrument through which ITSO
ensures that [Intelsat Ltd.] honors the Core Principles."). The funds required would be
modest, for at present, ITSO has only four professional employees, and is based in
office space that is located inside Intelsat Ltd.'s headquarters building. See Intelsat
Ltd., Contact Us, http://tinyurl.com/bbd6a.
208.
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, art. X(f) ("The Director General shall
(i) monitor [Intelsat Ltd.'s] adherence to the Core Principle to serve ['lifeline'
users] ... (iii) shall assist ['lifeline' users] in resolving their disputes with [Intelsat
Ltd.] .... "). To date, ITSO appears to have played an important behind-the-scenes role
in performing these functions. See Toumi, 2004 Address, supra note 189:
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Even if ITSO eventually is retired, however, Intelsat Ltd.'s LCO
contracts with its lifeline users would still remain in effect. If
necessary, these LCO contracts could be enforced directly against
Intelsat Ltd. in a court of competent jurisdiction in the United
209
States.
In sum, ITSO will continue beyond 2013 if the lifeline users
collectively determine that the organization is still needed to protect
their interests. Even if the organization is retired in 2013, lifeline
users still enjoy the benefit of their LCO protection and the legal
means of enforcing this benefit. For these reasons, the possibility that
ITSO might be retired in 2013 does not appear to seriously threaten
the ability of lifeline users to receive service from Intelsat Ltd.
5. What Will Happen if Intelsat Ltd. Goes Bankrupt?
Before its satellites were privatized, the international treaty
organization INTELSAT was not susceptible to financial failure.
Rather, before privatization, if ever INTELSAT's commercial
revenues had failed to cover the organization's costs, INTELSAT was
authorized to make capital calls to its Signatories to make up the
difference. 210 Moreover, for the first decade of its existence,
INTELSAT also was protected by international law against

July 2002 signaled the start of the active supervision of privatized Intelsat's
performance. This phase has definitely had its share of problems ....
[Ilt has
taken time to establish a relationship of mutual and solid trust between ITSO
and Intelsat Ltd., and to develop effective work methods ....
[In 2003, the
focus was chiefly on ... Intelsat [Ltd.'s] compliance with its lifeline connectivity
obligations with countries benefiting from LCO protection. For customers in
countries without any real power to negotiate price reductions with Intelsat,
the LCO Pricing Index is a guarantee that, under certain conditions, they will
enjoy market prices. After several months of painstaking discussions, we
reached an acceptable solution for both the annual calculation of the current
Index, and the principles that will govern [its future] revision ....
209.
See FCC Report to Congress 2002, 17 F.C.C.R. 11458, 11467 (2002) (noting
that post-privatization, Intelsat Ltd. "do[es] not maintain an immune or privileged
status").
210.
See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. V(c) ("Each Signatory shall
contribute to the capital requirements of INTELSAT, and shall receive capital
repayment and compensation for use of capital ....
); see also INTELSAT Operating
Agreement, supra note 19, art. 8(f):
To the extent, if any, that the revenues earned by INTELSAT are insufficient
to meet INTELSAT operating, maintenance and administrative costs, the
Board of Governors may decide to meet the deficiency by using INTELSAT
operating funds, by overdraft arrangements, by raising a loan, by requiring
Signatories to make capital contributions in proportion to their respective
investment shares or by any combination of such measures.
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competition from separate satellite systems that could cause
"significant economic harm" to INTELSAT's operations. 2 11 Even after
it waived this protection in 1984, INTELSAT remained capable of
at
furnishing substantially all of its satellite transmission capacity 212
rates more than sufficient to cover all of the organization's costs.
Thus, prior to privatization, lifeline users enjoyed an extremely high
level of assurance that financial difficulties would never force
INTELSAT to go out of business.
After privatization, in contrast, Intelsat Ltd. has become an
ordinary commercial entity, subject to competition and operated
according to ordinary business principles. Moreover, Intelsat Ltd.'s
business operations take place in a market sector in which
bankruptcies are far from unknown.2 13 Arguably, therefore, the
privatized Intelsat Ltd. could fail. If so, then the company's public
service obligations to lifeline users seemingly might go unfulfilled.
In practice, however, even if Intelsat Ltd. does fail, the
company's satellites-which are each worth hundreds of millions of
dollars-would not likely go dark.2 14 Rather, if Intelsat Ltd. should
become insolvent and is forced into receivership, its insolvency would
not excuse the company from fulfilling its public service
obligations. 215 Indeed, even if Intelsat Ltd. ultimately were to be
dissolved in bankruptcy, the company's satellites would then be
transferred to a new owner. In the event that such a transfer takes
place, U.S. law provides several safeguards that should prove
adequate to protect the interests of lifeline users.

See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. XIV(d). In fact, INTELSAT
211.
never invoked this protection, which it permanently waived in 1984. See supra notes
27-29 and accompanying text.
212.
See Direct Access to the INTELSAT System, 14 F.C.C.R. 15703, 15734-36
(1999) (finding that INTELSAT's utilization charges (IUC) historically were set at rate
levels sufficient to provide an 18 percent return on investment to INTELSAT); see also
Lyall, On the Privatization of INTELSAT, supra note 41, at 106 ("At present
INTELSAT finances are very healthy. It has not had to call on capital from its
Signatories to finance new satellites series for many years.").
See Andy Pasztor, After Debacles High and Low, Satellite Concerns Rise
213.
Again, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4, 2003, at C3 (recounting bankruptcies of commercial
satellite communications companies including New ICO, Globalstar, Iridium,
Teledesic, and Loral Space & Communications Ltd. that occurred from 1996 to 2002).
214.
See id. (describing the dispositions of the satellites that had belonged to
bankrupt commercial satellite communications companies including New ICO,
Globalstar, Iridium, Teledesic, and Loral Space & Communications Ltd., all of which
remained in operation).
See, e.g., Final Analysis Comm. Servs. Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 4768, 4783 & n.91
215.
(Int'l Bur. 2004) ("bankruptcy proceedings [are not] an excuse for failure to meet
unrelated regulatory obligations where debt is not an issue," and noting that bankrupt
satellite carriers have provided service to the public "before, during, and after [their]
bankruptcy proceeding[s]") (citing LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1146 n.2 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
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First, arguably Intelsat Ltd.'s LCO contracts are best
characterized as property instruments through which Intelsat Ltd.'s
lifeline users have been vested with leasehold interests in Intelsat
Ltd.'s satellite transmission capacity. If so, then the rights of lifeline
users under the LCO contracts are analogous to a tenant's leasehold
interest in real property owned in fee simple by her landlord. Under
U.S. bankruptcy law, however, when a landlord becomes bankrupt,
any post-petition disposition of the bankrupt landlord's property must
"provide adequate protection" of the tenant's leasehold interest in the
property. 216 To provide such protection, the transferee of a bankrupt
debtor's property ordinarily must take such property subject to any
2 17
preexisting third-party leasehold interests or encumbrances.
Moreover, even if the LCO contracts are better characterized as
"executory contracts"-rather than as property instruments that vest
lifeline users with leasehold interests in Intelsat Ltd.'s satellite
transponder capacity-Intelsat Ltd.'s public service obligations to
lifeline users would nonetheless survive any dissolution in
bankruptcy. Under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, an executory contract
to which a bankrupt debtor is a party normally remains in effect so
2 18
long as neither party defaults in its obligations under the contract.

216.

See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2000):

[O]n request of an entity that has an interest in property used, sold, or leased,
or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the [bankruptcy] trustee, the
court.., shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to
provide adequate protection of such interest. This subsection also applies to
property that is subject to any unexpired lease of personal property ....
In the present context, it is unnecessary to decide whether satellites in orbit are better
characterized as real property or personal property, because this rule governs
dispositions in bankruptcy of either type of property that is encumbered by a thirdparty interest. See id.
217.
See id. § 363(f) (providing that property of a bankrupt debtor's estate
ordinarily must be transferred subject to "any interest in such property of an entity
other than the estate"). The U.S. Bankruptcy Code enumerates five exceptional
situations in which the property of the bankrupt debtor may be transferred "free and
clear of' any third-party interest in the property: where "applicable nonbankruptcy law
permits sale of the property free and clear of such interest;" where the interested thirdparty entity consents to waive its interest in the property; where "such interest is a lien
and the price at which such property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of
all liens on such property;" where "such interest is in bona fide dispute;" or where the
interested third-party entity could be compelled by law "to accept a money satisfaction
of such interest." Id. § 363(f)(1)-(5). Should Intelsat Ltd. become bankrupt, none of
those five statutory exceptions would appear to apply. See id. Thus, even in
bankruptcy, Intelsat Ltd.'s satellite assets could not be transferred "free and clear" of
the company's LCO commitments to its lifeline users. Cf. id. § 365(h) (providing that
restrictive covenants that are enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law survive
lease rejection).
218.
See id. § 365(e)(1) ("[A]n executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor
may not be terminated or modified . . . at any time after the commencement of [a
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Here, the LCO contracts require Intelsat Ltd. to do no more than to
furnish transmission capacity to lifeline users. Significantly, the LCO
contracts do not, under any circumstances, require Intelsat Ltd. to
pay any money to anyone. Accordingly, Intelsat Ltd. would
presumably remain capable of satisfying its obligations under the
LCO contracts even if the company were to become insolvent.
Moreover, even if Intelsat Ltd. does fall into bankruptcy, lifeline
users would have no incentive to seek termination or modification of
the LCO contracts. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code's general rule
2 19
Under
favoring nontermination of executory contracts would apply.
this rule, Intelsat Ltd.'s LCO contracts with its lifeline users would
not be extinguished in bankruptcy even if those contracts were
characterized as "executory contracts" rather than as property
encumbrances.
Finally, if Intelsat Ltd. ever should be dissolved in bankruptcy,
the Communications Act would provide an additional layer of
protection to lifeline users, separate and apart from that provided by
the Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, when the operator of an FCClicensed communications facility becomes bankrupt, the bankrupt
operator's existing FCC licenses can be assigned to a putative new
owner, only if the FCC determines that the proposed assignment
220
To
would serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
satisfy this statutory standard, the proposed transaction must comply
Act, the FCC's rules, federal
with the Communications
222
221
and other U.S. policies and objectives.
communications policy,
Generally, when a bankrupt operator's license is transferred, federal
communications policy holds that the public interest is served by

bankruptcy proceeding] solely because of [the debtor's bankruptcy]"). Where the
bankrupt debtor has defaulted, or likely will default, its obligations under a contract,
the other contracting party may seek to have the contract terminated or modified. See
id. § 365(a)-(c).
See id. § 365(e)(1).
219.
10 (Wireless
See Leap Wireless Int'l, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 14909, 14914
220.
Telecom. Bur. 2004) (even in bankruptcy transfers, "[i]nconsidering assignment
applications, the Commission must determine, pursuant to Section 310(d) of the
Communications Act, whether the Applicants have demonstrated that the proposed
assignment of licenses will serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity.").
See id. at 14914-15 10 (citing cases).
221.
See Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1536, FCC
222.
7, n.20 (1986) ("While [the FCC's] primary mission is to
86-67, 1986 WL 291498, at
implement the Communications Act, we believe that, in doing so, it is both necessary
and appropriate for us to harmonize our actions with other federal policies and
objectives."), appeal dismissed sub nom., Office of Communication of the United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101 (D.C.Cir.1987) (citing Storer Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 763 F.2d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1985) & LaRose v. FCC, 494 F.2d 1145, 1146 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1974)); cf. FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293,
304 (2003) (FCC's implementation of the Communications Act must be harmonized
with other federal statutes, including the Bankruptcy Code).
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continuation of uninterrupted service to that operator's existing
customers. 22 3 Moreover, in ratifying the ITSO Agreement, the United
States adopted a specific federal policy and objective of maintaining
the global connectivity and global coverage of the satellite system
established by INTELSAT. 224 In particular, U.S. policy now holds
that the satellite system should continue to serve its lifeline users for
at least as long as the ITSO Agreement remains in effect, regardless
of whether the system remains in the hands of Intelsat Ltd. or is
passed to subsequent successors-in-interest. 22 5 For both of these
reasons, even if Intelsat Ltd. ultimately dissolves in bankruptcy, the
FCC should not approve the assignment of its operating authority to
any entity that is not committed to honoring the LCO commitments
to serve Intelsat Ltd.'s lifeline users.
B. Politicalor Legal Threats to ITSO's "PublicService" Mission
As a facilities-based international IGO, the former INTELSAT
treaty organization was immune from the operation of national laws
and trade policies of its member states. 226 As a Delaware corporation,

223.
See, e.g., Verestar, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 22750, 22755
14 (Int'l Bur. &
Wireless Telecom. Bur. 2004) ("Allowing the assignment of these assets to SES
Americom is critical to the uninterrupted provision of service to [bankrupt operator]
Verestar's customers, which we find, in this instance, to be a specific benefit of the
proposed assignments.").
224.
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, pmbl. ("The States Parties to this
Agreement ... [i]ntend[] that the Company will honor the Core Principles set forth in
Article III of this Agreement and will provide, on a commercial basis, the space
segment required for international public telecommunications services of high quality
and reliability ....
"); id. art. III(b) ("The Core Principles are: (i) maintain global
connectivity and global coverage; (ii) serve its lifeline connectivity customers; and (iii)
provide non-discriminatory access to the Company's system.").
225.
See id. art. 111(b); ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, art. I(d) (defining
"Company" to include both Intelsat Ltd. and its "successors-in-interest" to the satellite
system).
226.
See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. XV(c) (requiring all
INTELSAT member nations to grant to INTELSAT and its officers and employees
"immunity from legal process in respect of acts done or words written or spoken in the
exercise of their functions and within the limits of their duties"); see also INTELSAT
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 43, art. 16 (providing that INTELSAT and the
representatives of its Parties and Signatories "shall be immune from suit and legal
process relating to acts performed by them in their official capacity and falling within
their functions, except insofar as such immunity may be waived"). In 1977, President
Ford issued an executive order designating INTELSAT "as a public international
organization entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities conferred by"
the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA). Exec. Order No. 11,996, 42
Fed. Reg. 4331 (Jan. 19, 1977). President Ford's executive order superseded an earlier
executive order in which President Nixon had similarly designated INTELSAT as an
immune international organization under the IOIA. Exec. Order No. 11,718, 38 Fed.
Reg. 12,797 (May 14, 1973); see also Exec. Order No. 11,277, 31 Fed. Reg. 6609 (Apr.
30, 1966) (designating an INTELSAT predecessor organization immune under the
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a District of Columbia domiciliary, and a licensee of the United States
Federal Communications Commission, in contrast, the privatized
227
Intelsat Ltd. is now fully subject to U.S. law and FCC policy.
Accordingly, Intelsat Ltd. must now comply with a myriad of U.S.
international trade statutes under which the President may invoke
various trade sanctions or restrictions on foreign commerce as a
means of achieving political or economic objectives of the United
States. 228 Such trade sanctions or restrictions, if invoked, could
potentially prohibit Intelsat Ltd. from "doing business" with certain
foreign telecommunications carriers, even where such business
relations are necessary for existing telecommunications links to be
maintained.
For this reason, critics have charged that by rendering the
ongoing operation of the INTELSAT satellite system subject to the
control of U.S. law, the privatization of INTELSAT threatens the
universal global connectivity of the world's telecommunications
systems. 229 In particular, at the outset of the privatization process,
one leading critic voiced the following specific concerns raised by
rendering Intelsat Ltd. subject to regulation under U.S. law:
[C]an it be expected that the [United States government] will always
the provision of service to all
remain aloof and allow
customers?... [W]ill the US Congress refrain from seeking to direct
how services are provided? Will contentions with Iran, Libya,
Yugoslavia, or Iraq not impel the use of telecommunications as an
economic weapon? ...

[T]he attitude to international law seen in recent

US cases increases one's fears. The residual [treaty organization ITSO]
may have little actual power to secure [Intelsat Ltd.'s] immunity from
such pressures. Ultimately enforcement of any arbitral award would
end up requiring the intervention of a normal judicial system. How
would a [United States] court respond to an action to enforce an award

IOIA); Exec. Order No. 11,227, 30 Fed. Reg. 7369 (June 2, 1965) (designating an
INTELSAT predecessor organization immune under the IOIA).
227.
See FCC Report to Congress 2002, 17 F.C.C.R. 11458, 11467 (2002)
(observing that post-privatization, Intelsat Ltd. "do[es] not maintain an immune or
privileged status," but instead is now "subject to U.S. or U.K. licensing authorities").
See, e.g., Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3101-11
228.
(2000); Trade Sanctions and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7201-09
(2000); Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (2000);
International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2000);
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621-51 (2000); Trading With The Enemy Act
of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2000).
229.
See Lyall, Expanding Global Communications Services, supra note 153, at
68 ("[W]e must recognize that incorporation of a legal entity within a legal system
makes that entity subject to the law of that system, and to governmental pressures
backed up, if necessary, by appropriate legal changes."); Francis Lyall, Privatisation
and International Telecommunications Organisations, 38 PROC. INST. SPACE L. 168,
168-74 (1995).
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under the Public Service Agreement if there is also either
230
governmental direction, or a Congressional statute on the point?

a

Now that INTELSAT's privatization process has been completed,
these concerns merit serious consideration. Post-privatization, does
the global connectivity of the world's communications systems rest
solely on the continued support of incumbent U.S. policymakers?
Subpart V.B.1 addresses whether any U.S. law or policy now in effect
threatens Intelsat Ltd.'s continued ability to provide global
connectivity. Subpart V.B.2 then analyzes whether, as a matter of
current U.S. law, the President and his administration have
authority to adopt policies that impact Intelsat Ltd.'s ability to
maintain global connectivity. Subpart V.B.3 assesses whether the
U.S. Congress has the power to violate the ITSO Agreement by
enacting new laws or policies that threaten global connectivity, or,
alternatively, whether such laws would violate the U.S. Constitution.
Subpart V.B.4 considers whether non-U.S. subsidiaries or affiliates of
Intelsat Ltd. that serve non-U.S. locations via foreign-licensed
satellites can be rendered subject to U.S. law. Finally, Subpart V.B.5
considers whether global connectivity would continue if Intelsat Ltd.
were rendered incapable of fulfilling its public service obligation.
1. Is Intelsat Ltd. Violating Current U.S. Law by Providing Service
to Countries that Are Subject to U.S. Trade Sanctions?
The United States has been said to "lead[ ] the world in resorting
to economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes. '23 ' Indeed, the
United States currently maintains economic trade sanctions against
Burma (Myanmar), Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, North Korea,
Sudan, Syria, Zimbabwe, and several Balkan States. 23 2 Except for
Burma (Myanmar) and Liberia, each of these countries is a Party to
ITSO. 233 Moreover, three such countries-North Korea, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe-have been designated by ITSO as lifeline users of Intelsat

230.

Lyall, supra note 41, at 112-13.

231.

Barry

E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the

Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1162, 1169 (1987).
232.
See United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Sanctions Program and Country Summaries, http://www.ustreas.govofficesl
enforcement/ofac/sanctions/ [hereinafter Sanctions Summaries] (listing economic
sanctions in effect, and providing citations to Executive Orders and statutes
implementing such sanctions); see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1701 note (West 2000 & Supp.
2005) (setting forth text of various statutes that have enacted trade sanctions against
specific countries pursuant to International Emergency Economic Powers Act).
233.
See ITSO Member Countries, supra note 203 (listing 148 member
countries). With respect to the Balkan States, ITSO Members include Croatia, Bosnia
& Herzegovina, and the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro).

Id.
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Ltd.'s services. 234 As lifeline users, these countries depend heavily on
Intelsat Ltd. to keep them connected with the rest of the world.
Accordingly, consistent with the former INTELSAT treaty
organization's historic practice, Intelsat Ltd. has continued to serve
every ITSO member country since privatization. 23 5 In so doing,
however, has Intelsat Ltd. violated U.S. international trade law?
Historically, the U.S. Department of the Treasury has allowed
carriers
to
provide
international
U.S.
telecommunications
telecommunications services to countries otherwise subject to U.S.international trade sanctions-perhaps on the sound theory that
communication must be possible in order for international disputes to
be resolved. Accordingly, the Treasury Department has expressly
excepted the provision of basic international telecommunications
service from trade sanctions otherwise currently in effect against
ITSO lifeline countries North Korea, 236 Sudan, 237 and Zimbabwe 238 ;

234.
See LCO Eligible Countries, supra note 133 (identifying the Democratic
People's Republic of (North) Korea as eligible for lifeline connectivity protection based
on its low per capita income, and identifying both Sudan and Zimbabwe as eligible for
lifeline connectivity protection based on both low per capita income and low
teledensity). In addition, if they were ITSO Members, both Burma (Myanmar) and
Liberia also would qualify for lifeline connectivity protection. Id.
235.
See, e.g., Media in Iraq, BBC MONITORING MEDIA, Jan. 24, 2005, available
at 2005 WL 58346487 ("Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran television in Arabic is
based in Tehran and sponsored by the state-run Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
It broadcasts daily to Iraq on the Intelsat 902 satellite at 62 degrees east, 10973 MHz,
vertical polarization."). For a description of the programming transmitted by Vision of
the Islamic Republic of Iran, see Steven Barraclough, Satellite Television in Iran:
Prohibition,Imitation and Reform, MIDDLE E. STUD., July 31, 2001, at 25, availableat
2001 WLNR 4692654:
As described by Ayatollah Khamene'i, the country's constitutional leader,
Iranian broadcasting ... is 'the mouthpiece of the Islamic system.' Its duty is to
stand at the 'forefront' against 'a well-organised and obvious offensive (which)
has been launched by (the) enemies of Islam against divine principles with an
aim of promoting secularism, undisciplined behaviour and corruption among
the people.' Since this onslaught is directed specifically against Islam and the
Islamic Revolution, [the network] is required to promulgate 'religious thoughts
and introduce the politics of the Islamic Republic in conformity with Islam and
other parameters effective in the administration of the country. (footnotes
omitted).
236.
See 31 C.F.R. § 500.571 (2005) ("All transactions of U.S. common carriers
incident to the receipt or transmission of telecommunications involving North Korea
are authorized.").
237.
See id. § 538.512 ("All transactions with respect to the receipt and
transmission of telecommunications involving Sudan are authorized. This section does
not authorize the provision to the Government of Sudan or a person in Sudan of
telecommunications equipment or technology."); see also Sudan Peace Act, Pub. L. No.
107-245, § 6(b)(2), 116 Stat. 1507 (2002) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (Supp.
2005)); see generally Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-497,
§ 6, 118 Stat. 4012 (2004) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (Supp. 2005))
(implementing trade sanctions against Sudan "in support of peace in Darfur").
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the exception also extends to several "non-lifeline" countries currently
subject to U.S. -international trade sanctions. 23 9 Similarly, in the
special case of Cuba, the U.S. Congress has imposed seemingly
permanent general trade sanctions, but has expressly exempted
international
telecommunications
services from such trade
sanctions. 240 At present, no existing U.S. law or trade policy purports

238.
On March 6, 2003, President Bush issued an Executive Order prohibiting
U.S. businesses from trading with
certain members of the Government of Zimbabwe and other persons [whose
actions] ... contribut[ed] to the deliberate breakdown in the rule of law in
Zimbabwe, to politically motivated violence and intimidation in that country,
and to political and economic instability in the southern African region ....
Exec. Order No. 13,288, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,457 (Mar. 10, 2003). Subsequently, the
Treasury Department promulgated regulations that prohibit trade only with certain
named persons, while continuing generally to permit trade with the Zimbabwean
government and other persons or companies located in Zimbabwe. See Zimbabwe
Sanctions Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 45,246-02 (July 29, 2004). Even with respect to
the named Zimbabwean persons who are subject to U.S. sanctions, the provision of
"postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication that does not involve
the transfer of anything of value" is expressly excepted from the sanctions. 31 C.F.R.
§ 541.206(a) (2005). The regulations, however, did not "exempt from regulation or
authorize transactions incident to . . .the provision, sale, or leasing of capacity on
telecommunications transmission facilities (such as satellite or terrestrial network
connectivity) for use in the transmission of any data." Id. § 541.206(b)(3). Rather, "[t]he
exportation of such items or services and the provision, sale, or leasing of such capacity
or facilities to a [named] person whose property or interests in property are
blocked... are prohibited." Id. Thus, while existing U.S. trade sanctions do not
interfere with Intelsat Ltd.'s provision of lifeline connectivity to Zimbabwe, apparently
Intelsat Ltd. is prohibited from furnishing satellite data transmission capacity directly
to any of the individuals named in the Treasury Department regulations that
implemented limited trade sanctions against Zimbabwe.
239.
See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 550.510 (2005) (authorizing "[a]ll transactions of
common
carriers
incident
to
the
receipt
or
transmission
of
telecommunications... between the United States and Libya"); id. § 560.508
(authorizing "[alll transactions of common carriers incident to the receipt or
transmission of telecommunications ... between the United States and Iran"); id.
§ 515.542(b) (generally authorizing "all transactions incident to the use of cables,
satellite channels, radio signals, or other means of telecommunications for the
provision of telecommunications services between Cuba and the United States,
including telephone, telegraph and similar services, and the transmission of radio and
television broadcasts and news wire feeds between Cuba and the United States"); id.
§ 515.418(a) (authorizing licenses to be issued to U.S. communications carriers to make
settlement payments to Cuba to complete international calls).
240.
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, as modified by the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001-10 (2000), generally
prohibits U.S. persons and business entities from engaging in virtually any commercial
business transactions with Cuba. The same Act, however, specifically provides that
international "[tielecommunications services between the United States and Cuba
shall be permitted." 22 U.S.C. § 6004(e)(1) (emphasis added); see also id. § 6004(e)(2)
('Telecommunications facilities are authorized in such quantity and of such quality as
may be necessary to provide efficient and adequate telecommunications services
between the United States and Cuba."). For an accounting of payments made to Cuba
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to forbid the private, U.S.-licensed, Intelsat Ltd. from providing basic
international telecommunications service to any nation on earth.
2. Does the U.S. Administration Have Authority to Promulgate New
U.S. -International Trade Sanctions that Might Threaten Intelsat
Ltd.'s Ability to Maintain Global Connectivity?
As discussed in Subpart V.B.1, the Treasury Department, by
administrative rule, has generally excepted the provision of
international telecommunications services from the coverage of U.S.
trade sanctions otherwise in effect against certain foreign countries.
Arguably, however, the Treasury Deparment might someday repeal
any rules that it has promulgated. 2 41 The question thus arises
whether the patchwork of Treasury Department regulations now in
effect are subject to unilateral repeal by the executive branch of the
U.S. government. If so, then these regulations may provide a very
weak foundation upon which to entrust the continued global
connectivity of world's telecommunications systems.
Ordinarily, administrative agencies enjoy considerable discretion
to repeal regulations that they have promulgated.2 42 Such discretion,
however, is not unlimited. In particular, an agency may not take any
action (including repeal of an existing regulation) that is "not in
accordance with law" or that is "contrary to constitutional right,
power, privilege, or immunity."2 4 3 At present, several U.S. statutes
would appear to require the maintenance of at least a limited
exception from trade sanctions for international telecommunications
services. In particular, the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act of 1977,244 under which most U.S.-international trade

by U.S. telecommunications carriers pursuant to this statute, see Alejandre v. Republic
of Cuba, 42 F. Supp.2d 1317, 1325 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
241.
From a procedural standpoint, Treasury Department regulations that
implement trade sanctions are particularly susceptible to hasty repeal, since the
promulgation and repeal of such regulations need not comply with the transparent
public notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures generally required by the
Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (2000) (excepting from public
notice-and-comment requirements those rulemakings that concern "a military or
foreign affairs function of the United States").
242.
See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (agency's
rescission of a rule is reviewed under same deferential "arbitrary and capricious"
standard by which promulgation of a rule is reviewed).
243.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(B) (2000); see also
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1631 (2000) ("When the President declares a
national emergency, no powers or authorities made available by statute for use in the
event of an emergency shall be exercised unless and until the President specifies the
provisions of law under which he proposes that he, or other officers will act.").
244.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07 (2000).
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sanctions imposed since 1977 have been promulgated, 24 5 expressly
disclaims vesting the executive branch with authority to "prohibit,
directly or indirectly,. any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other
personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of
anything of value."246 The same Act further disclaims providing
"authority to regulate or prohibit . . . the importation from any
country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or
otherwise, regardless of format or medium of transmission, of any
information or informational materials, including but not limited
to ... news wire feeds." 24 7 While not entirely free from ambiguity,
these statutory reservations appear to contemplate that any trade
sanctions imposed under the Act would provide exemptions that
operation of the
commercial
at least some
would allow
communications facilities needed to transmit telegraph messages,
telephone calls, and news wire feeds. 248 If so, then any future attempt

by the Treasury Department to prohibit all commercial provision of
international telecommunications service between the U.S. and
another country would be subject to judicial reversal on the ground
24 9
that it is "not in accordance with law."
Similarly, the Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988 also vests
the President with authority to impose trade sanctions under certain
conditions. 250 At the same time, however, this Act cabins the scope of

245.
See United States Department of the Treasury, Sanctions Summaries,
supra note 232 (listing economic sanctions in effect, and providing citations to
Executive Orders and statutes implementing such sanctions).
50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1).
246.
247.
Id. § 1702(b)(3); accord Trading With The Enemy Act of 1917 § 5(b)(4) (as
amended in 1994); 50 U.S.C..app. § 5(b)(4).
A similar implication can be derived from a provision of the Trading With
248.
The Enemy Act of 1917 that exempts from trade sanctions the transmission of "any
telegram, cablegram, or wireless message, or other form of communication intended for
or to be delivered, directly or indirectly, to an enemy or ally of enemy," provided the
communication is first submitted for censorship to the U.S. government. 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 3(c). Like the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, the Trading
With The Enemy Act of 1917 appears to contemplate that commercial facilities used to
transmit communications to and from hostile countries would remain operational
during the period of hostilities.
249.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
See Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3101-11 (2000).
250.
This Act authorizes the imposition of trade sanctions primarily as a tool for assisting
U.S. telecommunications providers to obtain access to foreign markets in which they
seek to provide service. See id. § 3101(b) (setting forth purposes of the Act); see also id.
§ 3105(b)(1) (setting forth specific trade sanctions authorized by the Act). While the
U.S. has never actually imposed trade sanctions under this Act, it has periodically
threatened to do so. See, e.g., Luz Estella Ortiz Nagle, Antitrust in the International
Telecommunications Sector: The United States Challenges Mexico's Telmex Monopoly,
33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 183, 227 (2002) (noting that in the 1990s, United States
sought WTO sanctions and punitive actions against Mexico during trade dispute over
access to Mexican telecommunications markets); J. Gregory Sidak, Remedies and the
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such authority by providing that the President shall not impose
sanctions that are "inconsistent with the international obligations of
,,251 The current ITSO Agreement, like the
the United States ....
INTELSAT Agreement before it, places the United States under an
international obligation, even post-privatization, to "maintain [the]
global connectivity and global coverage" of the satellite system
the
Accordingly,
by
INTELSAT.2 52
operated
formerly
Telecommunications Trade Act cannot provide a basis for adopting
any trade sanctions that would violate the ITSO Agreement by
preventing Intelsat Ltd. from maintaining the global connectivity and
global coverage of its satellite system.
Collectively, these statutes appear to bar the U.S. executive
branch from unilaterally rescinding the regulatory exemptions that
currently allow Intelsat Ltd. to serve every nation on earth. On the
other hand, these statutes do not leave the U.S. executive branch
powerless to slow the expansion of Intelsat service to U.S. rivals. To
the contrary, early in the privatization process, the U.S. executive
branch in 2001 did block the deployment of the planned U.S.-licensed
Ku-band "Intelsat APR-3" satellite. 253 From its planned orbital
location at 85' E.L., the Intelsat APR-3 satellite would have offered
"strategic landmass coverage of China, Russia, India and the Middle
East.' '254 For this reason, SINOSAT, an agency of the Chinese

Institutional Design of Regulation In Network Industries, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV.
741, 752 (2003) (asserting that the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has
implicitly threatened initiating trade sanctions against Japan, in order to pressure
Japan into emulating U.S. domestic regulatory policy on "pricing of mandatory
competitor access to the unbundled elements of the local network belonging to the
operating companies of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT)"); Jeffrey
H. Rohlfs & J. Gregory Sidak, Exporting Telecommunications Regulation: The United
States-Japan Negotiations on Interconnection Pricing, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 317, 318
(2002) (same).
251.
19 U.S.C. § 3111; accord Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1677(4)(E)(v), (9)
(2000); Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608e-1(c)(2) (2000).
252.
ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, art. III(b)(i); accord id. art. IX(c)(i); see
also id.art. XI(a) ("The Parties shall ... meet their obligations under this Agreement in
a manner fully consistent with and in furtherance of... the Core Principles in Article
III and other provisions of this Agreement.").
253.
See generally Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat Announces New Satellite at
85 Degrees East; Establishes Strategic Relationship with SINOSAT for Use of Capacity
(Feb. 8, 2001), http://tinyurl.com/8t86x (announcing plan to launch the "Intelsat APR3" satellite). Under earlier plans that also were never implemented, the satellite to be
located at 85 E.L. was variously called the INTELSAT "KTV satellite" or the New
Skies Satellite "NSS-6 satellite." See Chris Bulloch, Satellite Builders' Tough Times, 57
INTERAVIA No. 661, at 43, Mar. 31, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 5140096 (reviewing
history).
Nick Mitsis, Asian Economic Tigers Re-Awaken Satellite Industry Pounces
254.
On Market Potential,VIA SATELLITE, Apr. 10, 2001, available at 2001 WL 11617138.
The "Intelsat APR 3" satellite was intended to provide service to corporate Very Small
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government, had pre-purchased the right to use six of the satellite's
255
transponders for the entire orbital. maneuver life of the satellite.
Launch services for the Intelsat APR-3 satellite were to be provided
by the China Great Wall Industry Corporation, another Chinese
government agency. 256 While the proposed lease of Intelsat APR-3
transponders to SINOSAT did not violate any U.S. law or policy, the
U.S. State Department denied Intelsat Ltd.'s application for the
export license that would have permitted China Great Wall Industry
Corporation to obtain certain U.S. technology needed to perform the
launch. 257 Rather than trying to launch the Intelsat APR-3 satellite
from a different country, Intelsat Ltd. instead terminated deployment
of the satellite. 258 In this regard, the U.S. executive branch did hinder
259
Intelsat Ltd.'s efforts to expand the capacity of its global network.
Under current U.S. law, however, the executive branch probably
lacks the means to go any farther. Specifically, the U.S.
administration seemingly lacks a legal basis to unilaterally order
Intelsat Ltd. to curtail the provision of any existing service.
3. Does the U.S. Congress Have Authority to Enact New U.S.International Trade Sanctions that Might Prevent Intelsat Ltd. from
Maintaining the Global Connectivity of the Satellite Fleet Formerly
Operated by INTELSAT?
At present, several U.S. statutes appear to safeguard the
patchwork of regulatory exemptions that currently protects Intelsat
Ltd.'s ability to serve every nation on earth. Seemingly, however,
nothing would bar the U.S. Congress from one day repealing the

Aperture Terminals Networks (VSATs), video distribution to cable head-ends, and
Internet connections to ISPs. Id.
255.
See Intelsat Press Release, supranote 253.
256.
See id.
257.
See Bulloch, supra note 253 (explaining that the Intelsat APR-3 satellite
"was denied an export license for a Chinese launch by the US State Department, and
so is once more 'spare"'); accord Intelsat Denies It Was Sending Message To State Dept,
COMM. DAiLY, Aug. 31, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5053923 [hereinafter Intelsat
Denies It Was Sending Message] ("Intelsat planned to launch APR-3 aboard Chinese
Long March rockets, but after months of waiting was unable to obtain necessary
presidential waiver that's provided after State Dept. recommendation.").
258.
See Intelsat Denies It Was Sending Message, supra note 257
("Intelsat ...

confirmed that . . . APR-3 had been terminated ...

. [but]

insisted

Intelsat wouldn't let U.S. licensing process deter it from procuring non-U.S. satellite
launches in future.").
259.
After Intelsat Ltd. was unable to launch the "Intelsat APR-3" satellite into
°
the 85 E.L. orbital location, a satellite launched in 1996 was relocated into that
location. See In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 18 F.C.C.R. 16414 (Sat. Div. 2003) (authorizing
Intelsat Ltd. to relocate the "Intelsat 709" satellite from the 55.35' W.L. orbital location
into the 85.15 ° E.L orbital location); see also In re Comsat Corporation, 11 F.C.C.R.
12170 (Sat. Div. 1996) (authorizing original launch of"Intelsat 709" satellite).
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relevant statutory provisions in order to rescind such exemptions. In
particular, the fact that an Act of Congress might cause the United
States to breach its international obligations under the ITSO
Agreement would not bar such an Act from taking effect.26 0 Rather,
under longstanding U.S. constitutional doctrine:
By the constitution, a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of
like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both are declared by that
instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy
is given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same
subject, the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give
effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of
either; but, if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control
the other....261

Accordingly, should the U.S. Congress ever enact a statute that
prohibits Intelsat Ltd. from fulfilling its contractual obligations to
ITSO or to a foreign "lifeline customer," that statute would be "last in
date" as compared with the ITSO Agreement, and would therefore
"control" that Agreement. Under such circumstances, international
ability to
law would not be sufficient to safeguard Intelsat26 Ltd.'s
2
users.
lifeline
serve
and
connectivity
global
preserve

260.
See A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial
Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 379, 381-82 (1997).
[I]t is clear that Congress is free to enact legislation that violates the
international legal obligations of the United States. This was made clear in the
Chinese Exclusion Case, [130 U.S. 581, 599-601 (1889),] which upheld
legislation requiring the United States to take action in violation of a treaty in
the face of a challenge based squarely on the fact that the legislation conflicted
with the treaty. (footnotes omitted).
261.
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (emphasis added). Although
Whitney is more than a century old, throughout the twentieth century the Supreme
Court consistently reaffirmed "that an Act of Congress ... is on a full parity with a
treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a
treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null." Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (plurality
opinion)) (ellipses in Breard); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115 (1)(a) (1986):

An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a
provision of an international agreement as law of the United States if the
purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if the act
and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.
262.

See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194:

If the country with which the treaty is made is dissatisfied with the action of
the legislative department, it may present its complaint to the executive head
of the government, and take such other measures as it may deem essential for
the protection of its interests. The courts can afford no redress. Whether the
complaining nation has just cause of complaint, or our country was justified in
its legislation, are not matters for judicial cognizance.
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Nor would such a statute likely be held to violate the U.S.
Constitution. Possibly, depending on its scope and effect, such a
statute might unconstitutionally abridge the recognized First
Amendment right of persons located inside the United States to
receive information from foreign sources. 263 That First Amendment

right, however, has not generally been construed to include any
concomitant right of U.S. persons to expend or receive money in
connection with the receipt of information from foreign sources 264;
thus, such a right might not sufficiently safeguard Intelsat Ltd.'s
265
ability to provide global connectivity on a commercial basis.
Alternatively, to the extent that the INTELSAT treaty organization's
privatization was predicated in substantial part on its reliance on the
U.S. government's assurances that privatization would not impair the
satellite system's ability to provide global connectivity, the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment arguably might be construed
266
to prevent the government from later reneging on such assurances.

The constitutional principle that U.S. courts may not fashion remedies to redress U.S.
violations of international trade treaties is also reflected throughout the U.S. Code.
See, e.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. § 2504(a) (2000) ("No provision of
any trade agreement approved by the Congress... which is in conflict with any statute
of the United States shall be given effect under the laws of the United States."); id.
§§ 3312, 3512 (concerning U.S. violations of WTO Uruguay Round Agreements).
See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1972) (recognizing
263.
First Amendment right of U.S. citizens to hear a Belgian professor "explain and seek to
defend his views," but sustaining the professor's exclusion from the United States
based on his previous violations of visa restrictions); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381
U.S. 301, 305 (1965) (holding unconstitutional statute requiring destruction of
unsealed mail from foreign countries determined to be "communist political
propaganda" unless addressee returned reply card indicating desire to receive such
mail); cf. Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (upholding statute requiring registration
as "political propaganda" of certain expressive materials sponsored by foreign
governments and intended to influence U.S. foreign policies, on ground that
registration requirement did not suppress distribution of such materials in the United
States).
264.
See, e.g., Veterans & Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Reg. Comm'r of
Customs, 459 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1972) (sustaining regulations prohibiting U.S. residents
from paying money to booksellers located in North Vietnam, North Korea, or China, to
obtain books); Teague v. Reg. Comm'r of Customs, 404 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968) (same).
265.
For arguments that judicial protection of the First Amendment right to
receive information from foreign sources has generally been inadequate, see generally
Norman Dorsen, ForeignAffairs and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 840 (1989); Burt
Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain:America's National Border and the
Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 719 (1985).
266.
See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 875-76 (1996)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibited the U.S.
government from reneging on a promise to apply special accounting treatment to
acquirers of failing thrifts) ("Although the Contract Clause has no application to acts of
the United States, it is clear that the National Government has some capacity to make
agreements binding future Congresses by creating vested rights. The extent of that
capacity, to be sure, remains somewhat obscure.") (internal citations omitted).
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In practice, however, whatever assurances the U.S. government gave
to INTELSAT (and INTELSAT's state parties) would not likely
satisfy the stringent standard of "unmistakability" needed to bind the
26 7
U.S. government to a promise under the Due Process Clause.
4.
If the U.S. Congress Enacts New U.S.-International Trade
Sanctions that Hinder Intelsat Ltd.'s Ability to Maintain Global
Connectivity, Would Intelsat Ltd.'s Non-U.S.-Licensed Satellites be
Required to Comply with the Sanctions?
communications
systems
remain
Would
the
world's
interconnected if the U.S. Congress were to enact future legislation
prohibiting the provision of basic international telecommunications
services to certain "rogue states"? Even in this "worst-case" scenario,
Intelsat Ltd. arguably has some means of fulfilling its public service
obligations to maintain global connectivity and serve lifeline users.
This is because some non-U.S. users of the Intelsat satellite system
now take service from non-U.S. affiliates and subsidiaries of Intelsat
Ltd. via satellites that are operated pursuant to non-U.S. licenses and
registrations. Specifically, since obtaining U.S. government licenses
to operate the fleet of seventeen in-orbit satellites previously operated
by the INTELSAT treaty organization, 268 Intelsat Ltd. has diversified
the regulatory jurisdiction to which its operations are subject. At the
outset of its privatization process, Intelsat Ltd. announced its
intention to license the operation of its planned future Ka-, BSS-, and
V-band satellites in the United Kingdom, rather than the United
States. 269 Moreover, under arrangements set in place just before

267.
See Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 877 (reciting the "unmistakability doctrine,"
which provides that, "absent an 'unmistakable' provision to the contrary, contractual
arrangements, including those to which a sovereign itself is a party, remain subject to
subsequent legislation by the sovereign.") (internal quote marks and citations omitted);
accord id. at 878:
[A] contract with a sovereign government will not be read to include an
unstated term exempting the other contracting party from the application of a
subsequent sovereign act (including an Act of Congress), nor will an ambiguous
term of a grant or contract be construed as a conveyance or surrender of
sovereign power.
But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal,
111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1665-66 (2002) (arguing that the strong presumption "barring
legislative entrenchment should be discarded; legislatures should be allowed to bind
their successors, subject to any independent constitutional limits in force.").
8-9 (2001) (licensing a
268.
See In re INTELSAT L.L.C., 16 F.C.C.R. 12280,
U.S. subsidiary of Intelsat Ltd. to operate the 17 C-band and Ku-band satellite space
stations then in orbit, which formerly had been operated by the international treaty
organization INTELSAT).
See id.
8 & n.22 ("[INTELSAT had] selected the United Kingdom as the
269.
licensing jurisdiction for future satellites that may be constructed for operating in the

1388

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 38.1323

INTELSAT was privatized, Intelsat Ltd. now provides some service in
the eastern hemisphere via satellite space stations owned by the
governments of India 270 and the People's Republic of China. 271 Since
privatizing, Intelsat Ltd. has also acquired an operational satellite
licensed by the government of Papua New Guinea, an independent
parliamentary democracy. 272 To the extent that Intelsat Ltd. (a

Ka-band, V-band and BSS band."); see also id.
9 (noting that Intelsat Ltd., the
Bermuda holding corporation, "will hold the United Kingdom authorizations for ITU
registrations in the Ka-, BSS-, and V-bands"). As of 2005, Intelsat Ltd. has not yet
launched any Ka-band, V-band, or and BSS-band satellites.
270.
On April 3, 1999, the "Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-I" satellite space station was
launched into fixed orbit at 83' E.L. by the Indian National Satellite (INSAT) program.
Aparna Achar, Insat 2E Impacts Indian Communications, TELECOMM. INT'L, May 1,
1999, at 22, available at 1999 WL 12495481. The "Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-I" satellite is
owned by the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), an agency of the Indian
government. Id. The 830 E.L. orbital location is registered to India by the ITU. Id. Even
before the Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1 satellite was launched, INTELSAT leased nine of
the satellite's 17 C-band transponders for a period of 10 years. Id. By 2000, INTELSAT
was using eleven of the satellite's seventeen transponders. Insat-3B: Big Leap For Net
Services, COMPUTERS TODAY, Feb. 29, 2000, available at 68, 2000 WL 3282501; accord
Space-Based Digital Embrace, THE HINDU, July 25, 2002, available at 2002 WL
24723404 ("Interestingly, Intelsat uses some of India's satellite capacity: ISRO has
leased 11 C-Band channels on INSAT-2E to the global company."). For background on
INTELSAT's involvement in the financing and launch of the "Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1"
satellite, see COMSAT Corp., DA 97-330, 1997 WL 54847 (FCC Int'l Bureau. Feb. 12,
1997) (authorizing INTELSAT's U.S. Signatory to lease eleven 36 MHz units of C-band
capacity from the Indian National Satellite System on the INSAT-2E spacecraft, and to
provide INTELSAT services via those facilities).
271.
On July 18, 1998, the "Sinosat-l/ Intelsat APR-2" satellite space station
was launched into fixed orbit at 110.5' E.L, an orbital location whose ITU registration
is held by the Peoples' Republic of China. The "Sinosat-l/ Intelsat APR-2" satellite is
owned by the SINO Satellite Communications Company Ltd. ("SINOSAT"'), a stateowned telecommunications operator of the Peoples' Republic of China. See Sinosat
English Language Web Page, http://www.sinosatcom.com/english/company/index.htm.
On June 6, 2000, INTELSAT and SINOSAT announced that Intelsat Ltd. would use up
to six of the Sinosat-1 satellite's twenty-three "36 MHz C-band transponders" to
provide Internet backbone connections or ISP access, regional business voice/data
networks, regional backbone networks, multimedia, VSAT/virtual private networks,
and video contribution and distribution networks in the Asia Pacific Region. Press
Release, Intelsat Ltd., Intelsat to Lease Six Transponders on SINOSAT-1 (June 6,
2000), http://tinyurl.com/dwxoe.
272.
See Intelsat Acquisition Press Release, supra note 99 and accompanying
text (describing Intelsat Ltd.'s purchase of the "EchoStar 9lTelstar 13" satellite from
the insolvent Loral Space & Communications Corporation). The "EchoStar 9/Telstar
13" satellite, originally a joint venture of Echostar and Loral, was launched into the
1210 W.L. orbital location on August 7, 2003. See Press Release, Boeing, Sea Launch
Successfully Launches EchoStar IX/Telstar 13 Satellite into Orbit (Aug. 7, 2003),
http://tinyurl.com/dsccz. At that time, the satellite's C-Band transponders, which serve
the North American continent, were designated as the "Telstar 13" satellite, owned by
Loral SpaceCom Corp., and operated under license from the government of Papua New
Guinea. In re EchoStar Satellite Corp., 18 F.C.C.R. 15862,
6 (Int'l Bur. 2003),
modified, 18 F.C.C.R. 15875 (Sat. Div. 2003). The Ka-band and Ku-band transponders
on board the same satellite were designated the "EchoStar 9" satellite, owned by
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Bermuda holding company)2 73 uses Chinese, Indian, British, or
Papua New Guinean-licensed satellites to provide communications
services on international routes that do not begin, end, or pass
through the United States, the attenuation of such services from the
regulatory jurisdiction of the United States arguably might provide
Intelsat Ltd. with a measure of insulation against U.S. national laws
and trade policies.
Intelsat Ltd.'s use of non-U.S.-licensed satellites, however, is
unlikely to fully insulate the company's operations against adverse
U.S. legislation. Rather, in a handful of previous instances, the U.S.
Congress has enacted statutes purporting to prohibit non-U.S.
entities located outside the United States from engaging in certain
business transactions with third party "rogue states."274 As of 2005,

5, 15 (authorizing
Echostar, and operated under U.S. license and registration. Id.
operation of EchoStar 9 satellite). When ownership of the C-band transponders aboard
the 'Telstar 13" satellite was transferred from Loral to Intelsat Ltd. in March 2004,
those transponders were rechristened the "IA-13" satellite, and retained their Papua
13 & n.36
New Guinean licensure. See In re Visionstar Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 14820,
(2004):
The C-band payload aboard the EchoStar 9 satellite is operated pursuant to an
authorization from Papua New Guinea under the name 'Telstar 13.' Although
Loral SpaceCom Corp. was the original operator of the Telstar 13 payload, its
interest in the payload was recently transferred to Intelsat North America LLC
10 (Int'l Bur. 2004)
(Intelsat). (citing Loral Satellite, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 2404,
and Loral SpaceCom Corp., 18 F.C.C.R. 16374 (Int'l Bur. 2003)).
The Ka-band and Ku-band transponders on board the same satellite continue to be
owned by Echostar and operated as the "EchoStar 9" satellite, which remains licensed
in the United States.
See Intelsat Ltd., 2003 Annual Report (Form 20-F) (Mar. 15, 2004),
273.
available at http://tinyurl.com8v2bv (stating that Bermuda is Intelsat Ltd.'s
"Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Organization" and its "Address of Principal Executive
Offices"). Because Intelsat Ltd. is a Bermuda holding company, disputes concerning
Intelsat Ltd.'s internal governance generally must be resolved under Bermuda law. See
Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 224 (1997) (under the "internal affairs doctrine,"
courts "normally look to the State of a business' incorporation for the law that provides
the relevant corporate governance general standard of care") (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 309 (1971)).
See, e.g., Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, §§ 5274.
6, 110 Stat. 1541, 1543-45 (1996) (imposing sanctions against any non-U.S. company
or person who directly and significantly enhances Iran's or Libya's ability to develop
their petroleum resources, or enhances Libya's aviation, military, or paramilitary
capabilities), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-24, §§ 2(a), 3-5, 115 Stat. 199, 200 (2001)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note (Supp. 2005)); Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton Act), Pub. L. No. 104114 § 102(a)(2), 110 Stat. 785, 792 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6032(a)(2)) (urging the
"President to take immediate steps to apply . . . sanctions . . . against countries
assisting Cuba"). For a thorough analysis of these statutes, see Harry L. Clark, Dealing

With U.S. ExtraterritorialSanctions and Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 61 (1999). For a European perspective, see KINKA GERKE, UNILATERAL STRAINS
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the U.S. government has never actually enforced any of these
statutes against a non-U.S. entity. Nor have any of these statutes
purported to restrict the provision of basic international
telecommunications service, even to "rogue states."'275 Nonetheless,
these statutes illustrate Congress's occasional predilection to legislate
extraterritorially. Accordingly, enactment of a statute purporting to
prohibit Intelsat Ltd. from using its non-U.S.-licensed satellites to
serve certain "rogue states" would not be wholly unprecedented.
Nor would such a statute be unenforceable against Intelsat Ltd.'s
non-U.S. subsidiaries or affiliates. Rather, U.S. courts have generally
sustained the extraterritorial application of U.S. substantive law,
subject only to the ability of those courts to exercise personal
jurisdiction over non-U.S. defendants.27 6 Here, should Intelsat Ltd.
ever be sued or prosecuted in connection with its use of non-U.S.licensed satellites, the Washington, D.C.-based company would
almost certainly be subject to personal jurisdiction in U.S. courtseven if the suit or prosecution concerned only the use by a non-U.S.
subsidiary or affiliate of Intelsat Ltd. of non-U.S.-licensed satellites to
277
serve countries or territories located outside the United States.
Additionally, separate from any threat of suit or prosecution,
Intelsat Ltd.'s operations remain subject to regulatory control by the
FCC, whose arsenal of tools is substantial. Most directly, should
Intelsat Ltd.'s non-U.S. subsidiaries or affiliates fail to honor any
U.S. trade sanctions imposed by Congress, the FCC could revoke (or

ON TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: US SANCTIONS AGAINST THOSE WHO TRADE WITH CUBA,
IRAN, AND LIBYA, AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE WORLD TRADE REGIME (1997).

275.
See supra notes 239-40, 274 and accompanying text (discussing scope of
foreign business activities restricted by the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and the
Helms-Burton Act); see also supra Part V.B.1 (discussing history of exempting basic
international telecommunications service from the scope of U.S. -international trade
sanctions).
276.
The constitutionality of the Helms-Burton Act was sustained in a case
brought by a domestic public interest organization. See Freedom to Travel Campaign v.
Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Weisburd, supra note 260 (arguing
that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes no territorial limits on
the legislative power of Congress).
277.
See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
415 & n.9 (1984) (U.S. courts will exercise "general jurisdiction" over a nonresident
defendant that has "continuous and systematic" contact with the forum, regardless of
whether the controversy at issue arises out of any such contacts). Because most of
Intelsat Ltd.'s employees are located in the United States and much of its service is
provided to users located in the United States, Intelsat Ltd. would clearly satisfy the
"continuous and systematic" contact standard. See id. For criticism of the application of
"general jurisdiction" in international litigation involving foreign defendants who do
business in the United States, see Walter W. Heiser, Toward Reasonable Limitations
on the Exercise of General Jurisdiction,41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1035, 1037-38 & nn.8-9
(2004). For a general defense, see Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General
Jurisdiction,2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141.
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threaten to revoke) Intelsat Ltd.'s existing U.S. licenses. 278 Were its
U.S. licenses revoked, Intelsat Ltd. would be unable to operate the
majority of its satellites. In addition, the FCC could also revoke (or
threaten to revoke) Intelsat Ltd.'s existing authority to use at least
one of its non-U.S. licensed satellites, the Papua New Guinea-licensed
"IA-13," to serve users located in the United States. 279 Finally, the
FCC probably could exercise additional leverage over Intelsat Ltd. by
prohibiting (or threatening to prohibit) Intelsat Ltd.'s U.S.-licensed
telecommunications customers from communicating with Intelsat
28 0
Ltd.'s satellites.

278.
Should Intelsat Ltd. violate any FCC rules or policies, the FCC could
revoke or suspend the satellite space station licenses currently held by Intelsat Ltd.'s
U.S. subsidiary. See In re Policy Regarding Character Qualifications In Broadcast
7, 21 (1986) (noting that FCC licensees must "comply
Licensing, 102 F.C.C.2d 1179,
with the Communications Act and [FCC] rules and policies" in order to obtain and
retain their licenses), recon. denied, 1 F.C.C.R. 421 (1986). In this regard, it is
significant that in certain circumstances, an FCC licensee can be held responsible for
violations of FCC rules and policies committed by its corporate parent or subsidiary,
whether or not the licensee is directly involved in the parent's or subsidiary's
79, 82. Thus, Intelsat Ltd.'s U.S. subsidiary licensee could
misconduct. See id.
possibly be held responsible if Intelsat Ltd. or an affiliate were to use Intelsat Ltd.'s
non-U.S.-licensed satellites as a means of circumventing U.S. law or FCC policy. See id.
Moreover, although the FCC has very rarely revoked licenses from existing licensees,
few licensees would risk revocation by continuing to engage in conduct of which the
FCC has expressed disapproval. See Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting In The
Shadow of CongressionalDelegations of Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 873, 874 (1997)
(arguing that "administrative arm-twisting"-i.e., "a threat by an agency to impose a
sanction or withhold a benefit in hopes of encouraging 'voluntary' compliance with a
request that the agency could not impose directly on a regulated entity"-represents a
broad and important category of informal agency activity).
279.
See In re Loral SpaceCom Corp., 18 F.C.C.R. 16374 (Sat. Div. 2003)
(authorizing the Papua New Guinea-licensed "Telstar 13" satellite located at the 1210
W.L. orbit location to communicate routinely, without additional FCC action, with
earth stations located in the United States); see also FCC International Bureau,
Permitted Space Station List Web Page, http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sd/se/permitted.html
(listing the 'Telstar 13" satellite as a foreign-licensed "permitted space station,"
authorized to communicate with earth stations located inside the United States);
Satellite Policy Branch Information, DA 05-2013, Rep. No. SAT-00308 (FCC Int'l Bur.
July 15, 2005), available at 2005 WL 1661854 (amending the Permitted Space Station
List to reflect the name change and the change of ownership of the IA-13 satellite). As
of 2005, Intelsat Ltd. has never sought to add any non-U.S. -licensed satellite space
station other than the "Telstar 13/IA-13" to the FCC's "permitted space station list." Id.
Neither the Indian-licensed "Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-i" satellite nor the Chineselicensed "Sinosat-l/ Intelsat APR-2" satellite is located in an orbital location from
which it is possible to serve the United States. See supra notes 270-71 and
accompanying text (discussing these satellites).
In In re International Settlement Rates, 12 F.C.C.R. 19806 (1997), affd,
280.
Cable & Wireless PLC v. FCC, 166 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the FCC essentially
dictated to every foreign telecommunications carrier on earth the maximum
"settlement rates" receivable by those foreign carriers to complete an international
phone call originating in the United States. Although it lacked direct authority to
regulate non-U.S. carriers, the FCC accomplished its objective by prohibiting U.S.
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Finally, in addition to the power that the U.S. government wields
in its sovereign capacity as a regulatory authority, it also yields
additional power in its commercial capacity as a consumer of satellite
services. At present, the U.S. government purchases up to ten percent

281
of all satellite capacity available commercially in the U.S. market.
At least half of this capacity is used to fulfill U.S. military
requirements. 282 By potentially threatening to take its substantial

business elsewhere, the U.S. government has an additional means of
pressuring Intelsat Ltd. to comply with U.S. laws and policies. For all
of these reasons, if the U.S. Congress should ever enact a statute
purporting to prohibit Intelsat Ltd. from providing international
telecommunications services to "rogue states," even Intelsat Ltd.'s
non-U.S.-licensed satellites would almost certainly be compelled to
comply with such a statute.
5. Does the United States Now Have the Ability to Disrupt the
Universal Global Connectivity of the World's Communications
Systems or Remove Individual Countries from the World's
Communications Infrastructure?
The U.S. Congress, working in conjunction with the President,
probably possesses the power to disrupt Intelsat Ltd.'s ability to

carriers from paying to foreign carriers any "settlement rates" in excess of the FCCprescribed caps. See Cable & Wireless PLC, 166 F.3d at 1229-32 (describing, and
sustaining, FCC's indirect strategy for imposing settlement rate caps on foreign
carriers); see also Rob Frieden, Regulatory Opportunism In Telecommunications: The
Unlevel Competitive Playing Field, 10 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 81, 92 (2001) (noting
that the FCC's "Settlement Rates" Order was affirmed notwithstanding that FCC
efforts "to affect the behavior and the financial performance of [foreign] carriers has
generated vocal opposition, at home and abroad, that the Commission failed to
appreciate international comity and national sovereignty") (footnotes omitted). Here,
by analogy, in the event that Intelsat Ltd.'s non-U.S.-licensed satellites were ever used
in ways inconsistent with U.S. policy, the FCC would likely have authority to prohibit
U.S.-licensed carriers and users from communicating with those satellites.
281.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION:

COMMERCIAL SATELLITE SECURITY SHOULD BE MORE FULLY ADDRESSED, GAO Rep. No.
GAO-02-781,
at 6 (Oct. 3, 2002),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dO2781.pdf.
Historically, federal agencies spent an estimated $400 million annually to secure
capacity from commercial satellites. See Andy Pasztor, U.S. Contracts Bring Windfall
For French Firm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2003, at All, available at 2003 WL-WSJ
3963189.
282.
Pasztor, supra note 281, at All. For example, commercial communications
satellites carried 45 percent of all military communications between the United States
and the Persian Gulf region during Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1991.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 281, at 7. As of 2002, nearly 60 percent of
the satellite capacity purchased commercially by the Department of Defense was
supplied by Intelsat Ltd. See Renae Merle, U.S. Probes Military's Use of Commercial
Satellites, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2002, at E5, availableat 2002 WL 103574491.
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maintain global connectivity. 28 3 For proponents of the principle of
global connectivity, the de facto devolution to the U.S. government of
legal authority to disrupt Intelsat Ltd.'s ability to serve every nation
on earth is a cause for concern. By the same token, however, the
degree to which INTELSAT's privatization exacerbated such a
concern should not be overstated. Even before privatization, the U.S.
government exercised tremendous influence on INTELSAT's decisionmaking and conduct. 28 4 Nonetheless, the United States never sought
to use that influence to advocate the exclusion or expulsion from
INTELSAT of any country or territory. Nor, since privatization, has
the United States sought to prevent the privatized Intelsat Ltd. from
providing service to any country. Indeed, by ratifying the ITSO
Agreement in 2000, the United States formally reaffirmed its
commitment to preserving universal global connectivity. 28 5 Since
2000, no U.S. elected official has publicly called for reconsideration of
28 6
that commitment.
Moreover, while privatization undoubtedly has enhanced the
ability of the United States to control access to the INTELSAT
satellite system, it bears remembering that, prior to privatization, the
same gatekeeping role formerly was performed by the INTELSAT
treaty organization itself. Recognizing that some form of gatekeeping

283.
See supra Part V.B.4.
284.
As the largest user of the INTELSAT system, the United States exercised
substantial influence within INTELSAT through its participation in INTELSAT
governance. See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. IX(f) (allocating certain
voting rights within INTELSAT based on each member country's investment share,
where investment share reflected each country's utilization of INTELSAT satellite
436-42 (1980)
transmission capacity); see also COMSAT Study, 77 F.C.C.2d 564,
(discussing the mechanism by which the U.S. government formerly participated in
INTELSAT's governance through its "instructional process"). On occasion, the United
States also influenced INTELSAT by threatening to withdraw from the organization if
it did not have its way. See, e.g., supra Part IV.A (describing the U.S. government's role
in influencing INTELSAT's decision to privatize in 1999-2000).
See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, arts. II(b)(i), IX(c)(i) (providing that
285.
State Parties to ITSO, including the United States, must ensure that the satellite
system formerly operated by INTELSAT maintains "global connectivity and global
coverage" post-privatization, including "non-discriminatory access to the ... system"
and continued service to "lifeline connectivity customers").
286.
During the same time period, in contrast, the United States formally
"unsigned" the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court. See Letter
from John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International
6,
2002),
Annan,
U.N.
Secretary-General
(May
Security,
to
Kofi
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm ("unsigning" the treaty). During the
same time period, various "U.S. officials and their political supporters urged the
unsigning of a number of important treaties that the United States has signed but not
yet ratified-such as the Kyoto Protocol, the Biodiversity Treaty, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the ILO Convention
on Race Discrimination in Employment." Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 2061, 2064 & n.15 (2003) (citing news accounts and press releases).
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is inevitable, some commentators have reasonably opined that
universal global connectivity would be better safeguarded by
internationalizing that gatekeeping function (as was done by
INTELSAT prior to privatization), rather than by vesting such power
in a single national government. 28 7 It must be noted, however, that
intergovernmental treaty organizations do not necessarily prioritize
the principle of universal global communications connectivity above
other political concerns. The charter of the recently formed African
Union, for example, expressly contemplates the disruption of
international telecommunications links as a permissible political
sanction against intransigent member nations.288 In this regard, the
African Union has followed the lead of the United Nations, whose
charter has long authorized the interruption of international
telecommunications links as an acceptable form of political sanction
28 9
against international aggressors.
Of course, the INTELSAT treaty organization-unlike the
African Union, the United Nations, or the United States-was never
empowered to impose political sanctions against individual
INTELSAT member countries. 290 INTELSAT was, however,
empowered to expel individual countries from membership in the

287.

See, e.g., Lyall, supra note 41, at 116-17.

The FCC as custodian of the U.S. interest is likely to listen to comments and
argument made by U.S. nationals, and the very nature of these proceedings is
culturally alien to most of the world and therefore their outcomes can be
difficult to accept . . . . [I]n licensing the FCC takes account of U.S. interests.
While it is true that it is supposed to have some regard to more general
interests, it would be preferable to have INTELSAT's licensing done with
regard to the world as a whole, and to leave national interests aside.
288.
See Constitutive Act of the African Union, Organization of African Unity,
art. 23,
2, July 11, 2000, 2158 U.N.T.S. 33 (entered into force May 26, 2001)
(providing that African Union Member States that fail to comply with the decisions and
policies of the African Union will be subject to sanctions, including "the denial of
transport and communications links with other Member States, and other measures of
a political and economic nature to be determined by the Assembly") (emphasis added),
discussed in Nsongurua J. Udombana, The Unfinished Business: Conflicts, the African
Union and the New Partnershipfor Africa's Development, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
55, 68 & n.81 (2003).
289.
See U.N. Charter art. 41 (providing that in response to a threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,
t]he Security Council may ...
apply . . . measures ...

call upon the Members of the United Nations to

includ[ing] complete or partial interruption of economic

relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations") (emphasis added).
290.
See INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 12, art. III ("INTELSAT shall have
as its prime objective the provision, on a commercial basis, of the space segment
required for international public telecommunications services of high quality and
reliability to be available on a non-discriminatory basis to all areas of the world.").
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organization. 291 While INTELSAT never exercised this power, it does
appear that the Peoples' Republic of China successfully exercised its
influence within the INTELSAT treaty organization to prevent the
Republic of China (Taiwan) from ever obtaining INTELSAT
membership. 29 2 Accordingly, by removing China from the
gatekeeping process, INTELSAT's privatization, in fact, has greatly
enhanced the ability of at least one territory, Taiwan, to obtain
service from INTELSAT's former satellite system. 293 Conversely,
while undeniably raising some concerns, to date the introduction of a
U.S. gatekeeping role has not actually impaired the ability of any
country or territory on earth to obtain service from the satellite
system now operated by Intelsat Ltd.
Moreover, certain developments since privatization have further
reduced the likelihood that the United States might seek to bar
Intelsat Ltd. from maintaining universal global connectivity.
Specifically, in addition to providing some services via non-U.S.licensed satellite space stations, 294 Intelsat Ltd. has also recently
begun to do the reverse: selling individual transponders located on
board its own U.S.-licensed satellites to foreign government users.
Thus, under an agreement negotiated in 2000, a telecommunications
295
operator controlled by the Norwegian government (Telenor A.S.)
purchased the permanent right to use one quarter of the transmission
capacity of the U.S.-licensed Intelsat Ltd. "10-02" satellite, which
became operational in August 2004.296 The 10-02 satellite is located

291.
See id. art. XVI(b)(i), (k) (setting forth the procedure for "involuntary
withdrawal" from INTELSAT of state Parties that "failed to comply with any obligation
under this Agreement"). This "involuntary withdrawal" procedure was never invoked.
292.
Interview with Yu-Li Liu, Professor, Department of Radio and Television,
National Chengchi University, College of Communication, Taipei, Taiwan (Sept. 29,
2002). The Republic of China (Taiwan) was never admitted to membership in
INTELSAT or ITSO. See ITSO Member Countries Web Page, http://tinyurl.com9bong.
Similarly, the Republic of China (Taiwan) also has never been admitted to membership
in the United Nations. See United Nations List of Member States Web Page,
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html.
293.
Interview with Yu-Li Liu, supranote 292.
294.
See supraPart IV.B.4.
295.
In September 2000, when it entered into the agreement with INTELSAT
described herein, "Telenor AS" was an agency of the Norwegian government, but had
already
initiated
a
process
of
privatization.
Telenor
History,
http://www.telenor.com/about/history/chronology/. Shortly thereafter, on December 4,
2000, Telenor was partly privatized, and its stock was listed on the Oslo Stock
Exchange. Id. The Kingdom of Norway, however, retained a 79% ownership interest in
the partly privatized Telenor. See In re Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications,
17 F.C.C.R. 14030, 3 at 14032 (2002).
296. In September 2000, before either INTELSAT or Telenor had been
privatized, INTELSAT leased to Telenor the right to use 10 high-power Ku-band
transponders located on the planned "Intelsat 10-02" satellite, for the entire life of the
satellite. See Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat and Telenor Launch New Satellite
Partnership at 359'E (Sept. 21, 2000), http://tinyurl.com/7v84y. Upon privatization of
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at 359°E, with spot beams that cover all of Europe and the Middle
East and much of Central Asia and North Africa. 297 Moreover,
Telenor uses its transmission capacity on the 10-02 satellite to serve
not just Norway, but also other territories throughout Europe and the
Middle East. 298 Similarly, in 2001 a telecommunications agency of the
Chinese government (SINOSAT) acquired the rights to use two Cband transponders on a planned Intelsat satellite then scheduled for
launch into, the 1780 E.L. orbital location. 299 In 2004, Portugal's
government broadcasting agency entered into leases to purchase
transmission capacity on three separate U.S.-licensed Intelsat Ltd.
satellites from 2005-2007.300
Selling or leasing transponders to foreign government users
cannot immunize Intelsat Ltd. from having to comply with U.S. laws.
Such activity can, however, interject diplomatic ramifications into
any decision by the U.S. Congress to enact legislation that would
hinder Intelsat Ltd.'s ability to fulfill its public service obligations.
Undoubtedly, some members of Congress might favor prohibiting
U.S. commercial communications carriers (including Intelsat Ltd.)
from serving "rogue states" such as Iran or North Korea. The same
members, however, might pause before enacting legislation that
would dictate to the governments of Norway, Portugal, or China, new

both parties, rights and obligations under this lease agreement were assigned to the
respective private successor entities, Intelsat Ltd. and Telenor Satellite Services
Holdings, Inc. The "Intelsat 10-02" satellite, which is U.S.-licensed, was launched into
orbit at 3590 E.L. (1° W.L.) in June 2004, and became operational in August 2004. See
Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat's IS-10-02 Satellite Launch Successful: Satellite to
Provide High-Power Coverage of Europe, Africa, South America and the Middle East
(June 17, 2004), http://tinyurl.com/7vump [hereinafter Press Release, Intelsat,
Intelsat's IS-10-02 Satellite]. At the time the satellite became operational,
approximately 50% of its thirty-six Ku-band transponders were owned by Telenor. Id.
(In addition to these thirty-six Ku-band transponders, the 10-02 satellite also carries
seventy operational C-band transponders). Id.
297.
See Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat's IS-10-02 Satellite, supra note 296; see
also Coverage Maps: Intelsat 10-02 @ 359°E, http://tinyurl.comc5hc5 (illustrating the
coverage of the satellite's spot beams in Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and
North Africa).
298.
See Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat's IS-10-02 Satellite, supra note 296.
299.
See Press Release, supra note 253; see also Paul Dykewicz, Further
ConsolidationAmong Operators Is Ahead, SATELLITE NEWS, Aug. 23, 2004, available at
2004 WLNR 839039 ("Sinosat acquired rights to use two C-band transponders
on... [an] Intelsat satellite at 178 degrees E."). Although Intelsat Ltd. to date has not
carried out its plan to launch a new satellite into the 1780 E.L. orbital location, in
August 2005 the FCC authorized migration of the existing "Intelsat 604" satellite into
that location. See Public Notice, FCC Satellite Policy Branch, Satellite Space
Applications Accepted for Filing, NO. SAT-00316 (Aug. 26, 2005), available at 2005 WL
2055950 ("Intelsat expects to have the INTELSAT 604 satellite at the 1780 E.L.
location in January/February 2006.").
300.
See Press Release, Intelsat, Intelsat to Provide International Distribution
for Radio e Televisao de Portugal (Sept. 10, 2004), http://tinyurl.comcj8jp.
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limitations on the permissible uses of satellite transponders that
those governments have already purchased from a U.S. company. In
response to Congress's enactment of such legislation, those foreign
governments, at a minimum, might raise a meritorious claim against
the United States through ITSO's dispute resolution process. 30 ' At a
maximum, those governments might lodge complaints with the WTO,
or might retaliate by enacting corresponding sanctions affecting U.S.international trade. Alternatively, those governments might simply
ignore any resale restrictions imposed by U.S. legislation, leaving the
U.S. government to face difficult choices about whether and how to
pursue enforcement. Because of these considerations, Intelsat Ltd.'s
practice of selling transponders on some of its U.S.-licensed satellites
to foreign government users may constitute a political safeguard that
contributes to protecting Intelsat Ltd.'s continued ability to maintain
global connectivity.
Finally, it must be noted that even if Congress should enact
legislation that effectively prevents Intelsat Ltd. and other U.S.international carriers from providing service to users located in
certain foreign countries, at this late date such legislation would not
likely cause any country to become disconnected from the global
commercial
nearly
250
In
2005,
grid.
communications
communications satellites operate from locations in geostationary
orbit above the earth.3 0 2 Correspondingly, almost every populated
land mass on earth falls within the "footprint" of at least six of these
commercial
Only thirty of these operational
satellites. 30 3

301.

See ITSO Agreement, supra note 117, art. XVI(a).

All legal disputes arising in connection with the rights and obligations under
this Agreement between Parties with respect to each other, or between ITSO
and one or more Parties, if not otherwise settled within a reasonable time, shall
be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Annex A to this
Agreement..
Satellites
in
Communications
Commercial
Boeing
Corp.,
302.
See
Geosynchronous Orbit, (updated Sept. 30, 2005), http://tinyurl.com/cvyta [hereinafter
Commercial Communications Satellites] (showing 248 commercial communications
satellites currently in geostationary orbit).
303.
See id.; see also COMSAT Non-Dominant Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 14083, 14117,
64 (1998):
A number of non-U.S. regional satellite providers can be used to provide
international video services. These systems and their regions include Arabsat
(Middle East), Eutelsat (Europe), Astra (Europe), AsiaSat and APStar (Asia),
and Palapa (Southeast Asia) ....

Also, a number of countries are served by

domestic satellite systems. These countries include Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Malaysia,
Mexico, Russia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and the United States.
Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand also obtain regional services
on their domestic satellites. (footnotes omitted).
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communications satellites, however, belong to Intelsat Ltd.30 4 Other
30 5
satellites, in contrast, are operated by the governments of Russia,
30 6
30 7
30 8
30 9
France,
China,
India,
and the Arab states,
none of which

304.
Compare Commercial Communications Satellites, supra note 302 (showing
248 commercial communications satellites currently in geostationary orbit) with
Intelsat Ltd. Satellite Coverage Maps, http://tinyurl.com/atj7z (showing thirty Intelsat
satellites currently in geostationary orbit). Under a merger plan announced on August
29, 2005, Intelsat Ltd. has proposed to nearly double increase the size of its fleet, to
fifty-three satellites, by acquiring the U.S.-licensed global fleet currently operated by
its longstanding rival, the PanAmSat Holding Corporation. See Press Release, Intelsat,
Intelsat and PanAmSat to Merge, Creating World-Class Communications Solutions
Provider (Aug. 29, 2005) (announcing proposed merger), http://tinyurl.com/admhl.
305.
Russia holds ITU registrations for three satellites that are owned and
operated by the Intersputnik International Organization of Space Communities, an
ongoing public international IGO originally established in 1971 by the former Soviet
Union. See Agreement on the Establishment of the Intersputnik International System
and Organization of Space Communications, 862 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force July 12,
1972) (establishing the Intersputnik treaty organization); see also Intersputnik
Organization
Web
Page,
http://www.intersputnik.com/company.shtml.
Today,
Intersputnik's 25 member governments include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Bulgaria, Cuba, Czech Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Georgia, Hungary,
India, Kazakhstan, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Kyrgyzstan,
Laos, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, Russia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen. See Intersputnik Members, http://www.intersputnik.
comlcountries.htm. In addition to operating three Russian-licensed satellites,
Intersputnik also participates in a joint venture with the U.S.-based Lockheed Martin
Corp. to operate a Belarus-licensed satellite (the LMI-1) located at 750 E.L. See In re
Lockheed Martin Corp., 15 F.C.C.R. 22910, 4 & nn.5-6 (2000).
306.
Among the many commercial communications satellites licensed in France
are those belonging to Eutelsat S.A., the private commercial successor entity of the
former European Telecommunications Satellite Organisation "EUTELSAT." See
EUTELSAT, Annual Report (1999), available at http://www.eutelsat.comleutelsat/
5_1.html. Originally formed in 1977 by the governments of Western Europe, the
EUTELSAT treaty organization was privatized on July 2, 2001, when its satellite
assets were transferred to Eutelsat S.A., a limited liability company established under
French law and headquartered in Paris. See id. at 3. As with INTELSAT, the
privatization of EUTELSAT left in place a residual treaty organization "to ensure that
Eutelsat S.A. continues to observe basic principles of pan-European coverage universal
service, non-discrimination, and fair competition." Id. From its fleet of twenty-three
satellites (eighteen owned and five leased), Eutelsat S.A. is technically capable of
serving up to ninety percent of the world's population Eutelsat Web Page,
http://www.eutelsat.com/about/1 1_1.html.
307.
See supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the Chinese-licensed
"Sinosat-l/ Intelsat APR-2" satellite located in orbit at 110.5 ° E.L). In 2005, without
Intelsat Ltd.'s involvement, the Chinese government launched its second satellite, the
Ku-band "Sinosat-2" satellite located above China at 134°E.L. Sinosat-2 Satellite Web
Page, http://www.sinosatcom.com/english/satellite/wx_2.htm.
308.
See supra note 270 and accompanying text (discussing the Indian-licensed
"Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-I" satellite located in orbit at 830 E.L.). In addition to the
"Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-1" satellite, the Indian government also operates nine other
commercial communications satellites currently located in fixed geostationary orbit.
See Indian Space Research Organisation, Indian National Satellite System (INSAT)
Programmes, http://www.isro.org/programmes.htm (setting forth launch dates and
orbital locations of the Indian government's Insat-lD, Insat-2A, Insat-2B, Insat-2C,
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would be bound to implement trade sanctions undertaken by the
United States for political purposes. 3 10 Moreover, many regions of the
earth now receive international telecommunications service via
transoceanic submarine fiber optic cable, which can provide many of
the same services as satellites. 311 Finally, if necessary to preserve
global connectivity or to protect lifeline users, Intelsat Ltd.
potentially could dispose of its interests in its Indian 312 and Chineselicensed 3 13 satellites, leaving the governments of India and China free
to operate those satellites unencumbered by adverse U.S. legislation.

Insat-2DT, "Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-I," Insat-3A, Insat-3B, Insat-3C, and Insat-3E
satellites).
309.
The Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ARABSAT) is a regional
intergovernmental treaty organization established on April 14, 1976 by the member
states of the League of Arab States. Arabsat Web Page, http://www.arabsat.com
aboutus/index.asp; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing
ARABSAT's first satellite launch in 1980). "ARABSAT is dedicated to enabling the
Arab World with a range of satellite-based communications services." Arabsat Web
Page, supra. ARABSAT operates three satellites currently in geostationary orbit above
the Middle East: the "ARABSAT-2B" satellite located in orbit at 30.5' E.L., and the
"ARABSAT-2A" and "ARABSAT-3A" satellites collocated at 26 E.L. See ARABSAT
Satellite Features Service Brochure, http://www.arabsat.coml downloads/pdf/brochures/
SATELLITEFeatures.pdf. At present, ARABSAT's Member states include Algeria,
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco,
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen. ARABSAT Member Countries, http://tinyurl.com/9f5z4.
Notably, four ARABSAT member countries-Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Syria-are
currently subject to various U.S. -international trade sanctions. See supra note 232 and
accompanying text. Should these sanctions ever be expanded to prohibit Intelsat Ltd.
from serving any ARABSAT member country, such a country would still be able to
remain connected with the world via ARABSAT.
310.
Indeed, the Russian-led Intersputnik treaty organization was originally
founded in 1971 precisely in order to provide an alternative to INTELSAT. See
Intersputnik Web Page, http://www.intersputnik.coml. Today, Intersputnik continues
to hold itself out as "an open intergovernmental organization that can be joined by any
state." Id. Notably, Intersputnik's twenty-five member countries include three-Cuba,
North Korea, and Syria-that are currently (and perennially) subject to various U.S.international trade sanctions. Compare supra note 305 and accompanying text (listing
Intersputnik member countries), with supra note 232 and accompanying text (listing
countries currently subject to U.S. -international trade sanctions). Should U.S.international trade sanctions ever be expanded to prohibit Intelsat Ltd. from serving
Cuba, North Korea, 'or Syria, those countries would still be able to remain connected
with the world via Intersputnik.
311.
See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
312.
See supra note 270 and accompanying text (discussing the Indian-licensed
"Insat 2E/ Intelsat APR-i" satellite located at 830 E.L., which is a joint venture of
Intelsat Ltd. and the ISRO, an agency of the Indian government).
313.
See supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the Chinese-licensed
"Sinosat-lf Intelsat APR-2" satellite located at 110.5 ° E.L, which is a joint venture of
Intelsat Ltd. and the government of the Peoples' Republic of China).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The transformation of INTELSAT into a profit-seeking
commercial entity inevitably has raised concerns about whether the
privatized successor entity will continue to be willing-and
financially able-to serve high-cost, low-volume lifeline users around
the world. These concerns are not without force. Particularly with
respect to lower-middle-income nations that do not qualify for lifeline
connectivity protection, privatization may not provide as strong a
guarantee of affordable service as was formerly provided by
INTELSAT's uniform pricing policy. Nonetheless, the safeguards
discussed in this Article collectively ensure that the privatization of
INTELSAT should not deprive qualified lifeline users of basic
international telecommunications service at affordable rates. Under
the LCO commitments that Intelsat Ltd. has executed with lifeline
users, service to such users cannot be reduced or curtailed. Moreover,
under FCC regulatory rules that now apply to Intelsat Ltd., the rates
charged to lifeline users must decline by no less than four percent
annually. While explicit subsidies have not been introduced, Intelsat
Ltd.'s business model appears viable and capable of supporting the
company's public service obligations. And if the company should fail,
any successor who obtained control of the satellites would continue to
be bound by Intelsat Ltd.'s public interest obligation. For these
reasons, in theory and in practice, these safeguards substantially
ensure that no individual user's economic ability to obtain such
service has been diminished by the privatization. Moreover, the
market competition on many international routes that privatization
has facilitated-and will likely continue to facilitate-is likely to
produce costs savings and other economic benefits for users
worldwide.
The transformation of INTELSAT into an ordinary U.S.-licensed
satellite system, subject to the laws and policies of the United States,
has also given rise to reasonable concern that the U.S. government
might someday seek to restrain the privatized Intelsat Ltd. from
continuing to serve certain geopolitical rivals of the United States, or
certain U.S.-defined "rogue states." At present, existing U.S. statutes
and treaty obligations appear to foreclose such an eventuality. These
statutes and treaty obligations deny the U.S. President and his
administration the legal authority to unilaterally impose sanctions
that might threaten global connectivity. Unlike the President,
however, the U.S. Congress has authority to repeal existing statutes
and to breach or abrogate existing U.S. treaty obligations. Moreover,
U.S. courts would likely uphold Congress's authority to regulate
Intelsat Ltd.'s provision of service to customers located outside the
United States, via non-U.S.-licensed satellites. Thus, as a matter of
law, Intelsat Ltd.'s ability to serve every nation on earth is not
entirely secure. As a practical and political matter, however, because
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several of Intelsat Ltd.'s satellites are operated as joint ventures with
foreign governments, the U.S. government could not implement trade
sanctions threatening Intelsat Ltd.'s ability to serve "rogue states"
without potentially creating diplomatic difficulties with U.S. allies or
trading partners. Moreover, even if the U.S. should adopt such
sanctions, the redundancies in coverage that are now provided by
several non-U.S. satellite systems ensure that no country need ever
international
obtain
to
unable
wholly
themselves
find
telecommunications service in the wake of INTELSAT's privatization.

